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Chapter 6 is the third of three chapters laying a basic foundation in German law and politics. The chapter describes the system of German legal education, which aims to develop Einheitsjuristen (a complete of full jurist). The chapter then presents the basics of German (private law) legal methodology. Finally, the chapter considers the expectations and mythology of German legal actors (judges and lawyers) by considering the standards used to exclude some former East German judges and lawyers from the legal profession (in a lustration process) after reunification.
This paper calls for the lawyering profession – which is often viewed as unabridged – to be reframed into two distinct occupations: legal aid practice and private practice, to better incorporate the divisions in labour. In order to better understand contemporary legal aid work and its workers, the hidden realities must be unveiled from behind their private counterparts, which opposingly signify wealth, professionalism, autonomy and privilege. Set within a context of crumbling professional identities, a shrinking industry and financial constraints, the paper draws on ethnographic and interview data. It finds that those working in legal aid undoubtedly face a more stagnated, under-resourced and precarious working environment, which means that their professional experience is vastly different from their private counterparts. Likewise, those in the field face toxic narratives from the government, the media, the public, and their private counterparts alike, resulting in persistent discourse of vilification. Ultimately, it calls for a refocus of legal aid work as a separate vocation due to its altruistic underpinnings, unique ‘professional’ identity, and values.
The closed material procedure (CMP) – ever since its introduction to English law – has been subjected to a very significant amount of academic criticism. But over time, the CMP has become increasingly settled as a fixture in English law. Whilst the existence of the CMP per se in English law seems settled, the extent of its deployment is not. Given this development, it seems important and constructive to examine whether – and the conditions under which – a CMP can ever be normatively justified, all things considered. Two propositions will be made. First, a common argument for the CMP – the maximising argument – does not demonstrate that the CMP is normatively justified, all things considered, for it does not sufficiently mitigate the two main objections to the CMP, based respectively on the principles of natural justice and open justice. Secondly, where the clear advantage variation is deployed – ie when a CMP allows the excluded party to make use of material that: (a) clearly advantages him; and (b) would otherwise be unavailable for the court's consideration – both objections are sufficiently mitigated. In such a case, the CMP is normatively justified, all things considered. This constitutes a limited normative case for the CMP.
Proactive transparency in the form of electronic provision of documents is required by law in the EU. It has long been acknowledged in law and technology studies that digital technology can have legal consequences when implemented to perform a legal function. Consequently, the technological design of document registers has the ability to limit as well as enhance access to documents. When technology can have such regulatory powers, incorporating it into a legal function requires closer attention as to how or why it is so. This article will provide a close analysis of the European Commission’s main Register of Documents (RegDoc) to study the implications of technological design for access to documents. Transparency is approached through a procedural view, highlighting its mechanisms. The article uses a HCI based walkthrough method for the case-study artefact critique of the RegDoc. The main findings suggest that there are two specific affordances of the RegDoc that limit access, especially for users who do not have pre-existing knowledge of the documents they are searching for. These affordances are, first, the scope of the dataset and, second, searchability. Overall, designing technology for legally relevant functions should take into account the wider legal framework that the technology aims to cater for. Attention should be paid to the affordances that can make a legal difference in a technology created to perform a legally relevant task.
Judges communicate outside of the courtroom on a regular basis. They give speeches at universities and to societies; appear before select committees; write for a range of publications; and engage in both media and outreach activities. Existing literature has charted the value and perils of such extrajudicial communication. This paper contributes an explanation of what motivates judges towards such communication, and what shapes their discourse. The work draws on 13 semi-structured interviews with senior serving and recently retired judges, along with an extensive range of examples of judicial speech beyond the bench. It argues that extrajudicial communication is shaped by a shared conception amongst the judicial community of what is appropriate. This conception of propriety is principally motivated by a communal pursuit of sustaining public confidence in the judicial office. The conception also informs the limits of appropriate discourse and establishes the ramifications for breach.
