This article examines the fiscal transformation of Spain's trade with Spanish America during the 17th century. It analyses the taxation of trade combined with the evolution of the Hispanic Monarchy's long-term domestic debt. To this end, the author looks at the almojarifazgo de Indias (main customs duty), its juro (annuity) obligations and the evolution of the transatlantic trade. He argues that the fall in customs revenue and the increasing non-payment of the juros issued against the almojarifazgo were neither a consequence of the alleged crisis of the Carrera de Indias nor of the higher incidence of fraud. The Crown was not interested in exerting greater fiscal pressure on the trade or fighting fraud at the customs houses of Seville and Cadiz as the increased tax revenue would have gone entirely to service the unpaid juros. Instead, the fiscal burden shifted towards extraordinary contributions that were free of juro obligations.

The South American Funds National Exchequer was established in 1818 to contribute to the consolidation of the public debt of Buenos Aires. It was the first financial innovation since the revolutionary outbreak in Buenos Aires, and its failure allowed the authorities to understand the limits of the fiscal and financial commitment they proposed by means of that institution. Its suppression, in 1821, offered an antecedent to develop a deep reform of the financial institutional matrix of Buenos Aires, based on the Public Credit office, the Amortization Exchequer and the Bank of Buenos Aires. The South American Funds National Exchequer was, thus, the first movement in the negotiation on the terms of the financial commitment assumed by the nascent State. This paper analyzes the 973 accounting entries of the institution, providing an interpretation of that failure and its importance for the course of public finances in Buenos Aires.

Numerous archival documents show how the suspension of payments by Philip II, in September 1575, on the contracts with Genoese bankers (asientos) induced a freeze of the domestic credit market in Castile through the bankers’ intermediation for asientos and the credit interconnections. Commercial fairs stopped, banks failed and trade suffered while the king granted legal protection to the Genoese bankers. The evidence strikingly confirms that by his strategy, Philip II was able to remove the de facto ceiling on the domestic debt (juros) imposed by the fixed revenue commitment of the Castilian cities in the Cortes. The agreement with the bankers was signed in December 1577 immediately after the cities had agreed to the doubling of their commitment.

This paper examines sovereign lending to Latin America and the Caribbean from 1820 to 1913. We examine four waves of capital flows where defaults were followed by a return to market access. In spite of extended default, countries kept promising high returns that attracted international investors again and again: financial autarky thus gave way to eras of high integration to global markets as measured by sovereign risk pricing. We discuss imperfections of the sovereign debt institutional context in the region and discuss a menu of options that some countries used to seek funds in the global financial markets after defaults. The parallel with the modern Latin American and Caribbean sovereign bond market experience is striking.

This article provides a historical overview of the factors leading up to debt crises and the default mechanisms used by governments to solve them, ranging from repudiation and restructuring to inflation tax and financial repression. The paper also analyses the Spanish governments’ graduation to responsible public debt management under democracy and the last debt crisis starting in 2010. After analysing the evolution of the outstanding public debt, budget deficits, the Spanish economy's ability to borrow, the central government's debt affordability and the profile of public debt, the article concludes that the Spanish case confirms the main hypotheses of concerning international debt crises: short-term borrowing enhanced the risk of a debt crisis; insolvency problems arose when governments were unwilling or unable to repay debt; debt crises took place after large capital inflows; most outright defaults ended up being partial defaults; public debt level became unsustainable when it rose above 60-90 per cent of GDP; default trough inflation became commonplace when fiat money displaced coinage; financial repression was used as a subtle type of debt restructuring; and defaults endangered the creditworthiness of the Spanish Finance Ministry and forced disciplined fiscal policies.

The historiography emphasizes the importance of the fiscal policy and regional differences as causes of Hispano-American independences. The Consolidación de los Vales Reales (1804-1809), an endorsement of the debt contracted to its colonies by Spain in order to finance its constant wars, caused the collapse of the Mexican Treasury and was a key factor in its independence. This article demonstrates that in Cuba, the Consolidation had a different effect. Thanks to its different institutionalization and fiscal praxis, it was used to alleviate the deficit of situados, with which the Mexican Treasury financed the Cuban, and it may help to understand the reasons for non-independence. However, to prove this requires reconstructing the accounts of the Cuban Consolidation, which also demonstrates that the data used up until now were erroneous.

This article attempts to analyse the role that the Rothschild House played in the evolution of Spanish Public Finances along the 19th Century. Therefore, it endeavours to describe an elementary chronology of the relationships between the Spanish Government and the Rothschild House during the whole Century, analysing the main financial operations they underwrote, quantifying their annual aggregate figures and, finally, trying to comment upon the different consequences of the process above mentioned. To cover these aims, we have deployed original records from the Rothschild Archives in London and Paris, their contents having been supplemented with information from National Public Records in Spain and France, and other financial institutions, namely the Bank of Spain.