In this chapter I examine the “real life” of dialogic constitutionalism. I begin the chapter by presenting the details of one recent dialogic example -namely the development of Argentina’s debate over abortion - and from that illustration I examine in which cases and for what reasons certain types of democratic dialogues may be considered valuable.

In this chapter, I examine what I take to be the most interesting recent development in constitutionalism, namely the emergence of “dialogic constitutionalism” -a practice that seems to be in line with the regulatory ideal defended in the book as a “conversation between equals.” The starting point of the chapter is the idea is that the system of ”checks and balances” pits the branches of government against each other, and that, in recent years, alternative practices began to develop that, in one way or another, “lubricate” the gears linking the different branches of government and favoring a more cooperative attitude between them. I exemplify these changes from two cases, one “judicial” and the other “political.” As an example of the first, I refer to the well-known decision by the new Constitutional Court of South Africa: Grootboom. As an example of the second, I refer to the now famous “nevertheless clause,” a political reform adopted in Canada. These cases allow me to describe in greater specificity what a “dialogical” approach to constitutionalism imply.

This chapter will focus on the manner in which non-judicial actors engage in constitutional guardianship, using the Netherlands as a case study. Article 120 of the Dutch Constitution explicitly prohibits courts from examining the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament. Accordingly, it has fallen to other institutions to ensure that constitutional rules and values are duly taken into account, especially when new legislation is under consideration. The chapter will focus in particular on the role that governments and civil servants play in verifying a bill’s constitutional conformity during the drafting stage; on the Council of State, which is tasked with providing non-partisan advice to the government on new bills; and on how Parliament itself goes about confronting constitutional issues during legislative debates. The Dutch experience shows that it is possible to successfully ensure constitutional supremacy even when judges are not available to act as ultimate protectors of the national constitution.