On 17 October 1989, the Loma Prieta Earthquake shook the San Francisco Bay area, home to more than 6 million people. This study examined the effectiveness and function of emergency medical services (EMS) communications after this event.

The six Bay area counties most affected by the Loma Prieta Earthquake were surveyed using a 156-part questionnaire. This study examined the functioning of the primary 9-1-1 county dispatch centers. Paramedics involved in a set of defined activities during the period after the earthquake also were surveyed. Emergency medical services directors also were questioned by telephone using an interview tool developed for this purpose. All areas concerning disaster response were not queried. Ten specific areas were considered, including: 1) preparation for disaster; 2) the impact of the earthquake; 3) reconnaissance; 4) call volume; and 5) others.

Coordination among the various agencies responsible for disaster response and mitigation needs more study. Uniform response plans for medical mutual aid need development. Government support similar to police and fire department arrangements for mutual aid are not in place. Additional planning and training for disasters at all levels need reassessment. The communication-center personnel indicated that they did not call for more resources, but instead accepted volunteers at dispatch centers and extra assistance. Once engaged, however, most communications centers (CCs) had great difficulty tracking and controlling all the units under their jurisdiction. In some large urban counties, some ambulances were idled awaiting calls but lost their communications centers, while other ambulance personnel were trying to handle multiple patients and requests for services.

Significant help from a state or federal agency likely will be unavailable for a substantial period after a catastrophic regional event. Important coordination among EMS agencies for disaster response is poor or absent. Although fatalities and casualties were limited compared to what could have occurred, great confusion reigned for varying periods of time after the earthquake. Communications among local agencies, counties, and the state were problematic. Information flow to hospitals was cited frequently as a problem, making it difficult for hospitals to prepare adequately. Medical mutual-aid help was disorganized and inadequately controlled. The training of personnel and the method of recall for disaster response need to be examined.

Many states in the United States ‘have developed policies that enable prehospital emergency medical services (EMS) providers to withhold cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) in the terminally ill. Several states also have policies that enable the implementation of do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders.

1) assess which states have statutes governing DNR orders for the prehospital setting; 2) determine which states authorize DNR orders in ways other than by specific state statue; and 3) define those states that had regional protocols which address prehospital DNR orders.

Survey of the state EMS directors in each of the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.

As of 1992, specific legislation authorizing the implementation of DNR orders was in place in 11 states. In addition, six others have a legal opinion or policy allowing the implementation of DNR orders. Fourteen additional states have either working groups or legislation pending that address prehospital DNR orders. In only five were there no existing regional protocols for implementation of DNR orders in the prehospital setting.

There exists great variation in legal authorization by states for implementation of DNR orders in the prehospital setting. Despite the existence of enabling legislation, many state, regional, or local EMS systems have implemented policies dealing with DNR orders.