This article explores Richard Fishacre’s (1200–1248) thinking on the relationship between theology and philosophy. It shows how, despite constructing what, on the surface at least, appears to be a traditional understanding of theology’s relationship to philosophy, Fishacre in practice offers a very creative interpretation of how the two sciences interact. For Fishacre, theology does not simply illumine philosophy by guiding it away from error. Instead, it steps into the fray of ordinary philosophical dispute so as to uncover novel ways of reading natural phenomena, ones which philosophy, by itself at least, is blind to. To demonstrate how this is so, the article explores how Fishacre appeals to Christ’s resurrected body to justify some of his most controversial arguments in the field of natural philosophy. Two specific areas are considered: Fishacre’s claim that light in medio is a body and his assertion that the stars and planets are made from the terrestrial elements as opposed to the celestial quintessence, as Aristotle claims. Each of these aspects of Fishacre’s physics show how, for the Dominican, theology can, when appropriate, step onto the philosophical plane and help the natural philosopher to discover truths that go against the philosophical consensus.

Das Papier bezieht sich auf die exegetische Auffassung, es beruhe die Argumentation von Gal 3,10 gerade auch auf einer unterdrückten praemissa minor („die Toravorschriften lassen sich nicht vollständig einhalten“), und es richtet sich gegen die These von P. C. Moore, nach welcher die in 2,16c aufgenommenen Worte aus Ps 143(142),2 genau diese Prämisse bieten sollen. Nicht zuletzt die Aufeinanderfolge der Partikeln γάρ, (ὅτι) δέ, ὅτι und δέ in Gal 3,10b, 11a, 11b und 12a lässt auf ein deutlich wahrscheinlicheres Szenario aufmerken: Paulus argumentiert in 3,10-12 mittels zweier Syllogismen, und er benutzt dabei letztlich durch biblische Formulierungen (aus: Deut 27,26; Hab 2,4; Lev 18,5) vorgegebene, abgesicherte Prämissen.

Here New Blackfriars is publishing for the first time a set of three talks given in 1979 by the distinguished Dominican theologian Herbert McCabe (1926-2001). It appears that the talks were delivered in Leeds, UK, during a Holy Week retreat (or something like that). The text below derives from a typescript put together by someone unknown on the basis of what seems to have been an audio recording. McCabe is clearly drawing on these talks in Chapters 7 to 9 of his 1987 book God Matters (chapters which are reprints of articles published in New Blackfriars in 1986). However, the original talks as they appear below have the brevity, freshness, informality, spontaneity, and blemishes characteristic of a ‘live performance’ rather than a reworking and development of them for publication coming seven years after they were delivered. That is why New Blackfriars is now publishing them in the hope that they might interest readers of the journal, which McCabe edited for many years. New Blackfriars is grateful to Marie Turner for drawing its attention to them and for sending it a copy of the typescript of the 1979 talks.

This article argues that Summa Theologiae 3a Q17 art. 2 is consistent with the attribution of a proper being to Christ's human nature. It proceeds in three stages. First, it examines the emergence of the problem of Christ's being through an analysis of the Chalcedonian Decree. In so doing it argues that the decree commits its adherents to accepting that Christ's human nature was an individual nature and it shows how Aquinas used his account of natures and essences to interpret this. Second, it considers five objections to the view which denies a proper being to Christ's human nature. Third, it argues that Christ's individual human nature can possess a proper being because (i) esse does not render an individual nature a person and (ii) the character and function of the divine esse entails that it could not receive any new esse from the individual human nature Christ possesses.

This article argues that views of sin and salvation are shaped by one's view of God. Thus, whenever it is thought that God is a metaphor that theologians can change to attain a desired social or psychological result, then the true meaning of sin and salvation are lost. Relying on Karl Barth's view of Jesus as the Judge judged in our place, this article argues against ideas that sin can no longer be understood as self-will, and that salvation must be understood only as our working for a better world. Such views fail to recognise that, since only God can reveal God, the true meaning of sin is and remains most visible today in our attempts to redefine God and salvation in social and psychological rather than strictly theological terms.

Gustaf Aulén's Christus Victor soteriological/atonement motif is constituted by the central theme of divine victory over the devil. Few scholars discuss at length the significance of Christ's victory over the devil in Aquinas's soteriology. A comparative analysis of the two treatments of Christ's victory over the devil will unveil the role and significance of that victory in Aquinas's soteriology. According to Aquinas, Christ's humanity and all his human actions are the instrumental efficient causes of salvation and, necessarily, his victory over the devil. Therefore, Christ's life prior to his Passion may be examined for evidence of that victory. The most obvious event for such an analysis is Christ's temptations which will offer a unique insight into Aquinas's presentation of Christ's victory over the devil.

This article examines the version of Christocentric exemplarism recently proposed by theologian Patrick Clark, whose Thomistic virtue ethics incorporates features of Linda Zagzebski's exemplarist moral theory. This article suggests that Clark and similar approaches to Christocentric virtue ethics would be better situated to appropriate Zagzebski's insights into exemplarity if it gave more prominence to the imitation of Jesus.

In recent work on the doctrine of atonement there has been little positive said about the view that Christ's work is principally a moral example. This article addresses that lacuna. It sets out two versions of the moral example doctrine, which are often conflated in the literature. According to the first, Christ is merely a moral example. Such a view does not amount to a doctrine of atonement. According to the second, Christ's moral example brings about reconciliation with God through a transformative experience. This does amount to a doctrine of atonement. I raise some traditional objections to the moral example view and show that it has resources with which to withstand them. However, moral exemplarism still has difficulties dealing with a cluster of biblical motifs about atonement. In the final analysis, it is a partial but not complete account of the saving work of Christ.

The article argues that philosophers of religion and theologians should pay less attention to the so-called ‘classical attributes’ of God and more attention to the neglected, but venerable, tradition of the divine names. Grounded in Scripture, these reflections are predicated on the doctrine of Creation, and what it is for human beings as creatures to speak of their Creator. The article demonstrates that, even the so-called ‘classical attributes’, when placed in the divine names tradition, are far from being mere ‘natural theology’ but Christological to the core and lead us, through intellect, into the mysteries of awe and prayer.