Chapter five explores definitions of citizenship in jurisprudence, royal law, and municipal ordinance. Ecclesiastical statutes tended to shape policy for indios under the assumption that they were to be administered in their own “republic” (i.e. within their own pueblos, separate from Spanish settlements). This chapter highlights how the city of Santafé responded when numerous indios ladinos emigrated out of their pueblos and into the settlement of Santafé.

Chapter 2 looks at seamen who were ‘aliens’ (non-subjects), and shows that legal distinctions ultimately mattered little to the Navy. Britain was rather open to immigration, and during wartime most residual disabilities of non-subjects were eased for common sailors, who were needed and overall welcome. At the same time, military necessity meant that any advantages which their status as subjects of a different sovereign should have afforded them, most notably protection from impressment (forced service), were often ignored in practice. In courts martial, special accommodations and concessions were granted informally, as a result of perceived cultural ignorance, rather than on the basis of legal status. Finally, naturalisation was liberally bestowed on naval seamen, but it was, this chapter argues, a largely irrelevant benefit. The state was very quick to revoke its protection if this clashed with native allegiances, and during wartime the alien sailor, already allowed to work in both the Navy and merchant vessels, did not stand to gain much from being naturalised. If individual seamen strategically navigated legal status and national allegiances, so did the state itself: when in need of manpower, it did not hesitate to treat its own legal categories and subjecthood boundaries as pliable.

The jus temporis that is argued for in this chapter aims to explicate the value of human time that is to be found in the finite, irreversible, and unstoppable character of human time. To make the value of human time explicit, "rootedness" and "integration" are conceptually distinguished. The latter signifying qualified time, the former mere lapse of human time. Rootedness simply signifies the entanglement of presence on a territory with the lapse of finite and irreversible human time. This conception of rootedness is at the heart of jus temporis and its implications are not limited to questions of citizenship acquisition. It is argued that the value of rootedness equally applies to waiting time in procedures, endless forms of temporariness, and unlawful residence. Concretely, it is argued that this jus temporis implies two elements. The first is a certain openness to the future, the possibility that a certain situation will not last forever. The second element is that there should be end-terms at work in law: procedures may not last forever, temporariness may not continue eternally, and there should be a moment when long-term unlawful residences can become lawful.

Those of Irish domicile or lacking a permanent home in England or Wales were barred from the divorce court, but parliamentary divorce’s noxious reputation encouraged some Irish petitioners to develop means to circumvent its expense and publicity. Various strategies such as renting a house and paying rates in England were deployed to access the divorce court. This chapter samples Irish petitioners who divorced in court both legally and surreptitiously. A covert court divorce could invalidate second marriages, bastardise issue and contest marriage settlements. The late-nineteenth-century court-based divorces of domiciled Irishmen Colonel Sinclair and Colonel Malone were the most widely publicised of these cases. The legitimacy of their divorces was questioned, and problems arose regarding marriage settlements. The court was therefore increasingly rigorous about testing domicile; a rule that all divorce court petitioners would have to swear English domicile and falsification would bar the proceedings was introduced. However, although domicile was more stringently tested, Irish cases were presented to the divorce court with an increased regularity in the early twentieth century.

Irish divorce reform began in the recognition of foreign divorces which produced convoluted case law from the time of the 1937 Irish constitution. The balance of these rulings pivoted on domicile, the intention to reside in a country permanently, which was challenging to test and still dictated by a husband’s domicile. Reform in foreign divorce and domicile was forthcoming from the 1980s and was part of a broader process of Irish family law reform which reflected changing social mores including those relating to the central position of the Catholic church in the Irish state. Some more liberal Irish priests emerged in the 1960s yet, more effective in prompting a reassessment of the position of the Catholic church was Vatican II, which recognised democracy and liberalism. The level of martial breakdown in independent Ireland was also becoming clearer and harder to ignore. A key recommendation of the New Ireland Forum of the mid-1980s was therefore the separation of church and state but divorce reform still provoked antagonistic and often religiously-charged debate.