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2 results

  • Appendix: - Population Statistics for U.S. Military in Germany, 1945–2000

  • Edited by Thomas W. Maulucci, Jr, State University of New York, Detlef Junker, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, Germany
  • Book:
    GIs in Germany
    Published online:
    05 October 2013
    Print publication:
    02 September 2013, pp 347-352

  • Summary

    In a preliminary assessment drafted in early 1954, Wolf Graf Baudissin, the head of the department within the Amt Blank responsible for developing the concept of Innere Führung noted that the Germans were faced with the difficult choice between "becoming Europeanized" or pursuing "reform". The failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) put an end to these worries. The discussions between the Americans and West Germans on the concept of Innere Führung in the years leading up to the creation of the Bundeswehr make clear the complexity of trying to transfer the practices of the American "army within a democracy". The West Germans were concerned about the broad issues of the social integration and legitimation of the armed forces subsumed within the concept of Innere Führung. The Americans took a more narrow approach and viewed the question of civil-military relations as primarily a constitutional issue.

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  • Edited by Thomas W. Maulucci, Jr, State University of New York, Detlef Junker, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, Germany
  • Book:
    GIs in Germany
    Published online:
    05 October 2013
    Print publication:
    02 September 2013, pp 353-358

  • Summary

    The West German experts envisioned that the Federal Republic would provide the proposed European Defense Community (EDC) with a modern tactical air force for close air support to German army units. The plan to restrict the air force to providing combat support to ground forces stemmed in part from the dominance of infantry and artillery experts in the West Germans' discussions and the lessons they had drawn from their World War II experiences. It also reflected the scant attention the Jahrbuch der Luftwaffe had given to aerial doctrine and the theory of airpower during the 1930s and 1940s. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) began a program within the framework of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) in 1953 to train pilots and technicians from NATO member states at air bases in Bavaria. The scale of American materiel and training support reduced their chances to influence German air potential.