“Constitutional values” is a term which appears to relate to concepts of what is now called public law. By constitutional values, I mean the basic ideas and interests which structure relations between the individual and the state, and the obligations to which they give rise, which underlie the common law and to which it gives recognition in more or less articulated forms. These are ideas and interests such as liberty, private life, freedom of expression and access to justice. Constitutional values and human rights overlap, but they are not necessarily and always the same, either in content or in effect. In exploring this topic I hope to retrieve and bring to the surface an important aspect of the common law in terms of both private law and public law.
This chapter considers public decision-making and children’s rights. Government action is essential to providing the legal, social and economic conditions in which children are protected from violations of their rights and provided with the environment in which they can thrive. Nonetheless, significant challenges remain in creating and securing consistent and practically effective protection for children’s rights in public law. The privatisation of many public services that affect children can create an accountability gap in which responsibility for children is fragmented. Further, any of the rights that are most important to children have a clear basis in international law, but a more uncertain foundation in domestic law. Finally, consideration of children’s interests in public decision-making and legislating is patchy, with no systematic means of reviewing policy or legislation for compatibility with children’s rights. This chapter considers these challenges before looking specifically at the issue of child poverty.
Edited by
Seth Davis, University of California, Berkeley School of Law,Thilo Kuntz, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf,Gregory Shaffer, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington DC
The familiar description of fiduciary law erases European and US imperialism. There is no discussion of the ways in which fiduciary law framed imperial struggles over political and economic power. There is no mention of the roles that fiduciary law played in various European empires and the US Empire between the late fifteenth century, when imperial expansion began, and the time of rapid decolonization in the 1960s. This chapter is a summary of a political economy of fiduciary law and imperialism that I hope to develop at length and in detail. My argument is that the familiar description of the economic structure of fiduciary law is incomplete. So too is the autonomy-enhancing account of fiduciary law. Fiduciary law, I want to argue, may enhance exploitation to facilitate market exchange. It provided an ideological justification for imperial expansion in the interests of opening up trade between peoples. Fiduciary law, moreover, played institutional roles in the financing, administration, and oversight of imperial exploitation and the facilitation of trade among those who benefitted from it.
Edited by
Seth Davis, University of California, Berkeley School of Law,Thilo Kuntz, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf,Gregory Shaffer, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington DC
This introduction presents the book’s framework for the study of the transnational legal ordering of fiduciary law. It notes the key conceptual tools of TLO theory (such as normative settlement and the recursivity of law) and explains how these tools bear upon analytic, normative, and sociolegal inquiries into transnational fiduciary law. The introduction discusses the role of framing problems in fiduciary terms in transnational legal ordering, the potential, but uneven, formation and institutionalization of fiduciary law transnationally, the recursive, transnational development and limits of fiduciary law over time, the conceptual frontiers of transnational fiduciary law, and the contributions of the book’s chapters. The conclusion presents the book’s principal findings regarding fiduciary law and its relation to theorizing transnational legal ordering.
With the advent of globalisation and the ubiquity of modern technology, the world has become increasingly interdependent, and a seamless transnational flow of commodities and capital is gradually erasing national boundaries. Constitutional ideas too are not immune from this globalizing force. Mark Tushnet has projected that constitutional systems all over the world will ‘inevitably’ converge ‘in their structures and in their protections of fundamental human rights’. There are multiple pathways to such constitutional convergence. The changes can arise exogenously, for example when new constitutions are imposed by foreign powers on domestic states, or when countries are coerced into accepting constitutional change in exchange for economic or military aid. Other constitutional changes can occur endogenously, for example the domestic legislature relies on foreign materials to amend its constitution, or domestic judges incorporate comparative legal materials when interpreting their local constitutions. This chapter focuses on Asian developments. Specially, it seeks to explain why Taiwan and South Korea – two liberal democracies – are converging with the West on constitutional jurisprudence, while authoritarian states like China and Singapore – deeply suspicious of Western values – remain outliers and have diverged from this cosmopolitan constitutional project.
