In this chapter, we consider exemplary damages and aggravated damages, remedies with a strong vindicatory flavour, as recognised by the High Court of Australia in Lewis v Australian Capital Territory.

Exemplary damages vindicate the plaintiff’s interests, but also explicitly punish the defendant for the wrong in question. Punishment is not commonly recognised as a central aim of private law. Some commentators have argued that it should not be part of private law. However, exemplary damages are said to validate the plaintiff’s feelings of hurt and anger arising from the contumelious nature of the defendant’s wrong. Such damages also perform a vindicatory function. The fact that the law punishes a defendant for the manner of his interference with the plaintiff’s interests signals the importance of those interests.

Chapter 6 is the third of three chapters laying a basic foundation in German law and politics. The chapter describes the system of German legal education, which aims to develop Einheitsjuristen (a complete of full jurist). The chapter then presents the basics of German (private law) legal methodology. Finally, the chapter considers the expectations and mythology of German legal actors (judges and lawyers) by considering the standards used to exclude some former East German judges and lawyers from the legal profession (in a lustration process) after reunification.

Comparing ancient societies allows us to observe the variety of relationships that prevailed between states — in different forms and at different scales — and their complex legal environments. This chapter explores five dimensions of this relationship. First, we examine the capacity of law to shape state power. While constitutional law, strictly speaking, was comparatively rare in the ancient world, we can yet observe various ways in which law, law-like practices and other cultural norms operated collectively to both empower and constrain the state. The second and third parts of the chapter look at the inverse relationship: state power over law and legal practice in the form of legislative powers and jurisdiction, respectively. In the fourth part, we turn from ideational aspects of state law to the structure of state legal systems themselves, particularly in the context of private or non-state legal practices. Here we focus on those domains of law in which the state was most intimately engaged, what was left to non-state actors and the engagements between both across a sometimes indistinct boundary. The final part of the chapter explores the role of law in legitimizing state power.

This Handbook brings together a global team of private law experts and computer scientists to examine the interface between private law and AI, which includes issues such as whether existing private law can address the challenges of AI and whether and how private law needs to be reformed to reduce the risks of AI while retaining its benefits.

This introduction presents the book’s framework for the study of the transnational legal ordering of fiduciary law. It notes the key conceptual tools of TLO theory (such as normative settlement and the recursivity of law) and explains how these tools bear upon analytic, normative, and sociolegal inquiries into transnational fiduciary law. The introduction discusses the role of framing problems in fiduciary terms in transnational legal ordering, the potential, but uneven, formation and institutionalization of fiduciary law transnationally, the recursive, transnational development and limits of fiduciary law over time, the conceptual frontiers of transnational fiduciary law, and the contributions of the book’s chapters. The conclusion presents the book’s principal findings regarding fiduciary law and its relation to theorizing transnational legal ordering.

This chapter explores the current landscape of Latin American legal systems from a private law and public law perspective. The aim is to show the influences that have shaped each of these fields and their current state of development. The focus is on countries which are leading jurisdictions within the region, or that represent a particular trend or characteristic. Within the private law analysis, after a historical overview of the milestones in its formation process, some select topics are addressed. First, we consider how Latin American legal systems fit into the traditional categories of legal families; then, whether they can form a unique legal family; and, finally, current efforts to harmonise private law. The public law section centres on constitutional law and, in particular, on the New Latin American Constitutionalism (NLAC) movement. We identify the main features of the original NLAC Constitutions and then test them against the recent Chilean experience. The chapter concludes that interesting trends have developed within private and public law in the region but questions their distinctiveness and success.

There can be little doubt that foreign law has influenced the development of South American private law and that this continues to be the case nowadays. However, this chapter shows that even from the earliest stages of their historical development, these states did not merely copy legal solutions created elsewhere when receiving foreign influences. We adopt a historical perspective and a broad notion of legal transplants to expose foreign law’s influence over the shaping of South American private law and critically evaluate some dominant narratives. First, we analyse the various ways they have influenced the drafters of South American Civil Codes throughout the different waves of codification, as well as the strategies adopted. Afterwards, the inquiry moves to some particular subjects of South American contract law and traces various key shifts that occurred when shaping a liberalisation which, during the nineteenth century, went further than the contemporary European legislation: for instance, taking inspiration from Bentham. After that, we show an inverse movement during the last decades of the twentieth century, directed towards developing a more social conception of contract law, inspired mostly by the German and Italian Civil Codes, though not followed by all jurisdictions. It is concluded that although different European legal systems have informed South American private law, the result is an original blend that is a product of both the creative character of the solutions and the inspiration taken from sources not usually adopted elsewhere in the field of legal transplants.

The laws of the countries that emerged on the territory of the former Soviet Union show profound similarities due to a number of shared historical experiences. They have all been parts of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union and have all gone, simultaneously albeit not uniformly, down the thorny path of post-socialist transition. The resulting common legacies concern deep-lying features of legal method as well as central structures of substantive law. The codification movement, institutional design, way of functioning and the role of the judiciary, and the extent of the professionalisation of law and the flaws of legal academia as well as the current state of property law and the law of legal persons provide prime examples. Disregarding these continuities results in distorted images based, in particular, on overemphasised formal similarities to the civil law family. Therefore, joint consideration of the formerly Soviet, but also formerly tsarist and formerly post-Soviet countries, remains an indispensable tool of legal comparison.

This chapter shows how thin the legal-economic analysis of property law has been and responds to a few particular arguments in that field, including arguments about the general structure of property law, adverse possession, and dead-hand control.

This chapter describes the motivations for an analytical, “internal” critique of the law-and-economics movement. In particular, it discusses earlier types of critiques and shows that, while they are probably successful on their own terms, they have done little to dislodge economic-style thinking as a dominant force in American private law. Instead, a critique on the law-and-economics movement’s own terms is needed. The chapter also identifies several recurring problems, or “antipatterns,” in legal-economic reasoning.

This chapter summarizes the problems of the law-and-economics movement and tries to outline new ways for economic thinking to make a more lasting contribution to law.