Frank Knight's theory of monopoly price has received relatively little attention in the literature on Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. We argue that Knight accepted and refined the monopoly price theory of Carl Menger and his followers. Knight highlights the difference between monopoly as an inevitable outcome of departures from perfect competition, and monopoly as a contingent or ‘culture-history fact’. In the latter case, coercive institutional barriers to potential competition shape the choice set of consumers and producers, and provide a crucial method for identifying monopoly gains. There are three benefits to this account of Knight's contributions: it rehabilitates the focus on the institutional determinants of monopoly price, as opposed to the mainstream emphasis on market frictions and imperfections; it opens the way for a Mengerian monopoly price theory that seriously engages the study of institutions; and it adds new evidence and nuance to ongoing debates about Knight's place in economics.

The implications of Knightian uncertainty are frequently discussed in the context of market-based institutional settings. Given money prices, entrepreneurs can engage in calculative action, in conjunction with ‘judgment’, to guide decision-making and bring about a coordination of production plans with consumer preferences. However, if the existence of Knightian uncertainty is ubiquitous and applies to all human action, then what are its implications in non-market institutional settings? This paper explores questions related to the implications of Knightian uncertainty for two important non-market institutional settings: democratic government and the nonprofit or philanthropic sector, where there is an explicit lack of monetary calculation, yet nonprofit and political entrepreneurs still must use ‘judgment’ to deal with Knightian uncertainty. For instance, what are the implications of private property and privatized cost in the case of nonprofits versus the absence of private property and socialized cost in the case of democracy, in the presence of Knightian uncertainty? Which group of ‘consumers’ is likely to have their preferences satisfied when it comes to nonprofits (benefactors or beneficiaries) and democratic government (voters or lobbyists)? The paper, thus, points to the importance of further research on the implications of Knightian uncertainty in the hard case of non-market institutional settings.

In Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (RUP), Knight (1921) develops a theory of the firm that stresses the important role of entrepreneurial judgment for a firm's success. For Knight, entrepreneurial judgment is first and foremost the selection of ‘proxy entrepreneurs’ who are capable of making good judgments under uncertainty. In this sense, entrepreneurial judgment is essentially ‘judgment of judgment’. An overlooked implication of Knight's position is the fact that it leads to an endorsement of distributed entrepreneurship and responsibility. We deem this a very modern idea that challenges a completely hierarchical understanding of the firm. Knight himself does not thoroughly examine the institutional implications of the analytical framework he sets up in RUP. In this paper, we summarize the ‘philosophical vision’ of Knight's framework and illustrate his rationale behind the distribution of entrepreneurship. We conclude the paper with a discussion of potential institutional implications by referring to the danger of monocultures, the additional value created by cognitively diverse teams, and the effectiveness of venture capitalists.

This paper evaluates the contribution of Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit to the development of economic theory in the 20th century. Our argument in this paper is twofold. First, we contend that this book embodied what had been the common knowledge of early neoclassical economics prior to World War II (WWII). Second, we also argue that embryonic to Knight's account of economics were two divergent approaches to economic thought that emerged after WWII. The first approach, what has come to be known as microeconomics, is characterized by utility maximization under fixed price, income, and institutional parameters that approximate equilibrium. This first approach is distinct from a second approach, referred to as price theory, in which prices are not sufficient statistics, as in microeconomics, but operate as guides to consumption and production decisions under alternative institutional arrangements. This second approach not only represented the continuation of the mainline1 of economic thought from its classical and early neoclassical roots. It also embodies the basis for Knight's understanding of uncertainty, profit and entrepreneurship, as well as its implications for economic organization and social progress.

Formal economic models of entrepreneurship have two characteristics: they model entrepreneurship as an allocation of resources, and they identify common factors affecting this allocation. These common factors are represented as parameters of optimization models, and they are evaluated at the market level. We argue that although these models are useful, they are incomplete because certain aspects of entrepreneurial behavior, such as judgment, alertness, or innovativeness, cannot be easily transformed into allocative problems. Moreover, entrepreneurial acts involve idiosyncratic elements, which limit the applicability of the market-level analysis to individual cases. Thus, the traditional economic methods have to be complemented by approaches highlighting the role of individual and historical specificity. The study of entrepreneurship, therefore, requires a synthesis of both general theory and historicist approaches, as envisioned a century ago by Frank Knight.