We quantify the importance of endogenous human capital and of selection effects for counterfactual analysis of social security (SS) reforms. The literature typically performs these analyses by using structural models featuring exogenous productivity profiles. However, this approach faces two issues: (i) the estimation of productivity is subject to selection bias, and (ii) productivity is endogenous to the SS reforms. In this paper, we estimate a quantitative overlapping generations model featuring endogenous human capital accumulation using US data. First, we eliminate the SS and find a large positive effect on aggregate effective labor supply (${+}10.31\%$). Next, we build variants of this model to quantify the two issues (i) and (ii). We find that the endogeneity issue (ii) is quantitatively more important than the selection bias issue (i).

Over the last 40 years, the massive increase in average years of schooling in developing countries was not accompanied by a similar increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. We investigate this apparent disconnect between education and growth by focusing on the role of education quality. We propose an overlapping generations model which features an endogenous tradeoff between quantity and quality of education. A policy that increases average years of schooling then has an ambiguous effect on long-run human capital and GDP per capita. We also consider a quantitative version of the model to understand the Latin American experience between 1970 and 2010.

Following the introduction of the one-child policy in China, the capital-labor ratio of China increased relative to that of India, while FDI/GDP inflows to China versus India simultaneously declined. These observations are explained in the context of a simple neoclassical overlapping generations paradigm. The adjustment mechanism works as follows: the reduction in the growth rate of the (urban) labor force due to the one-child policy increases the capital per worker inherited from the previous generation. The resulting increase in China’s domestic capital-labor ratio thus "crowds out" the need for foreign direct investment (FDI) in China relative to India. Our paper is a contribution to the nascent literature exploring demographic transitions and their effects on FDI flows.

This paper develops a general equilibrium life-cycle model with endogenous retirement that focuses on the interplay between old-age pensions (OAP) and disability pensions (DP) in Germany. Germany has introduced a phased-in increase of the normal retirement age from age 65 to 67 (Reform 2007) and closed off other routes to early OAP retirement. This reform was followed by a phased-in expansion of future DP benefits (Reform 2018). Our simulation results indicate that the first reform will induce a shift toward DP retirement, while the Reform 2018 will even neutralize the financial and economic gains of the Reform 2007 if current DP eligibility and benefit rules remain unchanged. We therefore highlight the increased relevance of DP when reforming the retirement system and retirement incentives in an aging society. Securing the financial stability of public pensions requires activation and rehabilitation of sick elderly in the workforce and tight access to disability benefits.

As the heterogeneity in life expectancy by socioeconomic status increases, many pension systems imply a wealth transfer from short- to long-lived individuals. Various pension reforms aim to reduce inequalities that are caused by ex-ante differences in life expectancy. However, these pension reforms may induce redistribution effects. We introduce a dynamic general equilibrium-overlapping generations model with heterogeneous individuals that differ in their education, labor supply, lifetime income, and life expectancy. Within this framework we study six different pension reforms that foster the sustainability of the pension system and aim to account for heterogeneous life expectancy. Our results highlight that pension reforms have to be evaluated at various dimensions. Reforms that may increase the sustainability of the pension system are not necessarily conducive to reduce the redistributive wealth transfers from short- to long-lived individuals. Our paper emphasizes the need for studying pension reforms in models with behavioral feedback and heterogeneous socioeconomic groups.

Homeownership rates differ widely across European countries. We document that part of this variation is driven by differences in the fraction of adults co-residing with their parents. Comparing Germany and Italy, we show that in contrast to homeownership rates per household, homeownership rates per individual are very similar during the first part of the life cycle. To understand these patterns, we build an overlapping-generations model where individuals face uninsurable income risk and make consumption-saving and housing tenure decisions. We embed an explicit intergenerational link between children and parents to capture the three-way trade-off between owning, renting, and co-residing. Calibrating the model to Germany we explore the role of income profiles, housing policies, and the taste for independence and show that a combination of these factors goes a long way in explaining the differential life-cycle patterns of living arrangements between the two countries.

