In Australia and many other advanced economies, housing is playing a central role in accentuating and perpetuating inequality. This paper, drawing on primary and secondary data, discusses the various ways in which housing tenure in Australia contributes to wealth and income inequality. It argues that a neoliberal housing policy framework and accompanying financialisation of housing have facilitated a dramatic increase in house prices, the neglect of social housing, and a deepening wealth and income divide based on housing tenure. With respect to wealth, the key divide is between outright homeowners versus low-income private renters and low-income households in mortgage stress. The wealth of outright homeowners has grown substantially in recent decades and many have been able to acquire a holiday home and/or investment properties, thereby intensifying the wealth divide. Approximately a third of Australian households are now locked out of home ownership for an extended period or even lifelong. Housing tenure status also has an impact on the disposable income of households. For example, low-income outright homeowners are invariably in a far better position with respect to disposable income than their counterparts who have large mortgages or are private renters.

This paper adds to the literature by identifying the effect of home ownership on rural-to-urban older migrants’ labour market participation in China. Using the 2016 wave of the China Migrants Dynamic Survey, we find that older migrants who do not own houses are more likely to participate in the labour market than home owners. To alleviate endogeneity caused by the potential sample selection problem, the propensity score matching method is employed. Our results imply that home ownership can be used as a type of precautionary/retirement savings for older migrants, especially for the ones lacking in financial security. We also show that older migrants owning houses with a higher level of liquidity are less likely to participate in the labour market. It indicates that liquidity may significantly affect the effectiveness for older migrants to use home ownership as precautionary/retirement savings.

Cases might be valuable for more than the legal lessons they offer. This paper argues that cases present an archive of evidence that can help us reason backward to better understand the fissures in the ways humans interact and how our social, political, and economic systems generate tensions in their lives. More specifically, the paper looks through a small window into the lives of the people who find themselves caught between our collective and individual expenditure aspirations. It explores the circumstances in which individuals find that their outstanding tax debts pose a threat to their ability to maintain ownership of their home.

Housing is a platform of wealth accumulation in many home-owning societies. Ownership of assets often contributes to help people build social capital, influence their social participation and helps them access increasingly privatised goods and services. Such ‘asset-based welfare’ has been fashionable in Western academic circles, considering the ways in which housing could become a real or potential welfare resource. It may not, however, be such a novel idea from an East Asian perspective since the promotion of home ownership has always been embedded in the wider context of welfare provision in many parts of the region. Despite the argument that an increasing level of home ownership could potentially compensate for the erosion of family support, the sustainability of a home-ownership-based welfare approach has been questioned. At the forefront of ‘post-growth’ societies with societal ageing, recession, housing price volatility and neoliberal policy reforms, using Japan as a case study, this article examines the reasons and conditions behind the lack of success in commonly identified strategies of asset-based welfare in a regional context. The policy-driven market failures which supersede the cultural obstacles require re-examination.

In the welfare systems of East Asian countries, the income, care and other needs of older people have traditionally been met less by state social protection measures and more by the family, supported by what might be termed the first homeownership strategy: widening access to home ownership as a physical, emotional and financial basis of family wellbeing. Recent political, economic and demographic developments, however, have undermined this model. Examining policy responses in the three most advanced East Asian economies, Japan, Singapore and South Korea, but also with reference to Taiwan, the paper identifies common tendencies in the ways in which the ability to use home ownership has been strengthened. As a second strategy, home ownership has been used to reduce geographical constraints on family support, while, as a third strategy, governments have introduced mechanisms through which older people are able to realise some or all of the equity they have built up through the housing market. These mechanisms include, moving down market or even converting to a rental solution, as well as forms of reverse-mortgage products, some available through private financial institutions and some involving state-organised and state-operated devices.

This article explores the changing nature and patterns of the ‘generational contract’, with particular reference to the exchange of nursing care and housing assets between older parents and their adult children. Inheritance practices and attitudes are used to examine the ways in which socio-economic, demographic and policy changes have recently altered the conventional arrangements in Japanese society. The previously defined ‘generational contract’ is now ambiguous, and the expectations and obligations of different family members are fragmented. This article also discusses whether such practices in Japan are unique and the ways in which they differ from the English situation. Family obligations and inheritance have been more explicitly connected in the Japanese social and legal systems, while in England there is neither legal obligation to support older parents nor any constraint on inheritance. This article elucidates the similarities and differences in the patterns of inheritance and thus the exchange models between care and inheritance in the two societies.

Existing tenure trends amongst middle-aged households mean that the next two decades will inevitably see significant increases in the numbers of older home owners in Britain. This paper applies estimates of trends in home ownership amongst older households in England, broken down by age group and household type, to official household projections to derive detailed estimates of the number of older home owners up to the year 2011. Additional data are used to derive estimates of the type and age of dwellings which older home owners will occupy and the amount of unmortgaged equity which they will have available. The paper goes on to discuss the implications of these estimates for a range of policies and academic debates. In future, fewer older home owners will experience poor housing conditions but significant minorities of single older people, many of them women and households headed by a person aged 75 and over, will continue to do so. The amount and effectiveness of investment undertaken in middle age is a key determinant of the conditions experienced in later old age, and factors such as right-to-buy and involuntary early retirement from the labour market in the 1980s and 1990s recessions, will lead to an increase in the number of very old home owners experiencing poor conditions. There will be more demand for mobility but limited equity and the lack of moving opportunities will restrict the extent to which older home owners' aspirations can be realised. The paper concludes that older home owners will face a varied future in the post-Keynesian welfare state, with many pressures to use the wealth tied up in their dwellings to meet welfare needs.