This paper traces the evolution of the meanings of the formative term dat, as it evolved in the history of Jewish culture throughout the ages. Its biblical meaning, derived from the Persian, is law, originally human law. In Judaism it was transformed into Divine law. This was basically the meaning it carried throughout the ages. With the advent of modernity, this old term started to acquire a radically new meaning, influenced by the appearance of the term ‘religion’ in Christianity, now applied to every so-called ‘religion’, including Judaism. My paper elaborates on the process by which the Hebrew term dat was transformed into ‘religion’ in modernity, and its implication concerning the changing meaning of Judaism.

Recent studies have observed that in Grotius’ legal doctrine the intellectual ambition to create a universal rule of law (natural law) coexists with a distinctively ‘modern’ use of the vocabulary of individual rights (natural rights). In this chapter, I argue that a more careful reading of Grotius’ engagement with the Aristotelian tradition might cast new light on this traditional dichotomy, and expand our understanding of Grotius’ theory of justice. Famously, Grotius relies on the Aristotelian notion of virtue ethics to introduce the concept of aptitude, which designs a more generic account of merit and moral fitness rather than a strict, enforceable legal claim. Far from being discarded as a ‘minor’ or ‘deficient’ source of right, aptitude plays a fundamental role in this context. Through his reading and translating of the Aristotelian commentator Michael of Ephesus, I will show how Grotius’ thin conception of right as aptitude and fitness provides his natural law doctrine with a heuristic requirement for right reason.

The present article examines Grotius’ views on the relationship between church and state. He composed most of the works dealing exclusively with this theme in the years before 1618, but his later work is discussed as well. The historical and intellectual background to Grotius’ views is examined, such as the Dutch religious troubles, toleration, Jewish history and Erastianism. This is followed by Grotius’ general views on church and state as expressed in his works and his views on specific aspects, such as lawgiving, the right of resistance by the church, synods, ecclesiastical hierarchy, divine and natural law. It is concluded that Grotius held that there is only one, indivisible sovereign government, and that this is civil government: all external acts in the public space are subject to the sovereign. Abuse of this absolute power is restricted by the fact that the sovereign has to render account to God. Grotius’ lifelong ideal was that of a state based on these principles, with a Christian public church, where toleration of religious differences was practised.

Chapter One presents what I propose is a perennial conflict of divine and human law, a conflict that is built into the very nature of religious freedom itself. It examines the reasons why the conflict is especially acute in late modernity, arguing that liberal approaches to religious freedom have both addressed and exacerbated the problem. Finally, the chapter proposes a theoretical framework in which natural law serves as a mediator between human law and divine law and thereby as a means forward from the perennial conflict of the two forms of law.

Chapter Two provides an original interpretation of Sophocles’ Antigone, arguing that the play illustrates the tragic consequences of perceiving law exclusively in its human or divine form. It builds on and diverges from the Hegelian reading of the play, drawing out the role of hubris, as characterized by Creon’s myopic view of law as human fiat, as well as Antigone’s exclusive concern for the gods’ commands, and shows that either form of hubris results in tragedy. To approach justice, the law must instead be conceptualized as not only human and divine but also as natural, for it is natural law that could have mediated the divine and human aspects of the law that clash in the persons of Antigone and Creon. The prudential voices of Teiresias and Haemon suggest how this natural law of justice could inform both Creon’s and Antigone’s views of law and avert the tragedy with which the play necessarily ends. This chapter also takes up the issue of agonistic politics, which some have interpreted the play to illustrate, and shows the peril of this view of politics for religious freedom.

Chaucer lived in a society that was aware of childhood and adolescence as distinctive stages of human life and which inherited practices whereby young people were brought up and trained for adulthood. Informally, at home, children were introduced to social norms, religion and work. Those from wealthier families underwent more formal education, mastering literacy at home, in schools or in great households, where they learnt reading, rules of courtesy, French and, in the case of some boys, Latin. Chaucer’s works refer in passing to most of these processes, with particular attention to adolescents, including university scholars. During the fifteenth century his works in general came to be seen as having educational value. The Astrolabe, first written for his son Lewis, seems to have been used for teaching reading to other young children while his major writings were recommended as suitable literature for older ones.

This chapter examines the place of law in the England of Chaucer’s day in both the formal legal system and in popular consciousness. It considers the relation of English common law both to the overarching law of God and to other institutional legal structures, not least the canon law of the church, as well as to more informal procedures. Intrinsic contradictions in the nature of legal norms, including the tension between the needs for general certainty and individual justice, provide much scope for writers of stories. Difficulties of proof and the role of the oath are outlined and an analysis is offered of the extent to which a knowledge of the law and legal system of Chaucer’s time can add to the appreciation and understanding of his work.