This paper evaluates alternative reforms of the public pension system in an overlapping generations model for an open economy facing demographic change. We make progress compared to existing literature on pension reform by modelling individuals with heterogeneous innate ability and endogenous human capital, and by putting (the reduction of) welfare inequality effects of reform at the centre. Frequently adopted reforms such as an increase of the normal retirement age or a decrease of the pension benefit can guarantee financial sustainability, but they fail when the objective is also to avoid intergenerational or intragenerational welfare inequality. Our results prefer a reform which combines an increase of the retirement age with an intelligent linkage between the pension benefit and earlier labour earnings. First, this design conditions pension benefits on past individual labour income, with a high weight on labour income earned when older and a low weight on labour income earned when young. Second, this linkage is complemented by a strong rise in the benefit replacement rate for low ability individuals (and a reduction for high ability individuals).

Pensions may be provided for in a modern society by a mix of several methods, namely by voluntary individual savings, mandatory fully-funded occupational pension systems, mandatory social security financed by pay-as-you-go, and old-fashioned hoarding in cash. We call a specific mixture of the four systems a pension composition. We assume that individual workers decide on their own individual savings, that the fully-funded occupational system is decided upon by the age cohort of the median worker, and that social security is decided upon by the median voter. We assume that individual and collective pension savings are the only sources of capital supply. When capital supply equals demand from industry, there is equilibrium in the capital market with a corresponding equilibrium interest rate and pension composition. In this paper, we assume a demography with one hundred age brackets and we investigate how changes in the birth rates, survival rates, and the retirement age affect the pension composition and the capital market equilibrium. Our conclusion is that for a given technology, the pension composition and the interest rate are determined by the demography and cannot be modified at will as a long-term political instrument.

In a standard overlapping generations model, we show how the health effects of pollution impact the balanced-growth path (BGP) and the transition dynamics of the economy. The key driver is the differential between physical and human capital accumulation. The differential occurs because pollution alters the incentives to save and to invest in education via reductions in longevity and alters the effectiveness of education expenditures via impaired cognitive learning. Two predictions of the model are noteworthy. The first prediction is the existence of two stable BGPs with a separating saddle path. One BGP is desirable featuring high economic growth and low pollution, whereas the other should be avoided because it is associated with low economic growth and high pollution. The second prediction is that economic and environmental cycles may emerge, implying inequality between generations. These theoretical results are supported by empirical evidence and imply a role for government to steer the economy toward the desirable BGP and eliminate the cycles.

The aim of this paper is to study the role of the distribution of income by age group on the existence of speculative bubbles. A crucial question is whether this distribution may promote a bubble associated to a larger level of capital, that is a productive bubble. We address these issues in an overlapping generations model where agents live three periods and productive investment done in the first period of life is an illiquid investment whose return occurs in the following two periods. A bubble is a liquid speculative investment that facilitates intertemporal consumption smoothing. We show that the distribution of income by age group determines both the existence and the effect of bubbles on aggregate production. We also show that fiscal policy, by changing the distribution of income, may facilitate or prevent the existence of bubbles and may also modify the effect that bubbles have on aggregate production.

We construct and parameterize an overlapping generations model for an open economy with individuals who differ in innate ability. Key endogenous variables are hours worked, investment in human and physical capital, and per capita growth. The model replicates important data in Belgium since 1960 remarkably well. Simulating it, we observe that behavioral adjustments by households and firms contribute to reverse the negative arithmetical effect of future demographic change on per capita growth. Individuals work and study more. However, with unchanged policies, there remains a net negative effect on annual per capita growth of almost 0.3%-points on average in the next 25 years. This is mainly due to adverse consequences of reduced fertility and a declining working-age population on (the return to) physical capital investment. Model projections also point to rising income inequality induced by demographic change. Differences in the capacity of individuals to respond to increasing life expectancy by investing in education, and by saving, are key.

We set up an overlapping-generations model with endogenous fertility to study pensions policies in an ageing economy. We show that an increasing life expectancy may not be detrimental for the economy or the pension system itself. On the other hand, conventional policy measures, such as increasing the retirement age or changing the social security contribution rate could have undesired general equilibrium effects. In particular, both policies decrease capital per worker and might have negative effects on the fertility rate, thus exacerbating population ageing.

