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  • 2 - Evidence and Religious Belief

  • from Part I - Faith and Rationality
  • Edited by Jonathan Fuqua, Conception Seminary College, Missouri, John Greco, Georgetown University, Washington DC, Tyler McNabb, Saint Francis University, Pennsylvania
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology
    Published online:
    24 August 2023
    Print publication:
    17 August 2023, pp 29-40

  • Summary

    This chapter offers an opinionated overview of the role of evidence when it comes to the justification of religious beliefs. After clarifying what is meant by “Evidentialism,” the chapter turns to an examination of two central objections that have been pressed against Evidentialist theories of justification. The first objection is that traditional Evidentialist theories make the justification of religious beliefs too difficult. The second objection is that more recent Evidentialist theories make the justification of religious beliefs too easy. A key finding of the chapter is that a form of seemings-based Evidentialism called “Phenomenal Explanationism” avoids both of these difficulties while providing a plausible account of the relationship between evidence and religious beliefs. Hence, although the chapter does not establish that Evidentialism is correct, it does provide reasons for thinking that Evidentialism should be seriously considered.