The chapter assesses the Taiwanese leniency programme. Taiwan incorporated a leniency programme into the Taiwan Fair Trade Act in 2011. Since it became operational in 2012, the leniency programme has been used fifteen times. Out of these fifteen leniency applications, three applications have led to a decision. Noticing that financial rewards are not really assisting the leniency applications, the chapter investigates whether the low number of decisions could be attributed to the design of the leniency programme. This is done based upon the checklist of effective leniency programmes created by the International Competition Network. The main conclusion drawn is that the leniency programme may only be moderately effective. The chapter further argues that lawyers have identified the following elements as exacerbating the bad conceptualisation of the leniency programme: uncertainty about the calculation of the fines, access to the leniency dossier by third parties, and uncertainty on how the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission deals with cartel cases in general. Another concern that the chapter ascertains is the lack of awareness in Taiwan about the disputable character of cartels.

Malaysia’s competition law came into force in January 2012. Detailed guidelines on the leniency programme were published in October 2014. Despite the leniency programme being designed based on best practices found in more mature competition regimes and the International Competition Network, the leniency programme has been underutilised in the cartel cases investigated in Malaysia. The underutilisation of the leniency programme could be due to the enforcement agency having too many discretionary powers. Another reason could be the lack of immunisation from civil proceedings. De facto government oversight and spillovers from deterioration in the country’s state of governance in the past could also have affected the public’s perception of quasi-independent commissions. This is reflected in the perceptions of the business community of courts and corruption in the country.

This chapter sheds light on the international organisations that have been active in proliferating leniency programmes. This contribution includes the efforts of the OECD, ICN, UNCTAD and ASEAN. For each of these organisations, the chapter argues that they have a tendency to look for the common elements among existing leniency programmes and present them as an international guideline or best practice. When the existing leniency programmes diverge, the international guideline or best practice is to offer options. By not further clarifying these options, the chapter holds, the international organisations do no more than summarise local practices and pull them outside of their context. Due to this practice, convergence is unlikely to happen because, when the international guidelines or best practices are consulted, there will be an automatic reflex to also consult existing local practices and the existing literature regarding those practices.

This chapter situates the emergence of leniency programmes in competition law in the broader context of contemporary trends in business regulation. It is suggested that although leniency programmes are a distinctive form of regulatory intervention, they do exhibit a family resemblance with other regulatory mechanisms that have emerged in the last two decades in other fields of business regulation, and that similar trends, pressures and effects can be seen across different regulatory contexts. The four trends highlighted are a shift towards some form of negotiated justice, a new emphasis on regulatory experimentation, the creation of new forms of transnational legal risk, and the emerging importance of regulatory networks. The intention of this chapter is not to blur the distinction between these different developments, but rather to suggest that by locating leniency in the context of these broader trends, we can deepen our understanding of the significance of these developments.