We formulate an overlapping-generations model with household heterogeneity and productive and nonproductive government programs to study the macroeconomic and intergenerational welfare effects of risk premium shocks and government debt reductions. We demonstrate that in a small open economy with a high level of debt, a small increase in the risk premium of the interest rate leads to a substantial contraction in output and negative welfare effects. We then quantify the effects of reducing the debt-to-gross-domestic-product ratio using a wide range of fiscal austerity measures. Our results indicate trade-offs between short-run contractions and long-run expansions in aggregate output. In the short run, spending-based austerity reforms are worse than tax-based reforms in terms of lost income. However, in the long run, spending-based reforms produce higher output than tax-based reforms. In addition, welfare effects vary significantly across generations, skill groups, and working sectors. The current old and middle-aged generations experience welfare losses, whereas future generations are beneficiaries of the reforms.

A challenge that faces many advanced economies is how to finance age-related spending programs as the population ages. In this paper, we investigate two policy options–pension cuts and tax hikes–to mitigate fiscal pressure arising in the special context of Australia, whose population is ageing fast while growing substantially in size due to immigration. Using a computable overlapping generations model, we find that while both policy reforms can achieve a similar fiscal goal, they lead to different distributional and welfare effects across income groups over time. Future generations prefer pension cuts, whereas current generations prefer tax hikes to finance government spending commitments. Moreover, within the tax hike option, taxing income or consumption results in opposing macroeconomic and welfare effects. Indeed, our opposing intra- and inter-temporal welfare outcomes highlight some political complexity when devising a more sustainable tax-transfer system.

By considering a simple endogenous growth model, we propose a new theoretical channel through which the presence of asset bubbles can promote economic growth. In the model economy, long-lived value-maximizing firms continuously improve the quality of their specific products through in-house research and development (R&D), while simultaneously new firms enter into the market. The key feature is endogenous market structure: The number of firms is endogenously determined, which leads to variation in firm size measured in terms of the scale of production at the level of an individual firm. The presence of asset bubbles unambiguously gives rise to larger firms. This allows in-house R&D expenditure to be spread over the greater numbers of goods that the firms produce, which can increase incentives to undertake in-house R&D.

The historical evolution of the EU–US unemployment-rate gap is often explained in the literature in terms of asymmetric changes in labor-market institutions. There may well also be asymmetries in population aging, which may generate international capital flows and have substantial impacts on relative unemployment rates. In this paper, we ask whether the combination of institutions, aging, and capital flows explains the rise in the unemployment gap between 1960 and 2010. To this end, we set up a two-region OLG model with search unemployment in which we introduce the historical and projected changes in labor-market institutions and demographics. We show that asymmetric institutional changes alone can reproduce a large part of the historical rise in the unemployment gap. However, this result no longer holds once we add asymmetric aging in closed economies. We find this initial result again, and in an even stronger form, when we allow for international capital mobility.

First generation immigrants to the United States have higher fertility rates than natives. This paper analyzes to what extent this factor provides political support for immigration, using an overlapping generation model with production and capital accumulation. In this setting, immigration represents a dynamic trade-off for native workers as more immigrants decrease current wages but increase the future return on their savings. We find that immigrant fertility has surprisingly strong effects on voter incentives, especially when there is persistence in the political process. If fertility rates are sufficiently high, native workers support immigration. Persistence, either due to inertia induced by frictions in the legal system or through expectational linkages, significantly magnifies the effects. Entry of immigrants with high fertility has redistributive impacts across generations similar to pay-as-you-go social security: initial generations are net winners, whereas later generations are net losers.

In an exogenous-growth economy with overlapping generations, the Cobb–Douglas production, any positive life-cycle productivity, and time-separable constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility, we analyze local stability of a balanced growth equilibrium (BGE) with respect to changes in consumption endowments, which could be interpreted as a transfer policy. We show that generically, in the space of parameters, equilibria around a BGE are locally unique and are locally differentiable functions of endowments, with derivatives given by kernels. Furthermore, those equilibria are stable in the sense that the effects of temporary changes decay exponentially toward ±∞.

I investigate a simple continuous-time overlapping generations model with a neoclassical production function. I demonstrate that the degree of wealth inequality is positively related to the difference between the real interest rate r and the growth rate of income g, and if g falls, the r – g gap widens and inequality worsens. I also argue that a wealth tax reduces the wealth inequality. All these results are consistent with the famous predictions advanced by Thomas Piketty in Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014).