Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Search

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

1 results

  • The European Fiscal Board: supranational de novo body or orchestrator?

  • Tobias Tesche
  • Journal:
    Italian Political Science Review / Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica / Volume 51 / Issue 3 / November 2021
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    08 April 2021, pp. 389-403
    Print publication:
    November 2021
    • Article
      • You have access
      • Open access
    • PDF
    • HTML
    • Export citation

  • The European Fiscal Board (EFB) is a supranational fiscal council advising the European Commission on the European Union (EU) fiscal framework. It was created as a response to the EU member states' repeated non-compliance with the EU fiscal rules and the emergence of national fiscal councils. Non-compliance with EU fiscal rules was often left unpunished and required a new expert body to regain some of the lost credibility of the EU's fiscal framework through enhanced fiscal monitoring. This article argues that the European Commission created the EFB in response to the new intergovernmental dynamics. A supranational fiscal watchdog that depends on the Commission for financial resources and access to information would deflect member states from delegating more competences away from the Commission. Thus, the Commission was able to counter a potential threat to its authority in EU fiscal governance by creating a supranational de novo body that it controlled.