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1 results

  • 8 - Persons, Things and Nature in Roman Law

  • from Part II - Recollection
  • Edited by Sandy Lamalle, Concordia University, Montréal, Peter Stoett, Ontario Tech University
  • Book:
    Representations and Rights of the Environment
    Published online:
    16 March 2023
    Print publication:
    06 April 2023, pp 184-205

  • Summary

    Roman law is often considered as an intellectual matrix of contemporary laws and in particular French civil law. However, even if the vocabulary persisted, some legal concepts went through great changes across history as law was step by step related to a subject’s power. The notion of ‘thing’ originally meant the trial, the case, the litigious situation managed by the legal process. In this way, the thing was understood as a res iuris. In contemporary law systems, the thing (res as a legal category) ordinarily specifies some goods on which the subject applies his property power. This view is understandable considering the evolution due to the theorisation of subjective law which led to the promotion of a strong and exclusive separation between persons and things, while Roman law could imbricate these legal categories. This difficulty is at the heart of the problem when jurists aim to categorise Nature in legal taxonomy.