The tradition of philosophical essayism beginning with Montaigne takes experience as its starting point, adopting a sceptical attitude towards grand philosophical systems and a priori truth. It was the favoured form of British empiricists, who looked to experience as the source of philosophical truth, and early analytic philosophers, who saw themselves as inheritors of the empiricist tradition and sought to avoid the perceived philosophical and rhetorical excesses of ‘continental’ idealism. Their adoption of the essay was accompanied by a view of writing, continued in present-day analytic philosophy, that stresses clarity, economy, and simplicity – virtues borrowed from the realm of mathematics and logic. But a tension, evident in Bertrand Russell’s work, emerges between fidelity to experience and fidelity to a mathematical model of clarity. This chapter argues that the notion of experience grounding the essay loses its philosophical richness in the analytic project.

Truth and content are theoretically prior in Frege to the act of judgment. Wittgenstein takes the opposite view, maintaining that truth is fundamentally correctness in judgment and that a content is fundamentally something to be judged. At Tractatus 4.063, Wittgenstein gives an argument against the Fregean position. Judgment can aim internally at truth, Wittgenstein holds, only if it is internal to truth that it is correctness in judgment.

In current analytic philosophy, Carnapian explication has become a prominent method and theme again, also under the names of conceptual engineering and mathematical philosophy. But there are questions about the reach and limits of this method, and in particular, about the goals for which it is appropriate. In the present essay, this topic is approached by reconsidering the origins of Carnapian explication, in the sense of its original inspirations and guiding paradigms.This leads to the following questions: What were the underlying goals in those cases, thus the function or functions explication was supposed to serve, and how did it serve them? Also, were those functions sufficiently stable and uniform to provide helpful orientation for us, both with respect to Carnap and current appeals to explication? Insofar as answers to those questions are not as easy as one might think, already because the relevant aspects often remain implicit, an important dimension of explication should be subjected to further clarification and critique. What is at issue here, at bottom, is the dividing line, insofar as there is one, between philosophical and scientific goals, and with it, between the methodologies appropriate for each.

This chapter summarises the main lessons gathered in the book. It explains that the arguments developed in the referentialist revolution, when properly understood, show that names have a Millian semantics. The main conclusions are that the metasyntactic interpretation of two-dimensionalism introduced in this book is the only form of descriptivism that remains compatible with this result, and that in turn the metasyntactic account will be compatible with an account of indexical thought inspired by David Lewis.

This chapter presents the descriptivist theories at the roots of contemporary semantics, and the epistemic puzzles about meaning which had led Frege, Russell, and Carnap to endorse them.

Reference is a phenomenon both of experience and thinking. It happens when a focal point for meaning is selected by the meaning-maker from the infinities of the world. The meaning – taking form as a mental representation, an act or object of communication, or an interpretation – “stands for” something in the world. Reference involves the specification of particular instances and general concepts, their circumstances as entities or actions, and their properties as qualities or quantities. Things in the world might be identified as entities or actions, though, by transposition actions may be construed as entities, and entities as actions. Entities and actions can be particular – a single instance – or multiple, defined in their generality as concepts. By transposition, by way of conceptualization, instances can be connected to the general. This connection of the instance to the general is by means of generalizable properties, including qualities and quantities.