The chapter traces the development of police cooperation in Europe from the Napoleonic period to the Second World War and beyond. It shows that police cooperation was shaped to a considerable extent by individual initiatives and also by bilateralism, the latter still having an impact today. Even after the founding of the EU, regional interests or initiatives are decisive. In particular, the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, still very important for everyday police cooperation, goes back to an initiative of individual member states. Going beyond bilateral interests and police mentalities, it seems that the very nature of police work is less influenceable by common denominators such as the principle of mutual recognition. Thus, it is not surprising that, for example, the Directive on the European Investigation Order provides, with regard to cross-border covert personal investigations, a provision that does not go beyond its predecessor provisions. The article concludes with a stocktaking of the data exchange of Europes police forces, based in particular on the Schengen Information System. Considering the technical inclination of today’s police practice, the exchange of information will certainly have a decisive effect on any future developments.

It is shown that the form of an institution, its legal character, and membership do not determine procedural density.

The finding that the procedural density regarding an activity is zero is very prevalent in the sample. The reasons for this usually lie in low state interest, which is demonstrated via case studies of the European Advertising Standards Alliance and the Proliferation Security Initiative.

During coding, there were certain procedural steps which occurred more frequently than others but no distinct patterns of combinations of procedural steps. This leads me to assume that procedure as a design element is valued for its variety and flexibility.

Whether an activity is hard or soft law or somewhere in between greatly determines state interest in procedural justice. This is further explored via a case study of the Human Development Index.

Like the legal character, the exact characteristics of an administrative activity affect procedural density. This is illustrated using the different branches of the International Telecommunications Union and their procedure.

Of the different kinds of procedural steps, review is by far the least prevalent because it strongly affects state interests and often juxtaposes them with individual rights and interests. This is illustrated with comparative case studies of the Interpol Commission for the Control of Files and the ICANN Independent Review Procedure.

Procedural justice in the shape of procedural steps is a more flexible design tool than an institution's different organs. All things being equal, it is therefore preferred. This is demonstrated by the decentralized compliance monitoring mechanism used by the International Electrotechnical Commission.

The main findings from the empirical research are summarized.

Chapter 2 focuses on the assemblage work of UN1267 ISIL and Al-Qaida Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team – a small group of security experts supporting the Sanctions Committee to administer the list. It engages with the practical problem of how to target ‘global terrorism’, which has not yet been defined in international law. Drawing primarily from actor-network theory and governmentality scholarship, the chapter shows how the technology of the list itself plays a crucial role in rendering this problem governable. The practice of UN listing experts is analysed at two specific sites - in ‘consultation meetings’ with national security and intelligence officials directed at populating the list with potential targets and in collaboration with experts from other international organisations to make the list interoperable with global policing data (Interpol) and the passenger data held by the global aviation industry (ICAO and IATA). Such seemingly mundane technical practices usually escape academic attention. But this chapter shows how analysing expert knowledge practices, data infrastructures and governance devices (like the list) can reveal important insights into how global security law is being made into something powerful, durable and global.