In the late 1960s, Brezhnev aimed to downplay the East–West ideological divide, prioritizing practical relationships over ideology. Worsening relations with China, demonstrated by the 1969 border clashes, heightened Moscow's fears of China. The prospect of an economic bonanza tempted the Soviets to reach out to France and West Germany in search of trade deals and access to markets. However, as this chapter shows, it was Nixon's visit to Beijing in February 1972 that awakened Brezhnev to the imperative of engaging with the United States. Despite America's ongoing war in Vietnam, he went out on a limb to host Nixon in Moscow. Brezhnev subsequently discovered that he and Nixon had much in common. He then strove to end the Cold War on terms that would approximate a Soviet–American condominium. This chapter argues, however, that the contradictions between the Soviet desire for American recognition and the Soviet quest for revolutionary legitimacy weakened the prospects for genuine superpower detente.

The year 1968 brought a powerful affirmation of West Germany’s uniquely stable economy and society, with ripple effects across Western and Eastern Europe. Chapter 6 opens by explaining how the Grand Coalition pursued reforms that reinforced West Germany’s commitment to price stability and economic growth. When youth protests escalated in 1967–68, driven in large part by anger over U.S. and West German policies toward Greece, Iran, and the war in Vietnam, German workers declined to join in – a stark contrast to the turmoil in neighboring France. Speculators rushed to sell French francs and buy up German marks, touching off a currency crisis. Western finance ministers converged in Bonn demanding that West Germany raise the mark’s parity value – yet Bonn refused, an unprecedented display of independence. Meanwhile, the “Prague Spring” raised hopes of West German credits for Czechoslovakia, perhaps via the Bundesbank; and German visitors poured in. When the Soviet bloc invaded, de Gaulle blamed the Bonn government for provoking it. Yet the main takeaway in Moscow was that West Germany, clearly Europe’s strongest economy, could become a significant economic partner.

This chapter examines the key political events of 1960s Europe, focusing on how different local conditions shaped the possibilities of activism. Beginning with a consideration of student radicalisms in Poland and West Germany, it moves on to events in France and Czechoslovakia. Whereas the French May saw a temporary but powerful alliance between students and workers, the Prague Spring was crushed by a Soviet invasion. Yugoslavia, too, saw attempts to regenerate socialism along the lines of workers’ democracy, but in a context where “self-management” was official (but unrealized) state doctrine. Hungary continued to suffer under the effects of its own aborted attempt to steer toward industrial democracy. In Italy, student and industrial militancy reached a pitch equaled nowhere else in Europe. Right-wing dictatorships in Spain, Greece, and Portugal repressed but failed to fully subjugate emancipatory movements of students and workers. Portugal saw a massive and sustained antiauthoritarian explosion that placed it at the forefront of European revolutionary movements. Activists pursued a “politics of truth” that challenged official lies and put forward emancipatory counternarratives.