This chapter advocates an ethic of “symmetric interpretation” as a solution to the challenges outlined in Chapter 1. To prevent undue politicization of constitutional law, judges should favor, when possible, constitutional understandings that are “symmetric” in the sense of conferring valuable protections across both sides of the nation’s major political and ideological divides. By the same token, they should disfavor understandings that frame constitutional law as a matter of zero-sum competition between rival partisan visions. Favoring symmetric understandings in this sense will not always be possible. When it is possible, however, favoring symmetry may provide a point of common orientation for judges with differing policy preferences and interpretive outlooks. Reflecting this approach's inherent appeal, an inchoate preference for symmetry is already evident in judges’ opinions, oral argument questions, and reasoning.

In this final chapter, we take on an issue that perhaps precedes all the others: how and why did language evolve? Linguistic theory has recently pivoted to amass considerable research on these questions. As we’ve seen over and over in the book, simpler structures have been posited across frameworks to account for the need to explain how language evolved. However, in this book, we’ve seen many distinct approaches to understand human language. A view of language evolution that permits the pluralism of the book would be consistent with the broad approach of this work. Therefore, in this chapter, I want to turn the minimalist research agenda on its head with an alternative thesis: natural language is a complex system and its emergence is likely to have been prompted by multiple interacting factors. First, we assess the current state of the art in biolinguistics and the strong saltation claim that goes with it. Then, we challenge the assumptions that’ve resulted in the saltation picture of language evolution on evolutionary grounds. Lastly, a radical approach to language evolution in terms of complexity science is proffered based on a unique connection with systems biology.

Syntax is perhaps one of the most successful projects in the history of theoretical linguistics. It’s also garnered the most philosophical attention. Thus, this chapter focuses on syntactic metatheory. It surveys a number of prominent frameworks from minimalism to construction grammar, dependency grammar, lexical functional grammar and head-driven phrase structure grammar.The main aim is to find a common argument structure and strategy across diverse theoretical positions. In the tradition of recent work on scientific modelling in the philosophy of science, the approach that’s adopted in this chapter works from a bottom-up review of the cross-framework literature. I’ll make a case for a general explanatory strategy or scientific project at the core of linguistic syntax. The core idea is that this general scientific strategy is relatively stable across syntactic frameworks. In other words, the chapter aims to address the question of what minimalism, dependency grammar, radical construction grammar, head-driven phrase structure grammar, and lexical functional grammar have in common. The answer is a general formal strategy that focuses on rules in creating structural units, captures recursive phenomena, and, most importantly, treats syntactic information as explanatorily autonomous from other systems.

Bernstein’s fame, reputation, and personality have for the most part been seen as excessive and problematic. This perception militated from the start against his position in time, place, and tradition as a serious composer being influential or even accepted. Yet from the golden moment of opportunity for American composers in which he grew to adulthood to his barely noticed final works, he was following a diligent route of creative output that may yet bear fruit at greater distance from the man himself, though it would be difficult to claim that, taken as a whole, it has yet done so.

In Chapter 2, I develop and defend an account of human rights as universalist and minimalist. First, I characterize rights as universal, protecting all people universally and absent any qualifying characteristic. Second, I argue that the human right to subsistence is a basic human right. I argue that without enjoying the substance of the human right to subsistence, we will neither be able to enjoy the substance of any other, non-basic right nor pursue any other ends, moral, or non-moral. And third, in response to critics who believe that the universality of human rights entails remaking the world in our image (i.e., maximalism), I develop a minimalist account of human rights. According to minimalism about human rights, human rights should enable us to live minimally decent and autonomous lives. On these terms, human rights aim to protect people from the worst rather than to promote the best.

We need better economic ideas that encourage moderation in our consumption while tackling the underlying constraints of neo-liberal economics in sustaining life on Earth and solving the global inequality crisis. Minimalism and self-sufficiency declutter consumption practices and respect the limits of the living planet.

This chapter examines the music created by Hans-Joachim Roedelius, Dieter Moebius, and Michael Rother, under the band names Cluster and Harmonia. It makes the case that this music exists in a different relation to post-war Germany than that of Kraftwerk or Neu. Cluster/Harmonia created music deeply informed by the rural setting in which the musicians worked; in doing so, they engaged with one of the archetypal signifiers of German identity – the German landscape. The improvisatory nature of their work both allowed them to respond directly to the influence of their environment, but also created a template that proved very influential – not least on the work of Brian Eno (who collaborated with them in the mid-1970s).

