At the end of the Cold War, the United States came to pursue a policy of “liberal primacy” that would maintain America’s hegemonic status while expanding the liberal institutions that constituted the postwar international order. At least three important, long-standing questions persist about liberal primacy. First, was liberal primacy consistent with, or a radical departure from, US strategy during the Cold War? Second, how did the United States come to embrace primacy as a central objective of its foreign policy in the post-Cold War period? Finally, why did the United States choose specific strategies of expansion, especially its decision to enlarge NATO, rather than pursue other options like Partnership for Peace? We suggest that focusing on the legitimation of US foreign policy can shed light on these questions. Over the decades, US leaders have consistently invoked familiar liberal concepts and tropes to justify US foreign policy. From a legitimation perspective, there is much more continuity than change between Cold War and post-Cold War US foreign policy. We argue liberal legitimation made the post-Cold War strategy of primacy palatable both at home and abroad. Finally, liberal legitimating language bolstered the proponents of NATO expansion, clearing the path for expansionist policies.

The United States emerged as the world’s sole superpower from the embers of the Cold War’s end, without, however, a wholesale reformulation of the principles and tools used to execute US grand strategy. This was particularly true in Europe, where the United States remained engaged politically, economically, and military; retained significant numbers of forward-deployed forces; and orchestrated the continuation and eventual expansion of NATO. For the United States, and for many Europeans, continued American dominance after 1991 of the continent’s security through NATO was a logical outgrowth of what Washington had provided in the West after 1945. Even within the context of America’s leadership of NATO, alternative strategies to the ultimate path of NATO’s post-1999 enlargement were possible. These included the Partnership for Peace, initially seen as an alternative to NATO enlargement formulated by the Pentagon; some enlargement of NATO to the east, but not as much as occurred; and a concrete path for Russia to join the alliance. This chapter considers the pros and cons of each of these alternatives to the NATO enlargement policy chosen by the United States and its partners in order to provide a more detailed assessment of the policy than has existed previously.

Now that more than thirty years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is clear that, while some borders have disappeared, new fronts have appeared as well. And, rather than a “new world order,” a familiar antagonism between Russia and the West is once again asserting itself. Among the central points of dispute is the question of whether the West offered Moscow assurances in 1989-90 in the form of a NATO non-expansion guarantee. Diverging interpretations of this crucial development continue to hinder international understanding and dialogue. In this chapter, Sarotte draws on elements of her historical research into archives in six countries to present evidence on what actually transpired, and to discuss the following questions: To what extent do current challenges for European security policy still have roots in the decisions and commitments of the powers involved in the process of German reunification thirty years ago? How did the Clinton administration come to support full Article 5 NATO enlargement rather than NATO’s Partnership for Peace? And what can we learn from those events to address the challenges of today?