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In 1921, John Maynard Keynes and Frank Knight independently insisted on the importance of making a distinction between uncertainty and risk. Keynes referred to matters about which ‘there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever’. Knight claimed that ‘Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of Risk, from which it has never been properly separated’. Knightian uncertainty exists when people cannot assign probabilities to imaginable outcomes. People might know that a course of action might produce bad outcomes A, B, C, D and E, without knowing much or anything about the probability of each. Contrary to a standard view in economics, Knightian uncertainty is real, and it poses challenging and unresolved issues for decision theory and regulatory practice. It bears on many problems, potentially including those raised by artificial intelligence. It is tempting to seek to eliminate the worst-case scenario, and thus to adopt the maximin rule, which might seem to be the appropriate approach under Knightian uncertainty. But serious problems arise if eliminating the worst-case scenario would (1) impose high risks and costs, (2) eliminate large benefits or potential ‘miracles’ or (3) create uncertain risks.
Estimates of the economic costs of climate change rely on guesswork in the face of huge uncertainties, and arbitrary judgements about what is important. The models can produce any number their creators want them to; and typically, they trivialise the risks. Despite being described as ‘worse than useless’ by leading academics, economic analysis of this kind has been credited with a Nobel Prize, and it continues to inform government policy.
This article examines a policy of scaling up LLINs by 10 percentage points from 2020 levels with a 90% cap in the 29 highest-burden countries in Africa along with social and behavioral change (SBC) and information education and communication (IEC) campaigns to increase the use and effectiveness of LLINs. The incremental cost of this scenario compared to a baseline of maintaining malaria interventions at 2020 levels has a present-day (2023) value of 5.7 billion US$ 2021 discounted at 8% over the period 2023–2030 (undiscounted starting at US$ 416 million in 2023 increasing to US$ 1.4 billion in 2030). This investment will prevent 1.07 billion clinical cases and save 1,337,069 lives. With standardized Copenhagen Consensus Center assumptions, the mortality benefit translates to a present value of US$ 225.9 billion. The direct economic gain is also substantial: the incremental scenarios lead to US$ 7.7 billion in reduced health system expenditure from the reduced treatment of cases, a reduction in the cost of delivering malaria control activities, and reduced household out-of-pocket expenses for malaria treatment. The productivity gains from averted employee and caretaker absenteeism and presenteeism add benefits with a present value of US$ 41.7 billion. Each dollar spent on the incremental scenario delivers US$ 48 in social and economic benefits.
Chapter 2 presents a theory of why members choose to collaborate – often with unlikely allies – in a polarized and conflict-prone legislature. Drawing on organizational theory, collaboration is clearly defined as members of Congress working together toward a shared policy goal. This behavior is then placed in the context of social exchange theory, in which social interactions are viewed as interpersonal exchanges of both tangible and intangible goods. Applying social exchange theory to the US House of Representatives predicts that members of Congress will collaborate when all involved have a common goal and expect that they will be better off working together than going alone. The expected costs and benefits of collaboration are informed by previous experiences and interactions, as well the rules and norms of Congress. The social exchange perspective emphasizes collaboration as a function of both self-interest and interdependence. As long as it improves the likelihood of achieving their goals, members will seek to collaborate. Their ability to do so depends on whether they can find a colleague with whom they can reach an agreement for mutual gain.
Professional sports teams commonly reevaluate their location decisions based on the prospect of building new, more attractive, stadiums. Even though a large economic literature warns about the modest (and possibly negative) effects on the local economy of hosting a professional sports team, the economic effects of professional teams and stadiums remain blurry for the general public, and cities in the United States continue to compete to lure teams with generous public subsidies. This article integrates several contributions of the literature into one cohesive and simple framework based on cost–benefit analysis, and provides estimations of the average local economic effects of teams in the four biggest professional leagues in the United States. If professional sports games do not attract visitors from other cities, or if players and owners do not spend a significant share of their income in the area, hosting a team can negatively affect the local economy.
