It is known that without synchronization via a global clock one cannot obtain common knowledge by communication. Moreover, it is folklore that without communicating higher-level information one cannot obtain arbitrary higher-order shared knowledge. Here, we make this result precise in the setting of gossip where agents make one-to-one telephone calls to share secrets: we prove that “everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone knows all secrets” is unsatisfiable in a logic of knowledge for gossiping. We also prove that, given n agents, $2n-3$ calls are optimal to reach “someone knows that everyone knows all secrets” and that $n - 2 + \binom{n}{2}$ calls are optimal to reach “everyone knows that everyone knows all secrets.”

It has recently been argued that a sensitivity theory of knowledge cannot account for intuitively appealing instances of higher-order knowledge. In this paper, we argue that it can once careful attention is paid to the methods or processes by which we typically form higher-order beliefs. We base our argument on what we take to be a well-motivated and commonsensical view on how higher-order knowledge is typically acquired, and we show how higher-order knowledge is possible in a sensitivity theory once this view is adopted.

Some time ago I wrote a paper about conceivability and knowledge. An anonymous referee rejected it on the grounds that the result had already been established in a short story by Jorge Luis Borges. Intrigued, I looked for the story but found no mention of it in Louis and Ziche's extensive bibliography. I spent months consulting archives and electronic records to no avail. I had begun to doubt whether the story even existed when I had the curious good luck to encounter Sir Thomas Browne of Pembroke College, Oxford, who assured me of the piece's authenticity and introduced me to Brother Christian Rosenkreuz of Invisible College who in turn generously put me into correspondence with Borges himself. The literary defects in what follows reflect not a diminution of Borges's undoubted power as a storyteller, but merely my limited ability as an amateur translator. Whatever the translation's literary faults may be, I hope the story's philosophical interest—i.e., an argument that ideal conceivers have higher-order knowledge of necessary truths—remains. [Trans.]