Shifting the focus from Borneo to the Persian Gulf, this chapter explains why Qatar and Bahrain – but not the other administrative units in the lower Gulf – achieved separate independence. Britain had been involved in the Persian Gulf for centuries until its withdrawal in 1971. Through treaties signed by the British and local rulers, there had been nine separate sheikhdoms in the lower Gulf with the same colonial status of a British protected state: Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Bahrain, Dubai, Fujairah, Qatar, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm al-Quwain. They had similar social, cultural, political, and historical backgrounds, but they varied in their decolonization outcomes. All of them participated in negotiations under Abu Dhabi’s initiative between 1968 and 1971 to form a federation. Among the other eight, six eventually joined the newly established United Arab Emirates. The other two, Qatar and Bahrain, however, chose to achieve independence on their own. This chapter analyzes the sheikhdoms in depth using within-case and comparative analyses to reveal that Qatar and Bahrain achieved separate independence because of their early oil development and the protectorate system, while the lack of these two factors resulted in the incorporation of the others into the UAE.

In the Middle East and North Africa region, laws organising the judiciary and bilateral agreements on judicial cooperation expressly permit the use of foreign judges on domestic courts. Judicial ‘secondments’ of this type allow host courts to deal with increasing caseloads expeditiously, while providing shadow-training for domestic judges in the long term. This chapter outlines the practice of sharing judges in the region and describes how foreign judges serve on domestic courts in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, in law and practice. Using the lens of political economy, the analysis highlights two trends in the region. The first is the recruitment of foreign judges to fill skills and knowledge-based gaps among domestic judiciaries. The second is the high degree of executive control over the movement of judges, in both sending and receiving states, with implications for the separation of powers, judicial independence and executive accountability.

The Cold War, oil, and new borders intensified the fight for hegemony in the Middle East. The shah maneuvered around thorny international issues by keeping intact his ties to different US administrations. Iran watched the Vietnam War with concern but maintained a balanced stance. Elsewhere, the creation of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) brought some regional cooperation. However, in the Persian Gulf, Iran became isolated and faced competition from the Arabian Peninsula and the newly Arab states of the south. Its conflict with Iraq escalated until a short-lived truce was concluded in 1975. Iran also flexed its muscles by supporting the Sultanate in Oman during the conflict in Dhofar, but the shah’s interventions only fueled the domestic unrest against his rule. Student groups and artists increasingly decried the shah’s dictatorial ways.

This chapter explores efforts to shape Bahrain’s political field and the ways in which its politically charged geographical location as the ‘epicentre’ of the struggle for supremacy between Riyadh and Tehran shapes these efforts. It explores the struggle for Bahrain’s political field and its social reality which has allowed a range of domestic and regional actors to become involved in the contestation over principles of vision and division, deploying economic, political, and religious capital in the process. Central to this is a number of networks and relationships that shape perceptions and behaviour, along tribal, ethnic, and religious lines. As Saudi and Iranian efforts to impose order on the region focused on Bahrain, they intersected with a complex set of intersectional phenomena bringing together tensions between rulers and ruled over social, economic, and political issues, all of which play out in the context of the transnational field.

Using the concept of a revolutionary situation as a turning point in which previously accepted social structures and relations are in flux, this chapter demonstrates the profoundly revolutionary nature of the 2011 Arab uprisings. Tracing the history of the revolutionary situations in each case – Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Libya and Yemen – the chapter demonstrates how mass uprisings of historically remarkable size and breadth established new forms and sites of sovereignty and challenged existing social relations. These included mass, class-based revolts rooted in dissatisfaction with decades of neoliberal economic policy in the region, and the rejection of hierarchies of gender and sect. These revolutionary situations often produced a new sense of expanded and collective selfhood, which would then require counter-revolutionary violence to be eradicated. This chapter, thus, outlines the revolutionary situations that post-2011 counter-revolutionaries sought to end.

This chapter focuses on Syria and Bahrain, states in which the ruling regimes of 2011 managed to retain power: albeit in the case of Syria at the cost of more than a decade of civil war. Acknowledging the great differences between the two states, the chapter highlights the similarity in the role of sectarianism and external intervention: binding the counter-revolutions from above, below and without. The chapter presents a materialist understanding of sectarianism, however, as the product of both particular forms of political economy and counter-revolutionary strategy. In Syria, this produced a cross-sectarian ruling elite, albeit with an Alawi core, that nonetheless had profoundly sectarian effects: whereas in Bahrain, sectarianism served more straightforwardly as a prop of the Khalifa ruling house. The Syrian counter-revolution could also rely, albeit to a lesser degree, on the inheritance of the previous revolution from above and the promotion of an ideology of development and modernisation. In both states, narratives of external intervention – Western, Zionist or Iranian – served to strengthen the counter-revolutionary cause, while extensive outside support for counter-revolution – mainly Russian and Iranian in Syria, Saudi and Emirati in Bahrain – made up for the limited appeal of the counter-revolution from below. This chapter focuses on Syria and Bahrain, states in which the ruling regimes of 2011 managed to retain power: albeit in the case of Syria at the cost of more than a decade of civil war. Acknowledging the great differences between the two states, the chapter highlights the similarity in the role of sectarianism and external intervention: binding the counter-revolutions from above, below and without. The chapter presents a materialist understanding of sectarianism, however, as the product of both particular forms of political economy and counter-revolutionary strategy. In Syria, this produced a cross-sectarian ruling elite, albeit with an Alawi core, that nonetheless had profoundly sectarian effects: whereas in Bahrain, sectarianism served more straightforwardly as a prop of the Khalifa ruling house. The Syrian counter-revolution could also rely, albeit to a lesser degree, on the inheritance of the previous revolution from above and the promotion of an ideology of development and modernisation. In both states, narratives of external intervention – Western, Zionist or Iranian – served to strengthen the counter-revolutionary cause, while extensive outside support for counter-revolution – mainly Russian and Iranian in Syria, Saudi and Emirati in Bahrain – made up for the limited appeal of the counter-revolution from below.

