The chapter deals with the Third OHL and its ideas, differing views of civilian and military leadership of how to continue and end the war.

The chapter deals with Erich von Falkenhayn, his understanding of the European stalemate, his plans for a new strategy in November 1915 and Bethmann Hollweg’s hesitation to accept Falkenhayn’s separate peace strategy. It also covers the Ottoman intervention and its consequences.

The chapter deals with German politics in 1917 and the effects of the first Russian revolution in 1917, offering chances for peace in the east.

The chapter deals with the German strategy for 1916, the alternatives, Falkenhayn’s plan for the Battle of Verdun, the start of the offensive and reasons for its failure.

This chapter analyzes the role that the dreadnought arms race with Britain began to play in Germany asa surrogate for its largely failed “World Policy” and how that contributed to a growing German debt crisis. In the six years before the outbreak of war, keeping to a set ratio of German and British battleships was increasingly linked with Germany’s “world status” and national honor in the minds of the German public, and Schmoller and his students had played a key role in shaping these perceptions. Even so, it put impossible strains on German public finances, the reform of which became the last major campaign of Bülow’s career and to which von Halle and Schmoller contributed actively. This reform fell far short and ultimately cost Bülow his chancellorship. Matching Franco-Russian military expansion would add additional fiscal burdens and a heightened sense of insecurity. One of the few remaining prongs of "World Policy," the Baghdad railroad, faced impossible hurdles that Karl Helfferich was enlisted to overcome. Ultimately a grand bargain between Britain and Germany around Mesopotamian oil cleared the remaining hurdles for its completion just weeks before the outbreak of war.