This book argues that justice rather than taxes was at the foundation of representative governance. The historical origins of representative institutions are typically sought in a fiscal bargain that pitted resource-poor rulers against subjects recently empowered through the growth of commercial wealth. Such an approach, however, fails to explain why representative institutions would become regular (since taxation was irregular), how social groups solved their collective action problem in resisting the ruler, and how exchanges with resource holders extended to include the whole polity. Acknowedging the role of justice in the emergence of representative institutions allows us to address these concerns. This requires, however, first noting that outcomes of interest often originate in conditions that are inversely related. This is defined as the normative/empirical inversion and is examined in connection to the importance of central power, the constitutional separation of powers, and the security of property rights. In all, state power emerges as paramount in securing constitutional outcomes. The chapter thus also makes the case for England as a strong state. It then provides a summary of the argument and concludes with a discussion of the case selection.

The conclusion examines some broader questions raised by the analysis. It first discusses the pattern of the normative/empirical inversion noted throughout the book, whereby conditions associated with some desirable outcomes (e.g. separation of powers) are projected back into an account of origins. This is identified as a major obstacle in effective causal analysis. Second, the chapter examines a fundamental underlying concern of the book, the origins of power. Although no answer can be offered, it explains the implications of the book's argument to our understanding of despotic and infrastructural power, perhaps the most influential formulation in social science, as well as to the distinction between direct and indirect rule, which is shaping discussion of the state in varied literatures. Third, the chapter offers some thoughts about how the medieval account I have provided can be reconciled with the early modern accounts that have proved far more influential in explanations of state- and institution-building. I conclude with some shorter thoughts on the implications of the argument on the use of bargaining theory in modern development theory, on the popular notion of land redistribution, and on Huntington's problem of political order and instability.