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2 results

  • 9 - Philosophy as Epistemology: Reply to Hacking and Kim

  • from II - Later Papers
  • Richard Rorty
  • Edited by W. P. Małecki, Chris Voparil
  • Book:
    On Philosophy and Philosophers
    Published online:
    10 October 2020
    Print publication:
    15 October 2020, pp 145-156

  • Summary

    “Philosophy as Epistemology: Reply to Hacking and Kim” replies to criticisms of Rorty’s work made by Ian Hacking and Jaegwon Kim. While both expressed some sympathy with Rorty’s rejection of foundationalism about knowledge, they believed, pace Rorty, that philosophy can still say something interesting about knowledge that other fields cannot say. The paper tries to show that these two positions cannot be consistently held at the same time. Philosophy can either have something distinctive and interesting to say about knowledge, but only at the price of succumbing to foundationalism, or it can avoid foundationalism, but only at the price of being unable to say anything interesting and distinctive about knowledge. The paper also addresses a few more specific points made by Kim and Hacking in their criticisms, clarifying, correcting or refining Rorty’s position on issues such as conventions, truth-makers, and hermeneutics, as well as on Kant and Foucault.

  • 13 - Richard Rorty: liberalism, irony, and social hope

  • Edited by Catherine H. Zuckert, University of Notre Dame, Indiana
  • Book:
    Political Philosophy in the Twentieth Century
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    29 August 2011, pp 198-212

  • Summary

    Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature was extremely successful, attracting a readership not only in philosophy but also across the arts and humanities. Although committed to the Enlightenment, Richard Rorty thinks it important to distinguish between what he regards as its two legacies: the philosophical and the political. By distinguishing between the philosophical and political elements of the Enlightenment, Rorty departs from classical liberalism. Rorty states that a society that has come to accept that justice is its first virtue will become accustomed to the thought that social policy needs no more authority than successful accommodation among individuals, individuals who find themselves heir to the same historical traditions and faced with the same problems. Rorty himself epitomizes the notion of the liberal ironist, ready to reread and revise the thinkers he encounters in order to offer redescriptions of issues in political theory and political life.