Most of the textual sources concerning the imperial court are relatively short; many recount anecdotes illuminating a single moment, a memorable saying, or a specific practice. The surviving works of history and biography do, however, contain a few longer narratives of connected sequences of events at court. Such narratives most commonly occur when historians and biographers describe crises, when events at court had wider implications for the political history of the Principate. Prompted by this observation, this chapter presents a selection of the richest crisis narratives. The narratives presented relate to: the fall of Claudius’ wife, Messalina; the loss of position at court suffered by Nero’s mother, Agrippina the Younger, and her ensuing murder by her son; and the assassinations of the emperors Domitian and Commodus.

Dio’s account of the second century AD, the ‘Antonine period’ broadly construed, has not received the same attention when compared with the better-preserved Julio-Claudian books or the exciting contemporary narrative of the Severan age. This chapter examines Dio’s portrayal of five second-century emperors: Trajan, Hadrian, Marcus Aurelius, Commodus and Pertinax. It focuses particularly on the role that military qualities (or lack thereof) played in the historian’s assessment of their character and reigns. In Dio’s view, the best emperors were not necessarily the best generals, but leaders who were able to maintain the frontiers in the face of foreign threats and kept the troops disciplined and ready for defence at all time. A good emperor should be an all-rounder, able to balance attention to military matters with concern for the civilian government of the empire. In the second-century narrative, it is Marcus Aurelius who best embodies these qualities.

Gresham’s law is much more than the idea that ‘bad money drives out good’ always and everywhere. Instead, historians should use Gresham’s law as a complex and interconnected set of conditions and premises involving ‘external’ elements (legal tender laws, differing coinage standards, transaction costs etc.) and an ‘internal’ sensitivity among (some!) coin-users to the precious metal content of coins.The ‘external’ conditions of Gresham’s law seem to have been inconsistently present at best. Legal coin values and precious metal values were more or less redundant during first century and a half of the Principate. A growing dissonance between legal value and metal value, however, emerged by the late second century AD, putting pressure on coin-users’ monetary habits. The actions of Roman authorities encouraged any metallist-minded coin-users to avoid the now relative high costs of monetary exchange at legal values and instead adopt special-purpose uses for money. The counterfactual logic of Gresham’s law, therefore, offers historians both improved understanding of Roman coin-users’ thinking as well as broader insights into the workings of the Roman monetary economy.