The chapter introduces strategic opportunity as the analytical approach guiding the book. China’s strategic opportunity is defined by the national goals and ambitions as set by the Chinese leadership, the opportunities and risks presented in the international environment, and the policy instruments and resources at the nation’s disposal. The chapter first shows how the concept is anchored in the reformist Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s assessment that peace and development were the predominant trends in the world. It then explains why the concept provides an appropriate and innovative approach to the study of Chinese foreign policy. Finally, the chapter investigates how Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping has launched a major-power diplomacy seeking to effectively deploy its newfound resources to reshape its international environment. It also lays out the salient causal beliefs and policy patterns behind the assertive Chinese foreign policy and concludes with a summary of the contents of the book.

This chapter recapitulates IST’s central assumptions and predictions, as well as the findings from the case studies. It identifies a number of empirical patterns emerging from the cases, which suggest areas for future research. The chapter also identifies alternative methodologies for testing IST and concludes with a discussion of IST’s implications for theories of power shifts and international order. Finally, it discusses the policy implications of IST for the future of the liberal international order.

This chapter draws lessons from the historical account offered in Part I of Before the West for contemporary debates in International Relations, especially those having to do with the crisis of the modern international order. It argues that broadening our temporal and geographical horizon helps us think about how ‘world orders’ come about and how they are replaced. IR has focused too much on the decline of ‘great powers’ and, until recently, barely thought about the decline of ‘world orders’. The story of Eastern world orders show us that orders often decline not because of what great powers do but because of larger, more structural crises. Furthermore, we should pay more attention to the health of the social fabric that holds our order together: 'the East' did not decline materially until much later but lost its social cohesion. This chapter shows that the 'decline of the East' has been misconstrued as being material. The chapter also offers a defense of using macro-historical narratives in service of IR theory and some guidance for how to approach such comparisons (e.g. in thinking about the transhistoricity of fundamental concepts).

Leading explanations for the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 using international relations theory adopt some version of the “rise of Japan” narrative. The focus of these studies is to explain the outbreak of war in 1894 as a result of the disruption in the systemic status quo or as an early warning signal toward Japan’s expansionism by highlighting the newly acquired military power and status of Japan – and the challenge this posed to China. Rather than treating the war as a purely bilateral interstate conflict, I instead characterize the clash between China and Japan in the late nineteenth century as part of a series of militarized crises involving multiple stakeholders from both in and out of the region during the breakdown of the treaty port system in East Asia. I also show how the Sino-Japanese War had both immediate and enduring consequences for East Asian international relations: intensified strategic competition over East Asian territories among not only Japan and China but Western powers such as Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States.

This chapter shows how conflict between the American hegemon and a rising China led to the collapse of the Doha Round (2001–11) and the breakdown of the WTO’s core negotiation function. At the center of the Doha standoff, I argue, is a dispute between the US and China centered on how China should be treated in the multilateral trading system. China has maintained that, as a developing country, it should be entitled to the special and differential treatment (SDT) promised to developing countries. The US, however, is unwilling to extend such treatment to its chief rival, and therefore refused to conclude the round without greater market opening from China. China rejected American demands that it undertake additional liberalization concessions, and, in doing so, showed that it has sufficient power to refuse to concede to US demands that it views as fundamentally against its own development interests. The US has a long track record of successfully overpowering opposition in multilateral trade negotiations and securing assent for its desired outcomes. Yet, in contrast with the past, the US has been unable to overpower China, and this deep and lasting impasse between the two powers resulted in the collapse of the Doha Round.

The American hegemon’s ability to exercise power in and through international institutions has been sharply constrained by the rise of China. China has consistently thwarted US efforts to construct new global trade rules, producing a recurrent deadlock across a wide range of different areas of global trade governance. The rise of China and its resulting clash with the US is blocking global rule-making in trade and undermining the institutions designed to prevent global trade wars. The China paradox—the fact that China is both a developing country and an economic powerhouse—has created significant challenges for global trade governance. The issue of whether, and how, the rules of the multilateral trading system will apply to China is proving to be a difficult and intractable source of conflict. While China demands exemptions from global trade disciplines as a developing country, the US refuses to extend special treatment to China and insists on universal rules and reciprocal concessions. This fundamental conflict over how China should be treated in the multilateral trading system, which has paralyzed global rule-making in trade, has profound implications—not only for the governance of global trade, but also for pressing issues related to global development and environment.

This chapter introduces the central argument and themes of the book and situates its contribution within contemporary debates regarding the rise of China and its impact on global economic governance. The book challenges two key prevailing views: (1) the US maintains its dominance in the international system, with China too weak to pose a serious threat to American hegemony; and (2) a rising China can be integrated into the US-led liberal international economic order. I argue that an important aspect of US hegemony to date—its ability to lead or dominate global institutions—has been severely undermined by the rise of China. If the US once “ran the system,” this book demonstrates the extent to which that has now been disrupted. China’s emergence as a counterweight to US power has sharply curtailed the US’s institutional or rule-making power. The US and China are engaged in a struggle over the rules of global trade, with each seeking to shape the rules to reflect and advance its interests. China has refused to defer to American power or simply be a rule-taker, but instead has repeatedly blocked the US from obtaining its objectives. US–China conflict is profoundly undermining global trade institutions and rule-making.