The Anglo-Dutch bombardment of Algiers on 27 August 1816 indicated how, after the Congress of Vienna, a new order based on collective security was taking shape, not just on the continent, but also in the Mediterranean Sea. This chapter suggests that 1816 was a moment of departure from past traditions and signified the creation of a new Mediterranean order. Defining features of that order – such as modes of cooperation, the linkage to the Congress System, the use of security as a legitimizing discourse and the important roles of smaller and non-European powers – all came into play during the Anglo–Dutch bombardment. Additionally, this Anglo–Dutch cooperation shows how various states took the lead in the fight against piracy, dependent upon the situation. There was not a single naval hegemon who executed the repressive effort. At this early stage, smaller powers initially drove the repression of ‘Barbary piracy’, later to be followed by Great Britain, Russia and France. The effort became a truly pan-European reorganisation of security in the Mediterranean.

The chapter covers the arrests and detention of the conspirators, the coercion used to force some to testify against their colleagues, preparations for the trials and the selection of the juries, public reactions to the news, identities of the men freed without prosecution.

Towards the end of the war against Napoleon, the Allies declared that they were fighting a ‘noble war’, to restore European equilibrium. They presented themselves in stark contrast to Napoleon’s hegemonic ambitions. The Allies agreed on the need to create a ‘just equilibrium’ by curtailing French imperialism, but also harboured imperial ambitions to further their own respective interests in Europe as they negotiated for peace. When the First Treaty of Paris was signed on 30 May 1814, the French constitution was revised to be more liberal. The resulting Charte Constitutionelle, adopted on 4 June 1814, was an important instrument in the fight against terror. Finally, the Congress of Vienna was marked by Napoleon’s return to France: as he marched towards Paris, the Allies confirmed the statutes and treaties that would shape the occupation of France and ensure the ‘safety of Europe’. The final battle against Napoleon saw the Duke of Wellington at the helm of the alliance. The Allied sense of communality and solidarity in the name of Europe’s safety would see Napoleon defeated, but it would also invite tensions and inconsistencies in times of peace and the Allied occupation of France.

Ambassadorial conferences formed a primary mechanism of the Vienna system of international relations and of the related European security culture that emerged after 1815. These gatherings offered more flexible opportunities for multilateral consultation and negotiation than did the rarer congress summit meetings. The London conferences of 1816–19 were the first to be planned, as part of British Foreign Secretary Castlereagh's efforts to internationalise abolition of the African slave trade, and they ultimately also took up interdiction of the Barbary corsairs of North Africa. The conferences established connections between these issues that are crucial to understanding European policies toward both abolition and the corsairs, and which reveal how these questions were matters of European – and African – security as well as of humanitarian intervention. As the Vienna settlement extended beyond Europe into the Atlantic and Islamic worlds, the projection of European power overseas to protect security of persons and property could at the same time bring violence in its wake.

This chapter discusses the role of diplomats at the Congress of Vienna, with a specific focus on the British Foreign Secretary, Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh. While accepting that Castlereagh, like all other diplomats, was motivated by a realist maximization of Britain’s interests, for which the talk of peace and cooperation tosome extent constituted mere rhetoric, the chapter emphasises how diplomats like Castlereagh were formed by the experiences and viewpoints they had accumulated over a long period of time. It was this political socialisation, notably shaped by the lengthy struggle against French Jacobinism and Bonapartism, that influenced Castlereagh’s beliefs about the most dangerous threats to the security of the Continent, and by implication, of Great Britain. These mixed beliefs informed his decision-making in ways that promoted both British interests and collective security and peace in the years after 1813.