Chapter 4 presents the paradox of republican emancipation, a paradox based on the ambivalence of republican freedom at the time of the revolution. On the one hand, republican freedom is the status of those who are already masters of themselves. Freedom is independence and it is this independence that makes them capable of governing with competence and virtue. On the other, freedom is the newly claimed right of everyone, or anyone, not to be dominated – regardless of their virtue, or their economic and social situation, that is, regardless of their capacity to self-govern. But how can one reconcile the universal claim of freedom as nondomination with the republican supposition that the free person ought to be already socially, economically, and intellectually independent to be able to self-govern? If the many are incapable of self-governing, how can they ever become independent from the government of the few – how can they ever emancipate themselves? This chapter presents four instances of this paradox: the debate on passive/active citizenship, Condorcet’s position on the emancipation of slaves, Guyomar’s argument for the emancipation of women, and Grouchy’s proposal for changing the way we think about human dependence.

This chapter lays further conceptual foundation for the book’s proposed trust-based framework. It applies to the citizen-government relationship what I call the ‘network conception of trust’ from the social science scholarship. In doing so, it makes a claim of how trust functions in the social rights context. According to this conception, trust arises in, and depends on, complex structures or networks of relationships. Applying this conception to the citizen-government relationship, the chapter argues that in contemporary democracies, the citizen-government relationship arises in a network of relationships and that trust in the citizen-government relationship depends on the relationships that constitute the network – including, importantly, the relationship between citizens and the courts that arises out of the adjudication of social rights by courts. This argument adds nuance to our understanding of trust and lays foundation for my contention in Chapter 4 that the courts, via their enforcement of social rights, can foster citizens’ trust in the elected branches.

Complications of alcohol misuse are frequently encountered in the general hospital setting, as well as primary care and outpatient clinics. It is an essential part of the skillset of a consultation-liaison (CL) psychiatrist to be able to competently assess the scale of the problem, to offer advice and guidance on acute issues which may arise during intoxication and withdrawal and to orchestrate appropriate support and follow-up if a patient is willing to engage. This chapter aims to equip the reader with relevant epidemiology, some clinically useful biology and mathematics and a scaffold for building on previously acquired basics in terms of assessment and management of alcohol-related problems in the general hospital setting.

From the early days of national independence in 1975, the central aim of the educational policy in Mozambique has been to ensure that all school-age children have access to school and can remain there until they have completed their basic education. In the pursuit of this aim, the extension of access to primary education was relatively successful, given that it reached a net rate of school coverage of almost 100 per cent. However, the impressive increase in school attendance rates has not been accompanied by a corresponding improvement in the quality of learning, and there are worrying signs of a considerable setback in relation to this aspect. Using this observation as a starting point, this chapter identifies and analyses the variables in the institutional context behind ‘schooling without learning’. The results point to (i) weak state capacity; (ii) excessive dependence on external aid; and (iii) poor community involvement and participation in school management, as factors with a major influence on the poor quality of education in primary schools.

What are we to make of the sermon at the end of Either/Or? How does it stand in relation to the book’s preceding presentations of aesthetic and ethical life? Why is it presented under the title, “Ultimatum”? This chapter takes up these questions by showing how the sermon, and the fictional Jutland priest to whom it is attributed, serve to represent a certain development within ethical subjectivity. On the reading I develop, the sermon represents, namely, a way of trying to sustain a stance of participation in ethical life, in the face of experiences of human powerlessness and exposure to tragedy, without despair but also without succumbing to illusions of ethical independence. So understood, the sermon offers a perspective that, while it incorporates elements of both, provides a third alternative to the tragic outlook of “A” in Either/Or’s Volume 1 and the letters of Judge William in Volume 2.

Chapter four concentrates on a close analysis of Aquinas’s understanding of creation, which is undeniably crucial for any attempt at constructing and evaluating a Thomistic version of theistic evolutionism. The exposition of Aquinass philosophical theology of creation and his commentary on the work of six days in Genesis is preceded by an analysis of Augustine’s reading of the Hexameron, his use of the concept of rationes seminales, and the debate on whether his notion of creation can be interpreted as evolution-friendly.

A focus on care draws attention to the fact that ethical self-cultivation, even in traditions that foreground moral autonomy, relies upon relationships of dependence. The recognition of relational and ethical dependence is familiar to anthropologists and has long been central for feminist ethics. However, the enormous body of anthropological scholarship that has emerged on care over the last decade raises the question of ethical dependence anew. This chapter problematizes the concept of care. It asks: how might ‘care’ as a topic, and as engaged ethnographically, trouble some of the ways that ethical life more broadly has been conceived in the philosophical and anthropological literature? Conversely, how might attention to the ethical stakes of care trouble some of the rich ethnographic scholarship on care? The chapter draws most substantially on anthropological and philosophical scholarship in virtue ethics and in phenomenology to consider both the relational complexities of care and care’s ineffable and elusive ethical dimensions.