The world remains off-track for the sustainable development goal (SDG) target 3.4, which calls for a one-third reduction in noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) mortality by 2030. This paper presents benefit–cost analyses of various NCD interventions in low-income (LICs) and lower–middle-income (LMCs) countries. We looked at 30 interventions recommended by the Disease Control Priorities Project, including six intersectoral policies (e.g., taxes) and 24 clinical services. We used a previously published model to estimate intervention costs and benefits through 2030, discounted at 8%. We focused on interventions with benefit–cost ratios (BCRs) > 15 and their contribution toward achieving the SDG target. We found that intersectoral policies often provided great value for money, with BCRs ranging from 40 (trans-fat bans) to 100 (tobacco excise taxes). However, seven clinical interventions (e.g., basic treatment of cardiovascular disease or breast cancer) also had BCRs > 15. The overall population impact of clinical interventions over the 2023–2030 period would be much higher than that of the intersectoral policies, which can take many years to reach their peak effects. Fully implementing the best-investment interventions would accelerate progress toward SDG 3.4 everywhere, but only one in 10 countries would achieve the target. This strategy would require an additional US$ 2.4 billion annually across all LICs and LMCs. We conclude that there are several cost-beneficial opportunities to tackle NCDs in LICs and LMCs. In countries with very limited resources, the best-investment interventions could begin to address the major NCD risk factors and build greater health system capacity, with benefits continuing to accrue beyond 2030.
Motivated by traffic congestion and air pollution, Beijing is one of several major cities to restrict vehicle ownership by requiring residents to win a lottery for the right to obtain an additional car. We examine the welfare cost of preventing people from owning cars because of misallocation: under a lottery, some individuals with low willingness to pay (WTP) for cars can obtain cars, while other individuals with high WTP cannot. We estimate welfare costs using a new contingent valuation method survey of Beijing lottery participants which we designed and conducted explicitly for this purpose. We find that restricting vehicle ownership reduced private welfare by 26 billion yuan. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the benefits of lower congestion and pollution roughly equal the costs. Our WTP estimates indicate a net welfare gain of approximately 32 billion yuan if Beijing’s lottery were replaced with an auction, which is similar to previous estimates.
Estimates of the economic costs of climate change rely on guesswork in the face of huge uncertainties, and arbitrary judgements about what is important. The models can produce any number their creators want them to; and typically, they trivialise the risks. Despite being described as ‘worse than useless’ by leading academics, economic analysis of this kind has been credited with a Nobel Prize, and it continues to inform government policy.
Politics is first and foremost about power. Short of the recourse to violence, politicians can follow one of three strategies in the quest for power: a programmatic, patronage, or populist strategy. This book proposes that this choice is grounded in economic trade-offs. Politicians will follow a populist strategy when it represents a more efficient use of their resources than alternative strategies.
Climate change presents two types of risks: those we can adapt to or try to counteract and those beyond our power to cope. The first group includes (1) sea level rise, which threatens much of our infrastructure and cultural patrimony; (2) extreme weather, particularly storm events; (3) climate alterations harmful to agriculture; (4) loss of biodiversity; (5) ocean acidification that interferes with shell production and threatens marine food chains; and (6) threats to human health from disease and especially extreme heat. The second group, which encompasses an unmanageable intensification of all of the first, is the risk of runaway climate change. This can arise if elevated atmospheric carbon concentrations trigger positive feedback mechanisms, like stored methane releases, widespread forest die-offs, reduction of the Earth’s albedo, or changes in prevalent cloud formations that amplify initial warming effects, resulting in a “hothouse Earth.” The tools of standard welfare economics, like calculation of a social cost of carbon and its use in cost–benefit analysis, are unhelpful. Their basis in marginal effects is contradicted by the scale of climate impacts, and their deference to consumer judgment tells us little about the political judgments that must guide policy trade-offs.
Health technology assessment (HTA) plays a central role in the coverage and reimbursement decision-making process for public health expenditure in many countries, including Thailand. However, there have been few attempts to quantitatively understand the benefits of using HTA to inform resource allocation decisions. The objective of this research was to simulate the expected net monetary benefit (NMB) from using HTA-based decision criteria compared to a first-come, first-served (FCFS) approach using data from Thailand.
Methods
A previously published simulation model was adapted to the Thai context which aimed to simulate the impact of using different decision-making criteria to adopt or reject health technologies for public reimbursement. Specifically, the simulation model provides a quantitative comparison between an HTA-based funding rule and a counterfactual (FCFS) funding rule to make decisions on which health technologies should be funded. The primary output of the model was the NMB of using HTA-based decision criteria compared to the counterfactual approach. The HTA-based decision rule in the model involved measuring incremental cost-effectiveness ratios against a cost-effectiveness threshold. The counterfactual decision rule was a FCFS (random) selection of health technologies.