This chapter offers two contributions to this collection. Its first part is dedicated to a conceptual overview of the nature and use of legal transplants. A concept central to comparative law, this is concerned with the movement of legal doctrines between legal systems in all fields of law. An overview of some of the central studies of legal transplants is ordered thematically, providing typologies of existing analyses of the nature of legal transplants sorted under several categories that range from the type of influence of foreign doctrines, through the motivations of such transplants, to the outcome of a transplant. This part also emphasises that the transplantation process is an ongoing, multi-participant exercise. The second part complements Caffera, Momberg and Morales’ chapter in this volume, which is concerned with legal transplantation in private law. In this part, I offer an example of the ways in which public law doctrines emerge and are subsequently transplanted into domestic systems, sometimes with limited, if any, attention to the particularities of public law concepts as they apply in different systems. The analysis of the movement of the ‘margin-of-appreciation’ doctrine is but one example of the highly complex nature of the movement of law around the world.
Rapid and radical digitalization and the “fourth industrial revolution” are generally associated with progress, but also pose significant risks to privacy rights and democracy. This article proposes a public law reading of the South African Constitution to respond to the dangers posed by disruptive technological change, in light of the constitution's rights-orientated and rule-of-law-centred approach to interpreting the right to privacy. It examines the legal resources available in the South African legal system and, specifically, its constitution. The article emphasizes the way South African privacy jurisprudence infuses the right to privacy with the value of dignity, and how this allows an interpretation that sees privacy as a public, as well as private, right. The article concludes that this rights jurisprudence, alongside the constitutional principles of proportionality, subsidiarity and supremacy, has established a working foundation to articulate the right to privacy in a way that is suitable in the digital age.
The interpretation of administrative policies is of great importance in contemporary public law. The correct approach to policy interpretation has, however, been subject to insufficient academic scrutiny. The effect of policies is to provide guidance: not only to decision-makers, but also to stakeholders in the decision. Obvious stakeholders include the applicant or the individual who is the subject of the administrative decision, but the scope of potential legitimate stakeholders may go far beyond this. In matters of general interest, the broader public may be guided by policy (for instance, whether to object to a proposal during a consultation exercise, or on what basis to object). When considering how policy should be interpreted, the court should have regard to the extent of the appropriate audience of the policy, specifically considering how the least expert reader of the policy would interpret it. This ‘least expert reader principle’ will assist in answering difficult questions, such as whether the court should have regard to the underlying evidence base when interpreting a policy. The courts should rely upon, and express their reasoning by reference to, the least expert reader principle, in order to increase the transparency of judgments in the field of policy interpretation.
The merits and means of accommodating non-binary populations into UK law is becoming an increasingly important issue for policymakers, judges, scholars and legal professionals. Following Elan-Cane's Supreme Court challenge to binary passport sex markers in 2021, the UK Government face another challenge this year concerning non-binary recognition on birth certificates. While an additional third sex option is perhaps the most well-known reform option for the current binary system, other options have been suggested, including additional multiple sex options and/or removing sex from the birth certificate. While scholars and policymakers debate the merits of these, little is known about non-binary people's own preferences towards these options. This paper therefore presents original empirical data on non-binary attitudes towards these options, demonstrating the various perceived opportunities and drawbacks of each, and reflecting on the possible consequences of reform.
The Attorney General for England and Wales is the Government's Senior Law Officer who, inter alia, initiates certain kinds of legal proceedings. She is also a politician: a member of the House of Commons or the House of Lords and appointed to Government by the Prime Minister. This paper considers the Attorney General's role in initiating contempt proceedings against fellow politicians. I detail a number of cases where politicians have been involved in potential contempts by publication. I argue that, in such cases, the Attorney General's position may amount to an actual or perceived conflict of interest and may breach the principle that justice should be seen to be done.