In a seminal contribution, Paul Grice took what he called the ‘total signification of an utterance’ (i.e. the complete content someone communicates by a linguistic signal) and divided it in two, distinguishing between ‘what the speaker says’ versus ‘what the speaker implies’. However, recent developments have served to throw doubt on Grice’s taxonomy, with both sides of his divide coming under fire. I examine these challenges to Grice’s framework, but argue that they do not show that Grice’s notion of implicature is ill-founded, nor that his ’favoured sense’ of what is said is unnecessary. What they do serve to highlight is a peculiar tension in Grice’s original account. For it seems Grice merged two distinct features when defining what the speaker says versus what the speaker implicates: the idea of a content dictated by word meaning and structure alone, on the one hand, and the idea of an asserted or directly expressed proposition on the other. Yet once we resolve this tension it is possible to deliver an account of the total signification of an utterance which is both (fairly) faithful to Grice’s original account and which is able to do a great deal of explanatory work.

Chapter 1 provides some background on the shift in emphasis from Universal Grammar (UG) to third factors and gives a description of selected third factors, e.g. the Inclusiveness Condition and the Extension Condition. The main emphasis is on the Labeling Algorithm and the Principle of Determinacy. Generative models focus on the faculty of language as represented in the mind/brain. UG is the “system of principles, conditions, and rules” that all languages share through biological necessity. However, although UG received a lot of attention, recently principles “grounded in physical law” and the general “capacity to acquire knowledge” have been emphasized more. This chapter also introduces two main reasons of language change that are responsible for the linguistic cycle: those caused by economy and those by innovation.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of a number of theoretical proposals that have been put forward in the literature to account for language variation. It elaborates on models that combine formal generative theorizing and quantitative sociolinguistic methodology, in line with current minimalist analyses (Adger & Smith 2005; Sessarego & Gutiérrez-Rexach 2011; Sessarego 2014a). This chapter also stresses the importance of embracing a perspective of mutual complementation – rather than mutual exclusion – between these two fields, especially when the varieties under study consist of stigmatized vernaculars, for which it may be hard to obtain reliable grammaticality judgments and that may be characterized by high levels of inter- and intra-speaker speech variability (Cornips & Poletto 2005).

In this paper I first worry that Rorty’s attack on various conceptions of “the world” has an alarming tendency to veer from opposition to the kind of realism that he associates with various philosophers, such as Plato, Descartes, or even Kant, into skepticism about ordinary activities including those of observing things and referring to them. I try to uncover the roots of this slide in various semantic doctrines, and explore the distinction between minimalist or deflationist theories of truth, and any wider, and less plausible general doctrine of semantic minimalism.

This chapter begins (1.1) by looking at prescriptive and descriptive approaches to grammar, and at different sources of linguistic data. It goes on to discuss the approach to syntax in traditional grammar, looking at grammatical categories (1.2) and grammatical functions (1.3). 1.4 considers aspects of syntax which are potentially universal before going on to consider the nature of universals, the architecture of grammars, and the Strong Minimalist Thesis. 1.5 examines parameters of variation between languages, before turning to consider the role of parameter-setting in language acquisition, and outlining Principles and Parameters Theory (1.6). The chapter concludes with a summary (1.7), and a set of bibliographical notes (1.8). There is a free-to-download Students’ Workbook that includes a separate set of exercise material for each core section and a Students’ Answerbook. The free-to-download Teachers’ Answerbook provides detailed written answers for every single exercise example. The free-to-download Powerpoints provide a more vivid and visual representation of the material in each core section of the chapter.

The chapter begins by delineating the separate tasks of truthmaker theory and theories of truth. The two kinds of theories can be separated, and so are in principle distinct. However, history has not always treated them that way. It is proposed that one way of understanding the distinction between substantive and deflationary theories of truth is in terms of their contrasting relationship to truthmaking. It is then argued that truthmaking cannot be put to work in a theory of truth. Consequently, truthmaking motivates the rejection of substantive accounts of the property of truth. (It ultimately remains neutral regarding the substance of the concept of truth.) As a result, it is shown how correspondence theorists – traditional allies of the notion of truthmaking – are threatened by this book’s approach to truthmaking, whereas deflationists – who frequently see an opponent in the truthmaker theorist – have found a friend.