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According to David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious just in case one is aware of being in that state via a suitable HOT. Jesse Mulder (2016) recently objects: though HOT theory holds that conscious states are states that it seems to one that one is in, the view seems unable to explain how HOTs engender such seemings. I clarify here how HOT theory can adequately explain the relevant mental appearances, illustrating the explanatory power of HOT theory.

Summary

This chapter discusses and elaborates upon the evidence for higher-order thoughts (or I-thoughts) in animals. It also shows that the higher-order thought (HOT) theory is indeed consistent with animal consciousness. The chapter argues that recent experimental evidence on animal memory and metacognition strongly suggests that many animals have the self-concepts and mental-state concepts necessary to form I-thoughts. It answers to the claim that having I-thoughts requires having thoughts (and thus concepts) directed at others' mental states. The stakes are high because if the HOT theory is true, any evidence indicating the absence of I-thoughts would also cast doubt on animal consciousness itself. The very concept of "consciousness" is notoriously ambiguous, but perhaps the most commonly used contemporary notion of a "conscious" mental state is captured by Thomas Nagel's famous "what it is like" sense.

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How Things Seem to Higher-Order Thought Theorists

10 - Animals, consciousness, and I-thoughts

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How Things Seem to Higher-Order Thought Theorists

10 - Animals, consciousness, and I-thoughts

Summary