Compared to people who are rated as less creative, more creative people tend to produce ideas more quickly, with more novelty, and more actively engage regions of the brain associated with cognitive control. Both inside and outside the laboratory, the evidence is clear: the creative mind is a productive mind. Structural analysis of what more creative people produce has led to two different proposals for how this is achieved. One is based on differences in the underlying knowledge representation – the structure of semantic memory – called the associative theory of creativity. The other is based on more effortful cognitive control – how semantic memory is accessed – called the executive theory of creativity. Evidence supports both, but there are few models integrating these two ideas. Network analysis offers some inroads into how to tackle this problem and invites some creativity of its own.

This chapter traces the extant historical literature on the growth and development of party politics in colonial Nigeria. These parties were led by formidable personalities who played an essential role in the formation of national consciousness crucial for the formation of an independent Nigeria. While historians have classified it into four phases, the chapter proposes that the growth of political parties should be analyzed into two generational periods: the 1920s and 1930s, and the 1940s and 1950s. The former period is marked by the promulgation of the Clifford Constitution that led to the creation of the first-ever nationalist parties, such as the Nigerian National Democratic Party and The Lagos Youth Movement which, though claiming nationalist status, was, however, confined to the Lagos area. The latter commenced after the enactment of the Richards Constitution which witnessed the growth of regional political parties such as the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, the Northern People’s Congress, and the Action Group all of which espoused ethnic nationalism. By engaging with historical works produced on nationalist movements in colonial Nigeria, the chapter places their value beyond the simplistic teleological development of politics of nationalism in Nigeria.

This chapter comprehensively lays out all the possible ways that artificial intelligence (AI) might interact with Jewish sources as their relationship develops over the next many years. It divides the scope of the relationship into three parts. First, it engages with questions of moral agency and their potential interactions with Jewish law, and suggests that this path, while enticing, may not be particularly fruitful. Second, it suggests that Jewish historical sources generally distinguish human value from human uniqueness, and that there is therefore quite a bit of room to think of an AI as a person, if we so choose, without damaging the value of human beings. Finally, it considers how Jewish thought might respond to AI as a new height of human innovation, and how the human–AI relationship shares many characteristics with the God–human relationship as imagined in Jewish sources.

This chapter explains and discusses the definition of public sector innovation. Public sector innovation includes two concepts or terms: (1) public sector and (2) innovation. The first concept, “the public sector,” refers to the general government organizations owned and funded by the government and may include or exclude state-owned enterprises. The second concept, “innovation,” refers to novel ideas or practices implemented organizations. Thus, novelty and implementation are two key terms defining innovation. Therefore, public sector innovation refers to innovative activities in the public sector, and this chapter provides information about it. In addition, this chapter discusses how and in what ways innovation differs from public management reforms, organizational change, invention, creativity, entrepreneurship, and improvement.

Chapter 5 looks at talent development and human excellence in a broader social-historical conditions and changes. The flourishing of particular forms of excellence in a given historical period or culture is always distinct, due to both cultural values and priorities as well as societal changes in social structure, leisure, and conditions of education. If human excellence reflects high-level self-organized individuality, then sociocultural contexts matter; ECT supports the notion of personal agency in changing the world and changing history, not by traits and genes, notwithstanding their meaningful role, but by cultural evolution that leverages characteristic and maximal adaptation with its niche construction and infrastructure-building to achieve the prosperity and vitality of its members. However, sociocultural conditions (including available technology) also significantly constrain individual strivings as well as how far individuals can go. The Needham Puzzle on the birth of modern science (why it occurred in the West, not China) is discussed, and a comparison is made of Da Vinci and Wang Yangming to demonstrate that any creative act is a sociocultural act, which can change history, yet is constrained by one’s times.

In this concluding chapter, I draw conclusions about several important aspects of nature of science by drawing on the topics discussed in the various chapters of the book. Such conclusions include: that individual brilliance and creativity can make a difference; the historical milieu of the individual is equally crucial; that scientists are humans with weaknesses and concerns like all of us; and that gender may influence one’s opportunities to contribute to science.

Through close analyses of a wide range of Minoan animalian things, we have explored the specificity of their involvements in the experiences of people, and how those engagements contributed to the unique character of sociocultural life in the Aegean, on various levels. Here we draw out key points from across the foregoing analyses. Special attention has come to the objects’ inter-corporeal relationships with living humans and the connections that would have been realized through the objects’ particular qualities—connections with other animals, things, and spaces. Such relations were afforded through different dynamics, including bodily juxtaposition, cultivation of formal assonance, the sharing of specific features (e.g., a forward gaze), and embodiment with the same substances, as well as through similarities in size, composition (e.g., in friezes), and contextualization. Moreover, by working beyond an implicit focus on the design of the objects, to instead emphasize people’s actual experiences with them, we have opened the space for appreciating how both intended and unintended associations involving these complex things were in play together. We should view these not as alternative lenses on the objects, but as forces working concurrently, and upon one another, in the creative realizations that the animalian objects were.

