Existing literature argues that the tactics of Cameroon foreign policy have been conservative, weak and timid. This study refutes that perspective. Based on extensive and previously unused primary sources obtained from Cameroon's Ministry of External Relations and from the nation's archives in Buea and Yaoundé, this study argues that Cameroon's foreign policy was neither timid nor makeshift. Its strategy was one of pragmatism. By examining the nation's policy toward Nigeria in the reunification of Cameroon, the Nigerian civil war, the Bakassi Peninsula crisis and Boko Haram, the study maintains that, while the nation's policy was cautious, its leaders focused on the objectives and as a result scored major victories. The study concludes by suggesting that President Paul Biya invokes the same skills he used in foreign policy to address the ongoing Anglophone problem, a problem that threatens to unravel much of what the country has accomplished.

Based on primary sources, including documents obtained from Cameroon’s Ministry of External Relations, oral interviews conducted in Cameroon, and local newspapers, and a variety of secondary sources, this article examines Cameroon’s foreign policy and economic relations with China. It argues that Cameroon’s engagement with China has resulted in short-term benefits for consumers but undermined long-term, sustainable economic development. The article concludes that unless China genuinely pursues its promised policies of “mutual respect” and “win–win gain,” voices of protest will only grow louder in Cameroon and other African nations.