Chapter 9 introduces the metaphor of a pendulum to characterize the sharp swings in Brandt’s policies toward European integration; the chancellor frequently backed ambitious EC projects that proved premature and unworkable. In 1970, fierce debates arose among the six EC members concerning how to pursue economic and monetary union (EMU). Brandt’s point person on Europe, Katharina Focke, sympathized with the French desire to tighten monetary cooperation among the EC partners right away. Bonn’s economy ministry under Karl Schiller took a more cautious line, insisting that macroeconomic convergence was necessary first. An EC agreement on EMU in early 1971 favored the French line; but soon thereafter a currency crisis prompted Brandt’s cabinet to “float” the mark, putting the EMU project on hold. Bonn’s policies helped the Nixon administration as it sought to stabilize the remnants of the Bretton Woods system – much to the dismay of French president Georges Pompidou. Afterwards Brandt worked to mend fences with France, and at a summit of the newly expanded EC in 1972 they pledged to form a European Union complete with a unified currency by 1980.

Chapter 7 depicts a severe cleft in German politics as the Grand Coalition headed toward Bundestag elections in September 1969. Chancellor Kiesinger tried to coax the USSR into softening its enmity toward West Germany, but his hard-line stances on Berlin and the NPT stalled progress. Egon Bahr, Willy Brandt’s controversial aide, urged the SPD to cast aside old ballast: Bonn should sign the NPT, stop isolating the GDR, and renounce territorial claims in Poland. Economy minister Karl Schiller, the SPD’s central figure in the 1969 campaign, insisted that the German mark should be revalued. Kiesinger’s CDU/CSU rejected all of these proposals, and the coalition cabinet proved incapable of decisive action for most of the year – causing economic havoc across Western Europe. The SPD–FDP coalition won the election only narrowly, but as Chancellor Willy Brandt acted decisively to revalue the mark and pledge German support for “deepening” and “widening” Europe at an EC summit in The Hague. On Ostpolitik, Brandt signed the NPT and authorized soundings with the USSR and Poland; but Bahr grew impatient and angled to open a back channel to the Kremlin.

The year 1968 brought a powerful affirmation of West Germany’s uniquely stable economy and society, with ripple effects across Western and Eastern Europe. Chapter 6 opens by explaining how the Grand Coalition pursued reforms that reinforced West Germany’s commitment to price stability and economic growth. When youth protests escalated in 1967–68, driven in large part by anger over U.S. and West German policies toward Greece, Iran, and the war in Vietnam, German workers declined to join in – a stark contrast to the turmoil in neighboring France. Speculators rushed to sell French francs and buy up German marks, touching off a currency crisis. Western finance ministers converged in Bonn demanding that West Germany raise the mark’s parity value – yet Bonn refused, an unprecedented display of independence. Meanwhile, the “Prague Spring” raised hopes of West German credits for Czechoslovakia, perhaps via the Bundesbank; and German visitors poured in. When the Soviet bloc invaded, de Gaulle blamed the Bonn government for provoking it. Yet the main takeaway in Moscow was that West Germany, clearly Europe’s strongest economy, could become a significant economic partner.