The sociocultural spaces of the “Minoan” Aegean were teeming with animal bodies. Many of these animals were alive, but many were not—and never had been; the latter are our focus here. Realized across a range of media, such as zoomorphic vessels, frescoes, and seal stones, animals’ bodies took on a rich diversity of material and spatial qualities that could afford distinctive interactive experiences that the notion of “representations” fails to capture. By recognizing both biological and fabricated entities as real embodiments of animals, which could coexist and interact in Aegean spaces, the nature of our discussion changes. We see that the dynamics of representation were caught up in a much wider field of relationships involving these crafted bodies, which characterized their engagements with people. Doing so moves us beyond questions of signification and intentional design, and toward a fuller recognition of people’s actual experiences of animalian bodies. Looking closely at a variety of venues, ranging from palatial courts to a modest house bench, our focus thus can turn to how the world of animalian things was a crucial part of social life in Aegean spaces, and how direct interactions with these other animal bodies were central, yet often overlooked and minimized, components of human relations with nonhuman beasts.

In this chapter, we explore the relationship between mind-wandering (broadly defined as task-unrelated thought) and creativity. We begin with an exploration of the evidence that mind-wandering may contribute to creative insights (Aha! experiences) and then explore its relationship to creativity more generally. Although assorted lines of evidence support a relationship between mind-wandering and creativity, this literature has proven to be somewhat mixed: an outcome that we speculate arises because only certain types of mind-wandering are helpful. We then consider the relationship between different types of mind-wandering and creativity, examining both differences between individuals in the frequency with which they engage in assorted types of mind-wandering and fluctuations within individuals across days. This review offers suggestive evidence that particular forms of mind-wandering may facilitate creativity and, in particular, that curious daydreaming (or “mind wondering”) may do so. However, we acknowledge the case remains equivocal as supportive research is limited. We close with a discussion of future directions that may help to more conclusively identify and potentially foster the kinds of mind-wandering that are most likely to promote creative insights and advances

Perspectives on how to define, operationalize, and measure insight have evolved due to developments in theory, methodology, and technology. Research on insight can be broken into several waves. In the first wave, Gestalt psychologists introduced the concept of insight as a discontinuous form of learning and problem solving that arises from changes in one’s global representation of a problem, in opposition to contemporary associationist views. In the second wave, psychologists examined insight in deliberate contrast with analytical problem-solving and found that insight involves nonreportable mental operations leading to a discrete, all-or-none availability of representational change. In the third wave, thanks to advances in behavioral methods and neuroimaging technology, cognitive neuroscientists began to examine how insight occurs in the brain with the goal of studying the neural states that co-occur with and precede insight to better understand its cognitive mechanisms. The advances made during these initial waves enabled the proliferation of research on insight over recent decades and inspired new discoveries. This chapter provides a brief retrospective on the first two waves of insight research and a more in-depth overview of the third wave of research on the cognitive neuroscience of insight, and ends by discussing current and future directions in insight research

In this chapter, we argue that differences in problem-solving experiences can be traced to differences in the activation of brain structures involved in the unconscious processing of information (what we refer to as “the backstage”). Scientists commonly distinguish between two major types of problem-solving experiences: via insight and via analysis. Three properties are often mentioned when describing how insight solutions differ from analytic solutions: (1) Solvers are unable to report much of the processing that leads to the solution which comes to mind in an off–on manner; (2) Solvers experience their solutions together with a feeling of pleasure and reward; (3) Solutions via insight feel correct and they actually are. This is captured by a distinctive response: the Aha! This chapter focuses on these three properties and argues that unconscious processes are important for problem-solving in general, but especially important for insight experiences because most of the processing that leads to the solution happens below awareness. It also argues that the positive affect associated with insight serves an adaptive function.

Where do insights come from? What causes those moments when, unexpectedly, a marvelous new idea flashes into consciousness, possibly accompanied by feelings of surprise and delight? Sudden insights are rare, yet everyone appears to be familiar with the experience that may be alternatively described as an “Aha!” or “Eureka” moment: a sudden realization, an epiphany, illumination, revelation, or satori. The ideas resulting from insight experiences range from mundane to historic. Insight is defined not so much by the importance or significance of the content produced, but rather by the cognition and the phenomenology of the event. At its core, the insightful solution process begins with the solver holding an incorrect representation, and ends (if successful) with a nonobvious solution. But there is much more to know: What is insight, and how does a solution emerge unexpectedly into awareness? Is there a set of steps, a pathway that leads to insight?

Problems can be difficult to solve when individuals become fixated by misleading information. A popular method for studying fixation in problem solving externally induces it by priming misleading solutions. However, fixation can also arise internally from incorrect solutions that are strongly activated by prior knowledge. The work summarized in this chapter considers both sources of fixation. It also considers the effects of warnings, and the countervailing influences that individual differences in working-memory capacity (WMC) may have. Higher WMC or attentional control may sometimes help individuals to retrieve solutions, maintain task-relevant goals, and use hints or warnings, but at other times may make individuals more prone to fixation. This chapter describes studies that explored both sources of fixation, how warning participants about possible sources of fixation might affect problem solving success, and whether benefits from warnings of what to avoid relate to individual differences in WMC. Both internal fixation from prior knowledge and external fixation from exposure to misleading primes led to poorer performance on a word-fragment completion task. Providing participants with a warning about the misleading solutions sometimes led to poorer performance (rather than better). Within the conditions where individuals received warnings, the likelihood of reaching correct solutions depended on WMC. Several results highlight potential differences between internal fixation from prior knowledge and external fixation from recent exposure. An important direction for future research is to continue to explore the differences that might be seen in insightful solution processes and experiences depending on the source of the initial fixation, and the extent to which fixation from prior knowledge and from recent exposure may need to be overcome differently.