Results
The HTA-based decision rule was associated with a greater NMB compared to the counterfactual. In the investigated analyses, the NMB ranged from THB24,238 million (USD725 million) to THB759,328 million (USD22,719 million). HTA-based decisions led to fewer costs, superior health outcomes (more quality-adjusted life-years).
Conclusions
The results support the hypothesis that HTA can provide health and economic benefits by improving the efficiency of resource allocation decision making.
For decision-makers considering new medicines for reimbursement and public use, both value for money and affordability are important considerations. Whereas a cost-effectiveness model provides information about value for money, a budget impact assessment (BIA) is customized to a specific context and estimates the total investment needed; one part of affordability. Both analytic approaches have parameter uncertainty within them, yet comparatively little attention is given to parameter uncertainty in BIA. Currently, within BIA, uncertainty exploration is limited to point estimates for plausible scenarios, prompting the question: can a decision-maker be confident in point estimates? Within this paper, our intent is to revitalize the discussion of uncertainty in BIA. In the context of health technology assessments submitted to support reimbursement decision-making, we propose reliance on probabilistic sensitivity analysis conducted in the cost-effectiveness model. If assumptions made in a cost-effectiveness model are valid, probabilistic cost estimates from the model, with the same perspective adopted as the BIA, should also inform BIA. Mean and variance of population outcomes, given parameter uncertainty in model inputs, are estimable from model outputs. As sufficiently large random samples are drawn from a population, the distribution of sample means will follow an approximately normal distribution. Therefore, when drawing samples from the model to inform estimates of budget impact, the assumption of an approximately normal distribution for costs is reasonable. We propose that the variance in mean costs from the cost-effectiveness model also reflects the variance in budget impact estimates and should be used to estimate budget impact confidence intervals.
President Reagan’s 1981 executive order exalted the use of formal cost–benefit analysis in determining whether to promulgate regulations (to the extent environmental laws permit those considerations). Regulations to curb pollution from oil and gas operations and the combustion of oil and gas, as documented in various studies, yield larger benefits than costs. To tilt cost–benefit analysis to disfavor these regulations, the administration adopted methods that systematically understated the economic benefits from regulations. It ignored public health and environmental benefits from reducing emissions, despite documentation by scientific studies, and ignored benefits that are difficult to capture in monetary terms. It also adopted assumptions that gave only limited consideration to the well-being of future generations and of non-Americans, both controversial ethical choices. The administration, forced by existing court decisions to take into account climate impacts, chose an extremely paltry sum of $1 per ton of carbon dioxide (down from $51, as calculated by the Interagency Working Group during the Obama administration). Armed with skewed economic analysis, the administration weakened numerous regulations governing the operations of the oil and gas sector, including curbing emissions of methane, a potent greenhouse gas.
Assuming that all patients are created equal may lead many to suffer prolonged, frustrating, and expensive trial-and-error therapy, in which one treatment after another is attempted in an effort to remedy patients’ maladies. Critics of this traditional kind of care champion a new approach – personalized or precision medicine – in which genomic testing might help us understand and remedy the ravages of rare genetic illnesses as well as energize efforts to treat more common afflictions. After three decades of well-funded research, has personalized medicine measured up to the hype of its ushering in a fresh paradigm for delivering unsurpassed health care? Has it displaced trial-and-error treatment? Or is personalized medicine itself undergoing a trial-and-error process of development and testing? These and other questions must be answered if we are to best deploy limited resources to combat a wide variety of diseases – from individual genetic disorders to devastating pandemics.
This chapter reviews Cost–Benefit Analysis (CBA) as one of the most commonly applied methods for assessing engineering projects, particularly when a choice is to be made between alternatives. It is often wrongly assumed that a CBA is an objective way of assessing costs and benefits and that the result unequivocally presents the best outcome. CBA is rooted in utilitarian thinking in ethics which argues that moral rightness depends on whether positive consequences are being maximized. CBA – together with its underlying ethical theory – has been abundantly criticized in the philosophy literature. This chapter is not just another voice in this "philosophical choir": not because the critique is not valid, but because it does not necessarily dismiss the CBA altogether. The chapter aims to show what a CBA can and cannot do and how it can be made more suitable for assessing the risks, costs, and benefits of engineering projects. It provides several ways of circumventing some of the ethical objections to a CBA by amending, adjusting, or supplementing it – and when none of these can help – rejecting the CBA as a method and substituting a multi-criteria analysis.
