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2 - Approaches to Inconsistency in the Philosophy of Science
from Part I - The State of the Art
András Kertész, Debreceni Egyetem, Hungary, Csilla Rákosi, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest
Book:

Inconsistency in Linguistic Theorising

Published online:

23 June 2022

Print publication:

07 July 2022, pp 9-29
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Summary

This chapter outlines the ways in which the philosophy of science handles the problem of inconsistency in scientific theorising. After raising this problem in ,will summarise the standard view of inconsistency in the analytical philosophy of science (SVI). In , we will touch on the break with the standard view of inconsistency in the analytical philosophy of science as initiated by Kuhn and continued by Lakatos and Laudan.will discuss the most recent trends that re-evaluate the emergence and the presence of inconsistencies in scientific theorising.will draw the conclusions that serve as guidelines for the next steps of our train of thought.