This Element contends that regulators can and should shame companies into climate-responsible behavior by publicizing information on corporate contribution to climate change. Drawing on theories of regulatory shaming and environmental disclosure, the Element introduces a "regulatory climate shaming" framework, which utilizes corporate reputational sensitivities and the willingness of stakeholders to hold firms accountable for their actions in the climate crisis context. The Element explores the developing landscape of climate shaming practices employed by governmental regulators in various jurisdictions via rankings, ratings, labeling, company reporting, lists, online databases, and other forms of information-sharing regarding corporate climate performance and compliance. Against the backdrop of insufficient climate law and regulation worldwide, the Element offers a rich normative and descriptive theory and viable policy directions for regulatory climate shaming, taking into account the promises and pitfalls of this nascent approach as well as insights gained from implementing regulatory shaming in other fields.
The chapter questions whether Tolstoy’s ideology was weakening the legitimacy of imperial legality. Beginning with an overview of the state of Russia’s legal system, the chapter examines Tolstoy’s first encounters with the law as a student at Kazan University, his evaluation of public access to justice after the liberal reforms of the 1860s to 1870s, and his ideas of rule of law in general. Disappointed in law as a field of independent expertise, Tolstoy became more interested in true power, which he believed one could find in oneself by understanding the purpose of life. In order to obtain this power, he turned to literature, which he found to be much stronger than law. In his writing he could criticize both the social and political systems in which people participated and the way they had been conditioned not to recognize the horrors of these systems. The most disturbing example Tolstoy witnessed personally was people being forced to serve in the army during war and told that it was their sacred duty to kill. Believing, like his hero Jean-Jacques Rousseau, that the conditions of society corrupt people’s natural goodness, Tolstoy made it his mission to save people from such false ideas and actions being legally and socially imposed upon them.
In the same intellectual league as Grotius, Hobbes and Locke, but today less well known, Samuel Pufendorf was an early modern master of political, juridical, historical and theological thought. Trained in an erudite humanism, he brought his copious command of ancient and modern literature to bear on precisely honed arguments designed to engage directly with contemporary political and religious problems. Through his fundamental reconstruction of the discipline of natural law, Pufendorf offered a new rationale for the sovereign territorial state, providing it with non-religious foundations in order to fit it for governance of multi-religious societies and to protect his own Protestant faith. He also drew on his humanist learning to write important political histories, a significant lay theology, and vivid polemics against his many opponents. This volume makes the full scope of his thought and writing accessible to English readers for the first time.
Law can be divided into sets of binary categories. One such set consists of public law, which concerns such matters as the powers of governmental institutions, on the one hand, and private law, which concerns such matters as the relationships between private persons, on the other. Another set consists of civil law and common law. In civil law systems, which prevail in Europe, Latin America, and most of Asia, public law is largely found in statutes, while private law is largely found in civil codes. In common law systems, which prevail in England and former English colonies, in particular the United States, private law is largely made by courts, in the form of rules adopted in judicial decisions. American private law is largely made by courts because complex societies need a great deal of private law to facilitate private planning, shape private conduct, and facilitate the settlement of private disputes, and the capacity and ability of American legislatures to make private law is limited. As a result, American courts have two functions: resolving disputes and making law.
This article adds nuance to current understandings of the relationship between the populist leader and the public by using the concept of trust. Merging the literature on populism with the growing scholarship on trust from philosophy, psychology and other social sciences, it argues that following on from the populist leader’s appeals to similarity, the populist–public relationship involves an intertwining of two forms of public trust: the public’s trust in the populist and the public’s trust in itself (what we term ‘public self-trust’). Contrary to what political and constitutional theorists have recognized as a tension between public self-trust and the public’s trust in its political representatives, we contend based on the scholarship on trust that in the populist–public relationship these two forms of trust can be mutually reinforcing. This mutual reinforcement, we suggest, has the potential to create a positive feedback loop of public trust that, given the value of public trust to political leaders, empowers the populist.