Community Rating System (CRS) incentivizes investments in risk reduction above NFIP standards using discounts on insurance premiums. These discounts are cross-subsidized by increasing premiums in non-CRS communities. We examine the distribution of these subsidies and find that redistribution does occur, but the gains and losses are not economically large with 95% of households gaining or losing no more than 0.3% of household income. We also examine their relationship with other community characteristics and find that the strongest predictor of premium reductions is the underlying flood risk level within the community. Thus, CRS appears to reduce the cost of living in the riskier communities.

As the heterogeneity in life expectancy by socioeconomic status increases, many pension systems imply a wealth transfer from short- to long-lived individuals. Various pension reforms aim to reduce inequalities that are caused by ex-ante differences in life expectancy. However, these pension reforms may induce redistribution effects. We introduce a dynamic general equilibrium-overlapping generations model with heterogeneous individuals that differ in their education, labor supply, lifetime income, and life expectancy. Within this framework we study six different pension reforms that foster the sustainability of the pension system and aim to account for heterogeneous life expectancy. Our results highlight that pension reforms have to be evaluated at various dimensions. Reforms that may increase the sustainability of the pension system are not necessarily conducive to reduce the redistributive wealth transfers from short- to long-lived individuals. Our paper emphasizes the need for studying pension reforms in models with behavioral feedback and heterogeneous socioeconomic groups.

As its practitioners know well, benefit-cost analysis (BCA) walks a fine line between the positive and normative, between the science of economics and the art of political economy. Missteps threaten to undermine its credibility as a value-free science, while overcaution risks irrelevance to the pressing questions of the day. As BCA adapts to give more weight to distributional concerns, while operating in a more highly charged political environment than ever before, these tensions will only grow. For perspective, I reexamine three prominent episodes in the history of economics where these issues were vigorously debated: (i) The founding of the NBER by Wesley Clair Mitchell, who insisted that the organization eschew all policy recommendations; (ii) the introduction of the modern definition of economics as the study of tradeoffs by Lionel Robbins, who insisted welfare effects could never be aggregated; and (iii) the origins of BCA as a measure of income, which to first-generation practitioners seemed to foreclose the possibility of measuring “intangible” benefits like recreation opportunities, mortality risks, and equity. These episodes, together with critiques of economics from philosophers of science, suggest we are best served by being as transparent as possible about the ways values influence BCA reasoning, without arrogating political decisions into it.

Some issues in the application of benefit–cost analysis (BCA) remain contentious. Although a strong conceptual case can be made for taking account of the marginal excess tax burden (METB) in conducting BCAs, it is usually excluded. Although a strong conceptual case can be made that BCA should not include distributional values, some analysts continue to advocate doing so. We discuss the cases for inclusion of the METB and the exclusion of distributional weights from what we refer to as “core” BCA, which we argue should be preserved as a protocol for assessing allocative efficiency. These issues are topical because a recent article in this journal recommends ignoring the METB on the grounds that desirable distributional effects offset its cost. We challenge the logic of this article and explain why it may encourage inefficient policies.

We study the welfare and energy poverty implications of energy price change scenarios in Indonesia. Our analysis extends previous analyses of energy price impacts at the household level in three ways. First, by employing a household energy demand system (QUAIDS), we are able to distinguish between first- and second-order welfare effects over the income distribution. Second, our results point to the ownership of energy-processing durables as another source of impact heterogeneity. Third, we extend the welfare analysis beyond the money-metric utility effects and look at energy poverty, which is understood as the absence of or imperfect access to reliable and clean modern energy services. The analysis indicates that energy prices may serve as an effective instrument to reduce energy use but also have important adverse welfare effects. The latter can, however, be mitigated by appropriate compensation policies.

We formulate an overlapping-generations model with household heterogeneity and productive and nonproductive government programs to study the macroeconomic and intergenerational welfare effects of risk premium shocks and government debt reductions. We demonstrate that in a small open economy with a high level of debt, a small increase in the risk premium of the interest rate leads to a substantial contraction in output and negative welfare effects. We then quantify the effects of reducing the debt-to-gross-domestic-product ratio using a wide range of fiscal austerity measures. Our results indicate trade-offs between short-run contractions and long-run expansions in aggregate output. In the short run, spending-based austerity reforms are worse than tax-based reforms in terms of lost income. However, in the long run, spending-based reforms produce higher output than tax-based reforms. In addition, welfare effects vary significantly across generations, skill groups, and working sectors. The current old and middle-aged generations experience welfare losses, whereas future generations are beneficiaries of the reforms.

In the last 20 years, both public and private expenditures on resource conservation and environmental protection have increased dramatically. However, there are numerous technical and political barriers to the efficient use of conservation funds. This paper discusses some of these barriers and approaches to overcoming them. It argues that ecosystem complexities such as threshold effects, ecosystem linkages, and spatial connections often mitigate against politically palatable criteria for resource allocation. Ignoring these complexities is likely to result in substantial efficiency losses. While challenges are daunting for the efficient management of conservation investments, payoff is potentially high for the use of sciences.

Benefit-cost (B/C) analysis must take into account the distributional effects from a policy or program change. To highlight this, we focus on the theory of production quota buyouts within a B/C framework. As an empirical application, we provide evidence on the distributional effects of the U.S. government buyout of the peanut program in 2002, where production quotas were key ingredients. Two approaches to producer compensation under the buyout are discussed: (1) value of quota approach and (2) gains from quota approach. In the peanut quota program buyout, the U.S. government chose the value of quota approach. Both consumers and producers were made better off as a result of the buyout, and there was a net gain in efficiency. If the government had chosen the gains from quota approach instead, government expenditures and producer gains would have been lower, and consumer benefits would have remained unchanged. Under either approach, the B/C ratios calculated for the government quota buyout are almost identical.

An asset market segmentation model is constructed to study the distributional effects of monetary policy when economic individuals can choose means of payment among alternatives. In equilibrium, monetary policy has two distributional effects: a direct effect and an indirect effect through the choice of means of payment. When the government injects money, some purchase a greater variety of goods with cash whereas others purchase a greater variety of goods with credit. Credit can dampen fluctuations in consumption arising from monetary policy. The optimal money growth rate can be positive or negative. The Friedman rule is not optimal in general.