How to theorise the pleasure of thinking? Psychoanalysis is the rare discipline of psychology that has accounted for the pleasure of thinking. Chapter 3 follows a historical presentation of psychoanalysis; it first presents how, when founding psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud theorised thinking and its pleasure, an experience he obviously himself had. The chapter then explores the two next generations of psychoanalysts. It thus focuses on two post-war authors, Wilfred Bion and Donald Winnicott, who, in very contrasting ways, give us elements to further understand psychic activity and its pleasures. Finally, it examines the work of contemporary theoreticians who, building on Freud, Bion, and Winnicott, turn their interests to the modalities of thinking and, with it, allude also to pleasure (André Green), whether in sublimation (Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor), daydreaming (Thomas Ogden), or the pleasure of insights.

This chapter gives an account of the different psychoanalytic traditions and their approaches to PD: the Kleinian/Bionian model, the British object relations perspective, Kohut’s self psychology, the structural object relations model, the interpersonal-relational approach, and mentalizing theory. The chapter goes on to describe two contemporary psychodynamic treatments, along with their evidence base: transference-focused therapy and mentalization-based treatment. Recent developments in the authors’ thinking in relation to PD are then described, partly in the context of recent work in the area of a general psychopathology or “p” factor. In particular, the authors discuss personality disorder in relation to epistemic trust, and suggest that psychopathology might be understood as a form of disordered social cognition, perpetuated by the obstacles to communication that these social cognitive difficulties create. It is postulated that effective therapeutic interventions for PD possess the shared characteristic of stimulating epistemic trust and creating a virtuous circle of improved social communication.

The chapter moves from these positions of textual paranoia and frustration and makes the case for a Kleinian theory of aesthetics. It outlines how that theory would operate. It surveys the relatively scarce body of work on Klein and aesthetics and elaborates a framework for understanding the problems the previous chapters raise.