This paper proposes a linear quadratic approximation approach to dynamic nonlinear rationally inattentive control problems with multiple states and multiple controls. An efficient toolbox to implement this approach is provided. Applying this toolbox to five economic examples demonstrates that rational inattention can help explain the comovement puzzle in the macroeconomics literature.

We assess the impact of fiscal and monetary policy shocks on US survey-based consumer expectations within states of low and high public debt. Following an unexpected increase in government spending, consumption intentions rise in the low-debt state and fall in the high-debt state. Overall, such a shock has adverse effects on expectations in high-debt states. Similarly, contractionary monetary policy shocks induce pessimistic expectations in the high-debt state but not in the low-debt state. The estimated responses suggest that higher public debt fuels considerations regarding its repayment, giving rise to state dependencies in the updating of expectations in response to both fiscal and monetary policy shocks.

We model agents' endogenous updating of information sets over time under changing macroeconomic conditions. Building on sticky information models, the degree of inattentiveness is endogenized by allowing agents to choose between a costly full-information predictor and a costless sticky-information predictor. This is modeled as a choice between discrete alternatives under rational inattention. Recursive simulation shows that the dynamic equilibrium paths of aggregate variables are highly persistent and match the moments of U.S. data better than a model with fixed sticky information or with sticky prices, especially with regard to higher moments and the degree of persistence. Predictors are chosen in line with the predictions from rational inattention models, as the aggregate degree of attentiveness increases with rising variance of the forecast variable. Moreover, the model can generate hump-shaped impulse responses of inflation to a monetary policy shock if the degree of inattentiveness is sufficiently high.

Empirical literature provided convincing evidence that explicit (i.e., legislated) inflation targets anchor expectations. I propose a novel game theoretic framework with generalized timing that allows us to formally capture this beneficial anchoring effect. Using the framework I identify several factors that influence whether and how strongly expectations are anchored, namely (i) the public's cost of decision making, (ii) the public's inflation aversion, (iii) the slope of the Phillips curve, (iv) the magnitude of supply shocks, (v) the degree of central bank conservatism, and under many (but not all) circumstances, (vi) the explicitness of the inflation target.