Chapter 6 characterizes the development of Kant’s views of the sublime in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and other pre-Critical writings and materials. The description of the sublime in the third Critique is shaped by Kant’s moral turn and his interest in a principle of natural purposiveness. The chapter shows how the early Kant synthesizes the ideas of Edmund Burke on the one hand and Alexander Baumgarten and Moses Mendelssohn on the other. It reveals how Kant shifts from a psychological–anthropological account of the sublime to a non-empirical, transcendental one.

Chapter 1 surveys philosophers from the German and British aesthetic and intellectual traditions with which Kant directly engages in the third Critique and pre-Critical materials. What is the role of rules in his early aesthetics? Laying the foundation for some of the book’s later analyses, the chapter shows how the early Kant synthesizes ideas from his German and British predecessors.

Chapter 7 explores ugliness and disgust (Ekel). In providing an overview of the third Critique position, the chapter argues that there cannot be pure aesthetic judgments of the ugly. In his early accounts, Kant views the responses to ugliness and disgust as unpleasant and therefore as (what Kant would call) “interested.” He typically discusses ugliness and disgust in connection with a teleological perspective of the whole of nature and of natural purposes. The ugly is disagreeable, since it is dysfunctional or asymmetrical (or both). A version of this view carries over into the third Critique. The ugly, if and when it is judged by the principle of nature’s purposiveness, would be contrapurposive and therefore disagreeable.

Chapter 8 focuses on Kant’s reaction to the metaphysics of quantity found in Leibnizian and Wolffian rationalism. Leibniz had broad ambitions for a unified theory of all knowledge that subsumed mathematics under metaphysics. Leibniz accordingly sought metaphysical definitions of quality and quantity that in turn supported metaphysical definitions of similarity and equality as identity of quality and quantity, respectively. A criterion of success was that these definitions corresponded to Euclid’s geometrical notions of similarity and equality. This chapter examines Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten’s views of quality and quantity and the contrast between them, which was closely tied to the conditions of their representation and distinct cognition. Kant adopts some of their understanding of the metaphysics of quantity, such as the definitions of similarity and equality as identity of quality and quantity, respectively. At the same time, he radically reforms it. Kant distinguishes between two notions of quantity, quanta and quantitas, and hence draws two contrasts with two corresponding notions of quality: quality versus quantum, and quality versus quantitas. Most importantly, Kant holds that quanta require intuition for their representation. This preserves the general framework of the Leibnizian and Wolffian metaphysics of quantity while radically reforming it at its foundation.

Chapter 1 elaborates on the historical context within which Kant developed his critique of early post-Leibnizian philosophy. It presents the pertinent elements of Wolff’s highly influential metaphysics and theory of cognition as well as the main thrust of Crusius’s critique of Wolff. Since Kant targeted both Wolff, Crusius, and those who followed in their wake, the chapter also discusses the main tenets of Crusius’s own metaphysics and the controversies that resulted from efforts among early post-Wolffian philosophers to reconcile Leibnizian monadology and Newtonian physics.

The Romans had a difficult relationship with the kind of luxury and excess that we think of as indicators of moral and social decadence. But in many ways they revelled in such luxury. Readily accepting the financial rewards of empire, they spent huge sums on their own benefits. Whether in the colossal public games in the amphitheatre and the circus, in the opulent imperial bath complexes, or in extravagant private villas, Romans of all social levels delighted in the very best that life was thought to offer. Chapter 1 examines how far the evidence supports this somewhat melodramatic view of Rome by looking at the ways in which luxury spread in the Roman world. It also looks at the ways this growth in luxury compelled the Romans to create new concepts to understand the phenomenon. Luxury was almost never seen as a simple index of increased wealth. Rather, it raised all manner of moral issues among Rome’s ruling classes, many of which long outlived the end of the Roman empire itself.

In the middle of the eighteenth century, the German rationalist philosopher Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten originated the ‘science’ of aesthetics as a means of analysing sensuous responses to art and nature. By the end of the century, in his Critique of Judgment (1790), Immanuel Kant demonstrated that aesthetic preferences or judgments of taste operated outside the realm of reason but could nonetheless be subjected to categorical treatment. The relationship between this aesthetic tradition and decadence is an intimate and complex one. Both the stock figure of the aesthete and the aestheticism of ‘art for art’s sake’ are classic decadent tropes with obvious sources in figures such as Théophile Gautier, Walter Pater, and Joris-Karl Huysmans. Yet the connections between aesthetics and decadence are more conflicted than might first appear: historically, aesthetics has served both as a site for the theorization of decadence and as the basis of an attempt to limit it, as in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. The purpose of this chapter is to examine these intricate ties.