Ideophones – imitative words using the stream of speech to simulate/depict the rise and fall of sensory perceptions and emotions and temporal experiences of completiveness, instantaneousness, and repetitiveness – have been characterized as semantically empty and context-dependent. The research reported here tested a simple schematic for the semantic categories of Pastaza Kichwa ideophones by tracking neurological responses to ideophones categorized as VISUAL, MOTION, and SOUND. Seventeen native speakers of Pastaza Kichwa listened to audio clips of ideophones extracted from sentential contexts. Subjects’ neural activity was assessed using functional near-infrared spectroscopy. Results demonstrate that these posited semantic categories activate areas of the brain associated with visualization, motion, and sound processing and production, respectively. This suggests that these ideophones convey semantic information related to these concepts, independent of context. This contrasts with what would be expected by theories suggesting that ideophones on their own are semantically empty. The data give rise to questions regarding whether any language contains only sound ideophones that do not carry additional sensory information and whether ideophones in previous studies treated strictly as sound ideophones might require greater specification of their semantics, specifically from a multisensorial perspective.

The paper presents the current state of the art of research identifying the neurophysiological and neuroanatomical substrates of private speech, both in typical and clinical (or atypical) populations. First, it briefly describes the evolution of private speech research, which goes from classic traditions as the naturalistic and referential paradigms to the neurocognitive approach. An overview of the neurophysiological (e.g., event-related potentials or ERPs) and neuroimaging techniques (e.g., functional magnetic resonance imaging or fMRI) is also presented. The next three sections review empirical works about the neurocognitive basis of private speech, across three groups of techniques: ERPs; fMRI/MRI; and other neuroimaging techniques (positron emission tomography [PET], magnetoencephalogram [MEG], and repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation [rTMS]). Such neurocognitive research analyzes the neural activity of individuals during a variety of task settings, including spontaneous and instructed overt and inner private speech use, subvocal verbalizations, and silent and overt reading. The fifth section focuses on electrophysiological and neuroimaging studies of private speech in atypical populations, for example: schizophrenia, pure alexia, hearing impairment, blindness, social phobia, alexithymia, Parkinson, and multiple sclerosis. The neurocognitive study of the various forms of private speech appears to be very promising in the understanding of these pathologies. Lastly, the advances and new challenges in the field are discussed.

We provide a threefold taxonomy of models in neurolinguistics: faculty models, which embrace the work of classical connectionists and holists and of such modern workers as Geschwind; process models, which are exemplified by the work of Luria, and which fractionate psycholinguistic tasks and ascribe the components to particular brain regions; and representational models, which use specific linguistic representations to build a psycholinguistic analysis of aphasic performance. We argue that further progress requires that neurolinguistics become more computational, using techniques from Artificial Intelligence to model the cooperative computation underlying language processing at a level of detail consonant with linguistic representations. Finally, we note that current neurolinguistics makes virtually no contact with the synapse-cell-circuit level of analysis characteristic of twentieth-century neuroscience. We suggest that the cooperative computation models we envisage provide the necessary intermediary between current neurolinguistic analysis and the utilization of the fruits of modern neuroanatomy, neurochemistry, and neurophysiology.

This target article presents a plausible evolutionary scenario for the emergence of the neural preconditions for language in the hominid lineage. In pleistocene primate lineages there was a paired evolutionary expansion of frontal and parietal neocortex (through certain well-documented adaptive changes associated with manipulative behaviors) resulting, in ancestral hominids, in an incipient Broca's region and in a configurationally unique junction of the parietal, occipital, and temporal lobes of the brain (the POT). On our view, the development of the POT in our ancestors resulted in the neuroanatomical substrate consistent with the ability for representations in modality-neutral association cortex and, as a result of structure-imposing interaction with Broca's area, the hierarchically structured “conceptual structure.” Evidence from paleoneurology and comparative primate neuroanatomy is used to argue that Homo habilis (2.5–2 million years ago) was the first hominid to have the appropriate gross neuroanatomical configuration to support conceptual structure. We thus suggest that the neural preconditions for language are met in H. habilis. Finally, we advocate a theory of language acquisition that uses conceptual structure as input to the learning procedures, thus bridging the gap between it and language.

The article analyzes the neural and functional grounding of language skills as well as their emergence in hominid evolution, hypothesizing stages leading from abilities known to exist in monkeys and apes and presumed to exist in our hominid ancestors right through to modern spoken and signed languages. The starting point is the observation that both premotor area F5 in monkeys and Broca's area in humans contain a “mirror system” active for both execution and observation of manual actions, and that F5 and Broca's area are homologous brain regions. This grounded the mirror system hypothesis of Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) which offers the mirror system for grasping as a key neural “missing link” between the abilities of our nonhuman ancestors of 20 million years ago and modern human language, with manual gestures rather than a system for vocal communication providing the initial seed for this evolutionary process. The present article, however, goes “beyond the mirror” to offer hypotheses on evolutionary changes within and outside the mirror systems which may have occurred to equip Homo sapiens with a language-ready brain. Crucial to the early stages of this progression is the mirror system for grasping and its extension to permit imitation. Imitation is seen as evolving via a so-called simple system such as that found in chimpanzees (which allows imitation of complex “object-oriented” sequences but only as the result of extensive practice) to a so-called complex system found in humans (which allows rapid imitation even of complex sequences, under appropriate conditions) which supports pantomime. This is hypothesized to have provided the substrate for the development of protosign, a combinatorially open repertoire of manual gestures, which then provides the scaffolding for the emergence of protospeech (which thus owes little to nonhuman vocalizations), with protosign and protospeech then developing in an expanding spiral. It is argued that these stages involve biological evolution of both brain and body. By contrast, it is argued that the progression from protosign and protospeech to languages with full-blown syntax and compositional semantics was a historical phenomenon in the development of Homo sapiens, involving few if any further biological changes.

This study examined the postulate that training production of syntactically complex sentences results in generalization to less complex sentences that have processes in common with treated structures. Three agrammatic aphasic patients were trained to produce wh-movement structures, object clefts and/or object extracted who-questions, while generalization between these structures was tested. One NP-movement structure, passive sentences, also was tested for control purposes. Wh-movement occurs from the direct object position to specifier position in the complementizer phrase [SPEC, CP] for both wh-movement structures. In who-questions movement occurs in the matrix sentence, whereas, in object clefts movement occurs within an embedded relative clause, rendering them the most complex. Results showed robust generalization effects from object clefts to matrix who-question for 1 participant (D.L.); however, no generalization was noted from who-questions to object clefts for another (F.P.), and 1 participant (C.H.) showed acquisition of who-questions, but not object clefts, during the baseline condition without direct treatment. As expected, none of the participants showed improved production of passives. These findings supported those derived from our previous studies, indicating that generalization is enhanced not only when target structures are related along dimensions articulated by linguistic theory, but also when the direction of treatment is from more to less complex structures. The present findings also support proposals that projections of higher levels in the syntactic treatment are dependent on successful projection of lower levels. For our participants, training movement within CP in a lower (embedded) clause resulted in their ability to project to CP at higher levels. (JINS, 1998, 4, 661–674.)