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We explain and document state-level fiscal developments in American Southern states from 1820–1910, focusing on their main source of revenue, progressive property taxes borne primarily by economic elites. The fourteen states in our analysis were characterized by severe economic exploitation of the enslaved and later politically repressed African-descended population by a small rural elite, who dominated the region both politically and economically. While rural elites are thought to be especially resistant to taxation, we offer a set of conditions that explains the emergence of progressive taxation and provides a coherent account of the fiscal development of these states over this period. Using an original, archival data set of annual tax revenues and select expenditure items, we show that the economic interests of these rural elites and the extent of their formal (over)representation played a critical role in shaping the observed fiscal patterns within and across these states over this period. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This article argues that weak local governments increase levels of taxation by “borrowing” institutional capacity from certain types of businesses. While many businesses lobby against taxation, businesses that are locally owned, nationally connected, and logistically complex build robust associations that support taxation. These types of businesses benefit from improvements in public infrastructure, so they empower their associations to monitor members’ tax compliance and to pressure officials to uphold their spending commitments. The article demonstrates the necessity of business support for taxation in the absence of state capacity by comparing two Philippine cities that differ in their ability to tax despite a number of similarities between them. The case studies show that tax increases co-varied with business support, and that business support waxed and waned depending on over-time variation in the capability of business associations to discourage tax evasion and to enforce official commitments to spend on infrastructure.
We use a New Keynesian DSGE model with search frictions on the housing market to evaluate how financing a labor tax reduction by higher property taxation affects the real economy and welfare. Search on the housing market enables us to explicitly model stocks and flows, which is necessary to differentiate between recurrent property taxes (levied on stocks) and property transaction taxes (levied to flows). We find that using recurrent property taxation as financing instrument outperforms other instruments although all policy measures increase aggregate economy-wide welfare. Our simulations suggest that using property transaction taxation as financing instrument is the least favorable measure.
In housing affordability levels and volatility, there could hardly be a greater contrast than between the UK and Germany. Differences in history, institutions and policies are explored in this paper. Residential housing supply has been far more expansionary in Germany and mortgage credit more tightly regulated. A sensibly regulated rental market and stable German house prices have combined to leave the rental sector with over half of tenures. Policy failures in the UK have resulted in widening intergenerational inequality, increased social exclusion, adversely affected productivity and growth and raised the risk of financial instability. Policy lessons are drawn for the UK, which go far beyond the remit of the immediately responsible Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government.
This paper jointly models a landowner's decision to develop a parcel and the option to enroll that parcel in a current use assessment program. The analytical results highlight different factors that influence the effectiveness of a current use program in delaying development. The results also underscore the difficulty a local government might have in influencing the behavior of the landowner. Except for altering eligibility rules, a local government employing current use assessment has but two policy tools: a penalty for development and the property tax rate.
Financing local public goods is a major issue in many communities, especially those that have experienced rapid growth. This paper analyzes problems associated with locally collected real property taxes where the real property tax base is only revaluated at long time intervals. Using counties in North Carolina as the subject of the analysis, we find that effective real property tax rates fall between revaluations. We calculate that a system of taxing market values of real property at a constant legislated tax rate would have yielded additional annual revenues of $320 million for North Carolina counties over 1980 to 1995.
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