Metacognitions, or the beliefs one holds about internal mental states and the strategies aimed at controlling them, are known to play a significant role in the development and maintenance of addictive behaviours. However, only very limited research has investigated the role of metacognitions in exercise addiction (EA). This chapter describes the case of a 36-year-old woman with EA, whose metacognitive strategies appeared to be directly linked to her addictive behaviour. The risky behaviours and detrimental effects on other aspects of life that are observed in individuals with EA appear to be as harmful to their physical and mental health as are the addiction-related behaviours and effects observed among people with substance use disorders. It is proposed that EA is a specific behavioural addiction that merits inclusion as a mental disorder in the International Classification of Diseases and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.

Chapter 5 examines Plato's account of the "fevered" polis in exploring the thesis that societies are to be understood as composed of parts well suited to carry out specific functions and that it is primarily in this respect that they resemble biological organisms. Thus, in the healthy polis each part carries out the specific function appropriate to it, and functions are coordinated such that all are well executed and society's essential needs satisfied. From Plato we learn that a defensible account of social pathology embraces a weak holism, according to which "ill" may apply to society as a whole without any part of it being ill (since it is institutions or societies that are dysfunctional, not individuals). At the same time, it eschews strong a normative holism that holds that things can be good or bad for societies without them also being good or bad for individual members.

The relationship between religion and concern for the environment has not always been an easy one. Theological ascription of ultimate value to God, rather than to creatures, has been said to underlie ecological destruction, exacerbated also by religious notions of human uniqueness. Conversely, some religious groups have feared that concern for nature will risk deflecting attention from God. Faced with such a stand-off, we turn to the idea of ‘participation’ – of partaking from, or sharing in – which offers common ground between these two domains, with its sense of dependence and derivation. From a theological perspective (here concentrating on the Christian tradition), particular emphasis will fall on the idea of creation as good gift, and on the derivation of all things from God, in all of their aspects. From the side of biology, themes of participation appear both in the form of ecological dependence in the present and of evolutionary relations of derivation and reception running down biological history. Approached in these terms, the theologian conviction that creation is not ultimate need not degrade it, nor need attention to creation stand in competition with religious devotion.

This chapter discusses a second source of care and support policy tension – the tension between supporting the claims of carers and supporting those of people with disabilities. Organized carer movements in Australia, the UK and other liberal welfare states have argued successfully for policy support on the basis of the burden of providing intensive care to older persons and/or children and adults with disabilities. Disability studies scholars and activists have challenged this characterization of disability as an individual deficit and source of burden, arguing instead that disability is a consequence of a failure to accommodate difference and recognize the rights of people with disabilities. They have advocated instead for policies that enable people with disabilities to be independent and choose how they live. Each approach has some benefits for one constituency at the expense of others. Support for carers to ‘care’ can produce disempowering arrangements for people with disabilities, while independent living arrangements sought by people with disabilities may disempower support workers if they do not have appropriate pay and conditions. Calls for choice and independent living have also coincided with the neoliberal marketization of care and support, resulting in a narrowing of choice that is only available to some.

This chapter is largely devoted to commenting on the other contributions to the volume.An attempt is made to evaluate the arguments and criticisms brought to bear by each contributor on the project of defining civil liberty not as absence of interference but rather in neo-Roman terms as absence of more general conditions of subjection and dependence. The chapter opens with an exposition of the neo-Roman theory, focusing on its articulation in Roman and common law traditions of thinking about the law of persons and related arguments about ‘fundamental’ rights and liberties. The chapter next defends the distinctiveness and coherence of the neo Roman approach against a number of objection that have been raised against it. The chapter ends by reflecting on how the re-appropriation and development of a neo-Roman perspective might help us to think more fruitfully about some current threats to privacy and democracy as well as individual liberty. This concluding section focuses particularly on threats stemming from increasing surveillance and other silent exercises of power.

This chapter traces the evolution of the term ‘addiction’ over time, demonstrating how its meaning has altered in the face of social and political changes in society. The second half explores the story behind the diagnostic terminology used in clinical practice today, and describes the recent changes to the addiction section of the major classificatory systems. Addiction is conceptualised as a disorder involving a loss of the normal flexibility of human behaviour, leaving a dehumanised state of compulsive behaviour (‘overwhelming involvement’). It has acquired a variety of terminology over time, much of it inferring moral weakness. Addiction may be associated with psychoactive substances or other pleasurable behaviours and occurs on a spectrum of use and harms, which vary in severity. The term ‘dependence’ may refer to physiological aspects of addiction (tolerance or withdrawal), but is also used to define the severe end of the spectrum. Confusion around this terminology has led to it being removed from the latest version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5).