This chapter offers an explication and partial defense of Ronald Dworkin’s philosophy of international law.It begins with an overview of Dworkin’s objections to legal positivism and the account of law Dworkin offers in its place, commonly referred to as (legal) interpretivism.A reconstruction of Dworkin’s analysis of international law follows, which in addition to being of interest in its own right usefully illustrates Dworkin’s interpretivist account of law and his reasons for thinking it superior to the one defended by legal positivists.The chapter concludes with rebuttals to a series of objections that have been raised to Dworkin’s analysis of international law.The defense is only partial, however, since it presumes Dworkin’s interpretivist account of law.

This chapter examines the legitimacy of international law.It begins with an analysis of the concept of legitimacy, or perhaps more precisely, of legitimate authority.It then considers four possible grounds for international law’s legitimacy: enhancing its subjects’ ability to act as they have most reason to act, the consent of those it claims as subjects, considerations of fair play, and international law’s democratic credentials.The chapter concludes with an examination of reasons why we should care about international law’s legitimacy; indeed, why from a moral point of view increasing the international legal order’s legitimacy might even take priority over making it more just.