Elizabeth Anscombe has called the part of the Tractatus dealing with the relation between the will and the world “obviously wrong.” To understand and assess this view, I look at what Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer, and Anscombe say about the will. She is right to reject the view of the will that she calls wrong, but it is possible that Wittgenstein intends his readers to reject it too. Recent work by Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen, Eli Friedlander, Modesto Gómez-Alonso, and Michael Kremer helps us to see this, and to understand Wittgenstein’s views on ethics as well. The will, conceived as something distinct from our actions in the world, is indeed a chimaera, as Anscombe argues. Will belongs to what we do. And it is not, as such, something that we can or should reject. If we are to reject anything in this neighbourhood, it is idle wishing that the world would change.

Chapter 3 develops a theoretical grounding for the PDE, the solidarity rationale. Taking a cue from Philippa Foot, I situate the PDE within a larger region of morality, one structured around the concept of solidarity. I propose that our conduct is measured by a standard of human solidarity toward each other person, that is, a standard of concern and goodwill that is based on our common humanity, and that a person’s conduct is wrong when it deviates from this standard. I argue that the solidarity standard grounds more specific moral norms, including the precept of beneficence, the strict constraint against intentional harm, and the Principles of Proportionality and Due Care. Finally, I argue that the normative foundation for the solidarity standard is the dignity of human beings.

An agent who acts intentionally typically foresees that she will bring about a number of effects and that her conduct will fall under a variety of different descriptions. Which of these effects and descriptions are intentional and which are incidental? To answer this question, Chapter 4 presents an Anscombian account of intentional action. I first show how Anscombe uses a special sense of the question “Why?” to elucidate the teleological order characteristic of intentional action. I then explain how the teleological order of an agent’s intentional action is determined by the calculation on the basis of which she acts, where the concept of calculation is illuminated by the notion of practical reasoning. Next, I explain how Anscombe’s account of intention and intentional action differs from a false conception she calls “Cartesian psychology.” Finally, I apply the Anscombian account to three controversial cases.