This chapter focuses on the ways in which English infantrymen understood duty and how their perceptions of their military role drew both on military and civilian culture. It underlines the differences between officers’ and other ranks’ understanding of their obligations. The army itself defined duty, like morale, as a set of ‘moral’ criteria. Officers’ duties were defined in their commissions and the King’s Regulations; their duty, at least to their men, was of an infinite nature. In contrast, the rank-and-file’s ‘contract’ with the military was finite and secular. In 1914, regulars viewed their job with a clinical and professional eye. However, for reservists and the civilian soldiers that followed them, the idea of ‘doing one’s bit’ came to dominate their perception of duty. Importantly, though, the cultural pressure of ‘respectability’ (drawn from both the military and civil society) informed their rationalisation of service. ‘Military cultures’ were also influential, particularly those of cheerfulness and obedience, which informed men’s actions, attitudes, and performance. What is more, the need to maintain ‘good character’ also exerted its own pressures. Men’s wartime record would influence their prospects once peace returned. Significant, too, was the soldiers’ perceived duty to England. After all, they were the defenders of the homeland.

RAR created a particular military culture in which its troops developed powerful bonds of soldiery loyalty to their regiment. This loyalty was created through the Rhodesian Army mimicking the invented traditions of British colonial regiments, which were historically successful in creating in-group solidarity among troops. In contrast to much received opinion, recruitment to the RAR was not dependent upon either ethno-regional or familial identity, and soldiers from all over the country joined the army for myriad reasons. Masvingo catchment area became important, although not dominant, in supplying recruits. Likewise, soldiering became a metier prevalent within certain families. By the onset of the war for Zimbabwe, the RAR’s soldierly potency had been greatly enhanced by operational experience. structure and ethos of the RAR underwent significant changes at the tail end of the Federation and after the Rhodesian Front’s rise to power. In particular, a new emphasis upon the counter-insurgency doctrine learned during the Malayan Emergency indicated a shift towards being deployed on COIN tasks within Rhodesia.

This chapter uses archival documents and oral history interviews to conclusively demonstrate that the Rhodesian Army was systematically racist, contradicting both Rhodesian-era and post-war neo-Rhodesian accounts. It also shows that some senior army officers and ministers blocked reforms of the army’s racist treatment of black soldiers and sought to retain systematic discrimination. reafter it argues that, despite the prevalence of racism within the army, it was not corrosive to the loyalties of black soldiers. In part, this reflected how the army’s practices of discrimination were less severe than those in other areas of Rhodesian life. It also reflected how the professional ethos of the Rhodesian Army also served to minimise the impact of racism upon black soldiers. Within the RAR, a distinctive military culture flourished that attempted to mitigate the racism of the wider army and society, founded upon adherence to a professional ethos. In this regiment, relationships between black and white came to be premised upon mutual respect and camaraderie in a way that differed from the rest of the army, and which enhanced the loyalties of black soldiers.

The present chapter provides a review and analysis of research on mental health stigma among military personnel. Given expectations of psychological resilience for military personnel, a large amount of research has been conducted to examine the antecedents and consequences of mental health stigma in this population. The chapter first provides an analysis of the different types of mental health stigma that have been examined, including their definitions and assessments. The chapter then addresses the antecedents of mental health stigma in the military, including demographics, mental health symptoms, unit factors, and personality/individual differences. The consequences of mental health stigma are then examined, including treatment- seeking intentions and treatment seeking, mental health symptoms, treatment dropout, and suicidal ideation. Training and interventions to reduce mental health stigma are then discussed. The chapter concludes with recommendations for future research, including a larger focus on unit/organizational factors that influence mental health stigma in the military.

This chapter engages with the neglected correlation between the religionization of the Israeli military and the religionization of politics. It is argued that we can identify four main stages of the relationship between the religionization of military and politics. During the formative period of the state and the military (1950s–60s), the partial religionization of the military reflected similar processes in the general society. In the second stage, following the 1967 War, the responses to the war’s aftermath strengthened ethno-national religionization. However, ethno-national religionization prompted the proponents of this process – the national-religious sector – to develop an extra-military avenue for upward mobility in the form of the settlement enterprise in the Occupied Territories. The third stage (1980s–90s) was characterized by the denationalization of Israeli politics with the Oslo Accords at its center, during which the national-religious sector increased its strongholds in the military by leveraging new opportunities created by the partial retreat of secular groups from the military as an avenue of upward social mobility. The fruits of this move were felt in the fourth stage (2000s), when the religionization of the military occurred in tandem with, and was bolstered by, the religionization of politics.

The emergence of organizational culture in the Israeli Defence Forces can inform scholars and practitioners how military cultures are formed and evolve, and how they shape organizational habits and patterns of actions in newly established military organizations. This chapter examines the vision, plans, and means the IDF’s early leadership deployed in a conscious attempt to create a shared pool of values and practices in the armed forces of the young State of Israel. It offers three different examples illuminating the dynamics of the IDF’s self-fashioned culture, defiantly independent and idiosyncratic from its very inception: the early emergence of an offensive approach in conventional and sub-conventional conflicts; the desire to learn from other armies but emulate none; and the IDF’s relations with the Israeli government characterized by agency and self-promotion. Together, these shed light on the IDF’s early organizational culture, imprinted into the organization’s cultural DNA and persisting many decades to follow.

The American Civil War presented an exceptional state of affairs in modern warfare, because strong personalities could embed their own command philosophies into field armies, due to the miniscule size of the prior US military establishment. The effectiveness of the Union Army of the Tennessee stemmed in large part from the strong influence of Ulysses S. Grant, who as early as the fall of 1861 imbued in the organization an aggressive mind-set. However, Grant’s command culture went beyond simple aggressiveness – it included an emphasis on suppressing internal rivalries among sometimes prideful officers for the sake of winning victories. In the winter of 1861 and the spring of 1862, the Army of the Tennessee was organized and consolidated into a single force, and, despite deficits in trained personnel as compared to other Union field armies, Grant established important precedents for both his soldiers and officers that would resonate even after his departure to the east. The capture of Vicksburg the following summer represented the culminating triumph of that army, cementing the self-confident force that would later capture Atlanta and win the war in the western theater.