When the constitutional bargain process is non-inclusive and nonparticipatory, and when civil society fails to operate as a democratizing force, the constitutional outcome is not likely to resolve the political and societal ills of authoritarianism. Chapter 6 addressed several of these constitutional design issues. It first examines cases where constitutions failed to limit the arbitrary powers of the monarchs (Morocco and Jordan) or presidents (Egypt and Algeria) by utilizing a constitutional design that lacked textual clarity, adopting contradictory provisions, and creating parallel institutions. Next, the chapter examines “non-consensual” constitutional designs in deeply divided societies. First, in countries where an ethnoreligious minority ruled against the majority’s will (Bahrain and Syria), new constitutions failed to institutionalize power-sharing. Second, where regional cleavages, rivalries, and grievances were prominent issues, as in Yemen and Libya, federalist and region-based power-sharing constitutional arrangements failed to prevent conflict. Lastly, where a country was deeply divided across ideological and identity lines (as was Egypt in 2012), winner-take-all approach to constitutional drafting alienated half of the population, leading to the failure of the constitution and the democratic transitional process.

Relations with Assyria dominated from the tenth to the late seventh century. Marduk’s reputation was tarnished as Babylon lost power. Tribes of Chaldeans and Arameans moved into the Sealand, where some settled, becoming literate and powerful. Iron gradually replaced bronze. Fine stone carving continued. Warlike Assyrian kings venerated Babylon, incorporated its gods into their pantheon, and treated the city separately from the rest of Babylonia; but Assyria and Babylon clashed east of the Tigris at Der. Chaldeans intermittently took the throne. Tiglath-pileser III, the first Assyrian king to become king of Babylon, took part in the New Year festival; Sargon II, the second, deposed a Chaldean and deported many disloyal groups, but invested in the city. When Sennacherib ruled Assyria, various rulers of Babylon and interference from Elam ended when he sacked Babylon, which remained kingless for seven years. His patricidal son Esarhaddon made some restitution. At his early death, Esarhaddon’s elder son took the throne, dominated by his younger son, Ashurbanipal, whose library at Nineveh included many Babylonian texts. Betrayed by his brother under Elamite influence, Ashurbanipal sacked Babylon. Royal records end, and three subsequent kings are poorly attested. Nabopolassar, a Babylonian general working in the Assyrian army, defected and took the throne of Babylon.

The First Dynasty, an unbroken succession of Amorite kings, lasted 300 years despite a major rebellion. Babylon had close relationships with the nearby cities Sippar, Kish, and Borsippa. Trade and alliances reached much further. The Sumerian king-lists of earlier times were replaced by Babylonian equivalents, various cities having their own version. Kings briefly recorded major events; names were given to each year of their reign for dating documents. Trade was widespread, by canal and river, or overland by donkey. Royal edicts excluded certain groups from trade. Evidence comes from a profusion of clay tablets. Official letters are plentiful. Priestesses of Marduk carried out trade for Babylon in other cities. The temple of Marduk was built and furnished with a golden throne. Elamite control over several major cities, which left its mark on temple design, was ended by Hammurabi late in his reign; there is a possible connection with Genesis 14:1–16. Regular edicts were issued to release individuals from debt and to regulate trade. The main powers were Halab (Aleppo), Eshnunna, and Larsa, until Hammurabi achieved supremacy and claimed divinity. His successor Samsu-iluna followed his father’s example.

This chapter discusses Iranian nationalism during the years of Reza Khan’s rise as a nationalism rooted in territorial concepts. It describes how the emerging military rule of Reza Khan coalesced with the foreign policy efforts of the Iranian statesmen until parliamentary politics were overshadowed by the military’s arbitrary rule. Against this backdrop, the greater part of the chapter is devoted to depicting Iran's policy toward the Persian Gulf and toward the Arab shaykhdoms in the Gulf during the period of Reza Khan's rise, and the rhetoric and conduct of Iranian officials in the port towns and islands where the paths of Arabs and Iranians from different walks of life intersected. The assertion of central authority over Arabistan (renamed Khuzestan) is viewed as a decisive step in Iran’s more ambitious goal of reducing British influence in the Persian Gulf waterway, islands, and littoral.

