This chapter will use the historical evolution of fiduciary norms in Japan and East Asia to examine the intersection of fiduciary law and transnational legal ordering theory. Various strands of fiduciary notions arrived in East Asia as part of modernization effort beginning in the late nineteenth century. The civilian regulation of conflicted transactions and duty of care was introduced in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan as part of Civil Code and Commercial Code, which was followed by statutory introduction of common law trust in early twentieth century, and American corporate governance theory after World War II. Singapore and Hong Kong adopted English common law and equity jurisprudence along with legislations that follow UK and Commonwealth models, which were frequently updated to meet the demands of international financial market. While tensions among common law, civil law, and indigenous norms were conspicuous during the early phases of modernization and reception, more recent decades of globalization have seen greater scale and dynamics of transnational interactions, most notably the rise of UK-style soft law initiative. Throughout the regional history, fiduciary norms have been shaped by shifting colonial pressures and economic hegemony, wars, revolutions, and financial crises, as well as legislative imitation and academic learning. By way of conclusion, this chapter argues that while fiduciary law presents a rich field for exploring process of transnational legal ordering, the theory of transnational legal ordering provides a valuable framework to understand both historical and contemporary evolution of fiduciary law both in individual jurisdictions and across jurisdictional borders.

Security is often a non-excludable public good. On the one hand, it benefits the people who buy it; on the other, it also benefits those who live near the people who buy it. It benefits those neighbors even if they refuse to share in the cost of the security themselves. Security also entails economies of scale. In part because of the positive externalities involved, people economize when they purchase security together. Rather than each pay to protect him- or herself, they save resources if they purchase their security together.

In 2006, the Japanese law of nonprofits underwent a major reform. Notably, the reform involved a shift in the governance mechanism from external governmental oversight to a structure that emphasizes internal fiduciary governance. As the Japanese law in this area has historically been marked by various strands of fiduciary rules derived from different sources, the event presents a valuable case study on how the shift to a fiduciary governance approach can impact the operation of those entities that are subject to the reform. This chapter will begin with a historical account of the evolution of Japanese nonprofit law that involves complex interactions among the indigenous nonprofit tradition, the civil law influence, American fiduciary principles, and the English-style charity commission. After discussing the major components of the 2006 reform against the backdrop of major events that created the reform momentum, this chapter will use available empirical evidence to critically examine the reform’s achievements and consider any remaining issues that pose ongoing challenges.