The book’s introduction explains why the years 1963 to 1975 were a period of tremendous experimentation in German foreign relations. A succession of relatively weak chancellors gave scope for cabinet members to push in various directions, whether this involved voracious weapons procurement, a single-minded battle against inflation, more generous development aid, or a tighter commitment to European integration. Even in periods of political instability, developments in West Germany had great import for Europe and the world beyond. Historiographically, the introduction stresses the broader historical relevance of German foreign relations: its study reveals the contested values of postwar Germans and how those priorities came to shape the international environment. Methodologically, the chapter presents a brief discussion of constructivism as outlined by political scientists Alexander Wendt and Susan Strange. International relations theory informs the book’s core question – how West Germans shaped and were shaped by the international system.

Chapter 13 documents a shift in leadership as hard-nosed pragmatist Helmut Schmidt moved to the fore. The 1973 “oil shock” provoked disarray among the EC-9 as European countries adopted egoistic strategies to secure oil supplies. Bonn responded by putting the EC Regional Development Fund on hold, touching off a crisis in British–EC relations. Schmidt aligned German positions more closely with the United States, ending capital controls and embracing Henry Kissinger’s plan for Western energy cooperation. When Brandt resigned over a spy scandal, Schmidt assumed control of a confident West Germany that was managing the oil price spike smoothly – and used its influence (and a Bundesbank loan) to urge austerity measures on Italy. Schmidt forged a tight partnership with French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who endorsed many German economic views. Relations with the USSR soured due to disputes over Berlin, and also because of Bonn’s key role in thwarting communist gains in Portugal and Italy. As seen in German diplomacy toward Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, Schmidt’s Germany was defining a role as a stabilizing force on the European continent in cooperation with the United States.

Helmut Schmidt’s Germany helped to found several multilateral institutions in the mid-1970s. Chapter 14 opens with the European Council, a thrice-annual gathering of EC-9 leaders that reasserted the primacy of European nation-states over supranational governance. Schmidt reconciled with Britain, acceding to the Regional Fund in hopes of swaying a British referendum on EC membership. The CSCE summit, held in Helsinki, was a milestone for East-West détente – though Bonn’s relations with the USSR remained strained, even as improvements with Poland were achieved. The Federal Republic fell into recession, and Schmidt fretted about Global South proposals for a New International Economic Order. Bonn’s response was to court major countries individually, highlighting Germany’s interest in positive trade relations while loosening controls on weapons exports and nuclear commerce. Economic anxiety also animated Schmidt’s urgent demands on allies to cooperate in staving off protectionism. Informal coordination with Britain, France, and the United States became commonplace, a more structured grouping, the G-7 (adding Japan, Italy, and soon Canada), reestablished confidence in Western leadership.