This chapter analyzes Iran’s policy toward the Persian Gulf during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi. The analysis is roughly divided into three periods: the years of 1925‒1932, during which time Reza Shah's court minister, Teymurtash, tried unsuccessfully to regularize the situation in the Persian Gulf through negotiations with the British government; the year of 1933 during which time various crises in the Persian Gulf arising from local challenges to British authority became part of the negotiation process; and the period of 1934‒1941 during which time Iran, encouraged by British withdrawal from Hengam and Basidu, strengthened its reliance on the tactics of deception, bluff, and intrigue in pursuit of its aspiration to obtain a paramount position in the Persian Gulf. This analysis is preceded by a brief discussion of the nature of the Pahlavi state because it provides the necessary context for Iran’s policy toward the Persian Gulf.

This chapter focuses on the intersection between Bahrain, Iran, and the British during the interwar years and the influence that contacts with Iran and Iranians had on the process of nation and state building in Bahrain. It analyzes the role of Iran and the role of the Iranian immigrant communities in the evolution of the Bahrain administration and the emergence of Arab nationalist sentiments in Bahrain. It depicts how different elements of the Iranian communities viewed Iran, the Al Khalifa ruling family, and the British. And it explores how the Al Khalifa and different segments of Bahraini society regarded Bahrain residents of Iranian origin and nationality. The analysis is preceded with a background on politics and society in Bahrain with special attention to the growth and characteristics of the Iranian immigrant communities.

This chapter discusses British policy in the Persian Gulf during the interwar period. A focus is placed on the way in which the British government coped with the challenges to its dominant position during key junctures of the interwar years. First it provides an analysis of how British policy evolved in relation to the emerging challenges in the region, namely the coming to the fore of Reza Khan and the consolidation of power by Ibn Sa‘ud. Then it provides an analysis of Britain’s negotiations with Iran toward the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty between the two countries. An analysis of these negotiations, which ultimately failed to produce an agreement, provides valuable insights into the positions of both governments on issues in the Persian Gulf during the interwar years. The last section sheds light on how local actors perceived Britain's role in the Gulf, an inquiry that forms a vital precursor to the topic of Arab-Iranian relations in the Persian Gulf during the interwar period.

Chapter one explores different and overlapping studiesof repression to formulate an operational definition. It rejects the dominance of quantitative studies in the field and calls for more 'fine-grained' approaches. It concludes by defining repression as the process by which the dominant hegemonic order attempt to maintain power by destroying, rendering harmless or appeasing those organizations, people, groups, or ideologies that potentially threaten their position of power or privilege.

The conclusion sums up some of the main findings of the book, including the revisionist and revelatory insights detailed by the various examinations of new primary sources. It argues that repression has changed form over the past two years, and not been moderated by democratic reform. On the contrary, it makes the cases that in many regards, repression has got worse acrosss many fields, from torture and mass arrests, to the co-optation of new digital technologies for social control purposes.

In the years following World War I, the British Government of India began taking greater interest in internal security challenges in the Gulf. Aside from small detachments of sepoys in Manama and Muscat, Britain did not have forces stationed in the area to prevent plots against rulers or defend against unexpected tribal attacks from the desert. There were very few incentives for Britain to fill this power gap by garrisoning troops, but plenty of disincentives: hostile inhabitants, an unforgiving climate in summer and malaria in winter. In keeping with its hands-off approach, Britain wanted the rulers to secure their own positions by developing militaries. In Muscat, the British actively encouraged the sultan to develop a force that could dominate the land approaches to Muscat. Britain supported the establishment of the Bahrain Levy Corps in 1924 to protect the regent from relatives. In Kuwait, the threat was external: raids by the Ikhwan (religiously inspired tribal fighters) into Kuwaiti territory. In all cases, the British Government of India wanted the local rulers to take greater responsibility for securing their own territories rather than continually seeking British military assistance in a crisis.

When money-sensitive civil servants questioned British expenditure on local forces, supporters of this spending argued that it was less costly in the long run as greater indigenous capabilities would reduce the likelihood of Britain having to intervene directly and could reduce defence expenditure in the long term. This was the logic applied in Kuwait after independence from Britain in 1961. This was especially true after 1966 when Britain reduced its defence commitment to Kuwait air support only. Unlike Kuwait, the build-up of military capabilities in the Trucial States and Bahrain was not seen as a security gain for Britain. Accepting its reduced ability to shape events in the Gulf, however, Britain reasoned that if it could not stop the rulers from setting up their own armed forces – or prevent them from expanding too rapidly – then it might as well try to steer them in the right direction. The right direction for Britain meant, if possible, that British officers (contract or loan service) should command and train these forces and that they should use weaponry produced by British manufacturers.