Innovations in the world of alternative finance such as online consumer lending, fund-raising platforms and cryptocurrencies are proceeding apace. In this article, we examine three historical case studies of newly emerged non-bank financial markets and discuss the possible implications for today's alternative finance markets. The first insight is that the private sector can generally be counted on to meet previously unmet needs. Moneylenders filled a gap unaddressed by the banking system of the day. Junior market IPOs provided access to funds for smaller companies that might otherwise have struggled to raise external finance. Private currencies replaced sovereign coins in transactions at various points in history. The second insight, however, is that new financial markets and instruments eventually attract the attention of regulators. Finally, these examples are a warning to industry not to take for granted that an initially laissez-faire regulatory regime precludes a stronger response at some point in the future. In all three cases, tougher regulation – in some cases even to the point of shutting down the products and markets concerned – arrived after long periods of observation and deliberation by the state.

Commission Regulation (EC) No 2273/2003 regulates price stabilisation activities for equity initial public offerings (IPOs) in Europe as a form of permitted market manipulation. To test the actual practices and effects of stabilisation we empirically analyse the support provided by underwriters of 141 Italian IPOs from 2000 through to 2008. We find that underwriters support the share prices not only by short covering, but also by posting pure stabilisation bids. Pure short covering is mostly used by more reputable underwriters for IPOs with higher institutional participation and more secondary shares in the offer, whereas the opposite is true for pure stabilization IPOs. We try to identify some patterns in underwriters' aftermarket activities and analyse the extent to which the stabilisation activity, permitted for four weeks after trading begins, produces temporary or permanent effects on share prices.

This article analyses, from a comparative law and economics perspective, the regulatory regimes for the stabilisation of share prices during IPOs in the United States and the European Union. Pure stabilisation, which is the principal form of stabilisation forms the focus of this study. With respect to ancillary stabilisation, i.e., the overallotment facility and greenshoe option, Germany and Italy are taken as examples for describing the concrete functioning of the discipline in Europe as compared to the United States. First, the article argues that the economic rationality of pure stabilisation may cast doubt on its effective use because of its high potential costs. Furthermore, a credible commitment problem of the syndicate's intervention may lead to a possible discrepancy between the ratio legis of the prospectus disclosure discipline and the ratio legis of the pure stabilisation activity. Second, the article shows that the judgement on the proper working of ancillary stabilisation crucially depends on the binding or non-binding character of investors' adhesions with respect to the final price setting, i.e., on something that is regulated by European law and national contract law.