This study investigates whether the International Safety Management (ISM) Code remains an effective regulatory tool for the shipping industry by analysing maritime accident statistics published for the last 32 years by the Korea Maritime Safety Tribunal, 24 years by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and seven years by the European Maritime Safety Agency. For this purpose, the data were divided into four groups: pre-ISM Code, in-transit, post-1 and post-2 periods, and tested by multilateral comparative analysis. The results show that the Korean merchant fleet has no improvement over the periods, whereas the world merchant fleet has a continual decrease in serious casualties. This study confirmed a trend of maritime accidents in recent years: fewer in number but heavier in damage. Conclusively, the results suggest that IMO and decision-makers in the maritime industry must review the ISM Code again and seek solutions to achieve the goal of continual improvement, as specified in the code.

Shipping is a safety critical industry where operational errors may lead to maritime accidents involving property damage, loss of lives and environmental pollution. As part of the trend towards self-regulation, the International Maritime Organisation has adopted a worldwide International Safety Management Code which made ship managers responsible for workplace health and safety. This study, based on interviews in two Chinese shipping companies, examines how ship managers use ship visits to monitor shipboard safety management. Interviews with managers from company offices and crew members indicated that managerial ship visits mainly take the form of inspections that focus on low-trust surveillance and disciplinary action rather than genuine support, being based on the safe person rather than the more effective safe place approach. From the perspective of crew members, because the managers visited ships only occasionally, they were unlikely to have sound knowledge of the specific situations and work routines on their ships. Consequently, managers’ interventions for safety compliance were seen by crew members as failing to address real risk factors, and leading instead to increased workloads, psychological pressure and fatigue, the very antithesis of safety management. Meanwhile a coherent, supportive system for reducing risk remains underdeveloped in the shipping industry.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the significance of the human element in accidents involving Greek-flagged ships, during 1993–2006, worldwide. In this context, the human element as a general factor of accident initiation and most importantly its constituent components, in the form of specific onboard duties (functions) and/or off-board (mainly ashore) entities, were presented and analysed. It was found that 57·1% of all accidents were attributed to the human element, whereas 75·8% of the latter were detected onboard and 80·4% of the onboard human-induced accidents were linked to errors and violations of the ship's master. Furthermore, since the timeframe examined covers the implementation of the ISM Code, the current analysis was aimed at producing valuable information with regard to its effectiveness upon Greek shipping. In this respect, a 12·2% reduction of human-caused accidents has been found during the post-ISM period. Finally, the association between specific accident types and human element components was examined utilising the technique of correspondence analysis and it was found that groundings and collisions were closely related to the ship's Master, whereas mechanical failures and fires were associated with the engine officers, and cargo shifts and flooding with bridge officers.