The problem of how to evaluate investments in airports has now been studied for over 50 years. This paper analyzes the use of different methods like cost–benefit analysis (CBA), economic impact analysis (EIA), and computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to address the question. It assesses the strength and weaknesses of each method, and it discusses which methods have been used in different countries. The paper argues that the CBA approach and the newer CGE modeling approach address the policy issue well and that both methods are appropriate, although improvements are possible, especially in the newer aspects of evaluation. Furthermore, more data intensive CGE models are able to analyze broader aspects of the evaluation question for which CBA has had difficulty. EIA does not address the problem satisfactorily, and it misleads air transport policy. But this evaluation contrasts sharply with practice. EIA has been extensively used to decide on airport investment. CGE approaches are very promising, though further work is needed for them to reach their full potential. This paper pays particular attention to the relationship between CBA and CGE in airport investment evaluation and also the possible role of wider economic benefits (WEBs) of aviation in evaluation.
Biodiversity points are a quantitative measure for biodiversity. For over a decade, biodiversity points are being applied in the Netherlands for measuring the impact of roads, enclosure dams, and other water management projects on the non-use value of biodiversity. Biodiversity points are quite similar to the quality-adjusted life years used for cost-effectiveness analysis of healthcare treatments. Biodiversity points can be calculated by multiplying the size of the ecotope (e.g., number of hectare), the ecological quality of the ecotope (0–100 %), and the ecological scarcity of each type of ecotope. For many infrastructure projects, the impact on the non-use value of biodiversity can be a principal purpose or a major co-benefit or trade-off, for example, for a park, a fish sluice, a road, an ecoduct, an enclosure dam, or a marine protected area. Biodiversity points are a simple, transparent, and standardized way to aggregate and quantify the qualitative or ordinal assessments by ecological experts. For measuring the non-use value of biodiversity, they are also more informative than valuation by revealed or stated preferences methods. This paper provides the first overview of the application of this method in the Dutch practice of cost–benefit analysis. It also discusses its merits and limitations. The calculation and use of biodiversity points are illustrated by four case studies.
Proponents of the public goods argument (‘PGA’) seek to ground the authority of the state on its putative indispensability as a means of providing public goods. But many of the things we take to be public goods – including many of the goods commonly invoked in support of the PGA – are actually what we might term publicized goods. A publicized good is any whose ‘public’ character results only from a policy decision to make some (otherwise private) good freely and universally available. This fact poses complications for the PGA, insofar as the set of possible publicized goods is quite extensive indeed.
A commonly assumed reason for the delegation of authority from a legislature (politicians) to bureaucracies is that the bureaucrats have an information advantage over the politicians, including knowledge of cost–benefit analysis (CBA). But it is reasonable to assume that the bureaucrats use their information advantage by taking all relevant aspects of policy into account? We model the use of CBA using a delegation model and then test the theoretical predictions with empirical data collected from five Swedish government agencies. The empirical results lend support both for the hypothesis that risk aversion concerning the environmental outcome, the bureaucrats’ environmental attitudes, and the cost of taking CBA information into account have a considerable impact on the probability of using information from a CBA. Hence risk averse and bureaucrats with strong environmental preferences are less likely and bureaucrats with low cost of doing a CBA more likely than other bureaucrats to use CBA information. Finally, a binding governmental budget constraint may positively influence a bureaucrat’s choice of using CBA information. A tentative conclusion is therefore that it may be possible to increase the use of CBA by making the budgetary consequences of policies much clearer and demanding due consideration of costs.
Social discounting conventions vary widely. Some differences reflect institutional constraints, but many reflect differing assumptions about how a social discount rate should be derived and applied. The divide between advocates of social opportunity cost and social time preference (STP) frameworks seems unbridgeable. There is no consensus among STP advocates on whether the social cost of funding $1 of public spending is barely more than $1 of consumption or perhaps more than $2; or on whether the covariance of public service benefits with income merits a discount rate premium that is trivial or a few percentage points. The practicalities of government fund raising are sometimes overlooked. The issues are here reviewed in the light of the literature and of experience with developing and applying social discounting regimes and extended debates within government.