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1 results

  • Conclusion

  • Tony Cowan
  • Book:
    Holding Out
    Published online:
    31 March 2023
    Print publication:
    20 April 2023, pp 276-285

  • Summary

    Recaps why 1917 Entente spring offensive a good case study of German command, and derivation of the command tasks. Sums up findings on the patchy fulfilment of the tasks. Shows why they apply to German command throughout the First World War and beyond; draws parallels with British and French experience.

    The German army which emerges was neither a picture of military excellence nor a gang of incompetents. Analysing its command tasks and their fulfilment produces a more rounded and more humanly recognisable picture of German command and of the army as an institution. This helps understand better their contribution to Germany’s ability to hold out for four years. In early 1917, the army was flawed and under increasing strain, but still able to think and operate effectively. It remained too formidable an opponent for the Entente to defeat despite their numerical and material superiority.